


Division DS126

Section .W2






MODERN PALESTINE

JEWISH LIFE AND PROBLEMS

BY

A. S. WALDSTEIN, Ph. D.

Author of
"Evolution of Modern Hebrew Literature," Etc.




NEW YORK
BLOCH PUBLISHING COMPANY
1927

COPYRIGHT, 1927
BY BLOCH PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.

Printed in The United States of America

TO MY WIFE
WHO WAS OF INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE
IN REVISING THE MANUSCRIPT



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
Princeton Theological Seminary Library

FOREWORD

THE following chapters are not the result of a mere flying automobile trip to various places, holy or unholy, in Palestine; nor are they sentimental or romantic effusions, flowing from the beautifully moonlit Palestinian nights or the majestic wastes of the mountains of Judah or Galilee. They are the result of observation during thirteen years' residence in Palestine and participation in its life in various capacities. They aim not at a subjective appreciation, but at an objective understanding of life in that country. They deal with problems rather than indulge in descriptions. They were prompted by the desire to depict Palestinian life and present Palestinian problems as they are in actuality, not as seen through the goggles of a Cook tourist, as interpreted by the prejudice of Western civilisation, or as colored by the sensationalism of the reporter.

It is not, however, for the sake of satisfying mere curiosity that the following pages were written. Here is a life in the making that is crying out for more expansiveness; here are problems that insistently demand their immediate solutions. Let this book contribute its mite towards illuminating this life and pointing the way to its realisation; let it offer a clear presentation of these problems and stimulate their solutions.

A. S. WALDSTEIN

Chicago, Illinois

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. JUDAISM IN THE DIASPORA AND JUDAISM IN PALESTINE	1
II. THE OLD AND THE NEW PALESTINE....	14
III. THE "OLD SETTLEMENT" AND THE "NEW SETTLEMENT"	26
IV. CITY AND VILLAGE IN PALESTINE.....	37
V. AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY	48
VI. JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT	67
VII. JEWISH EDUCATION	86
VIII. CULTURAL LIFE	106
IX. HEBREW LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN PALESTINE	118
X. JEW AND ARAB	130
XI. LIFE AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE JEWISH WORKMEN	144
XII. PROBLEMS OF THE JEWISH WORKMEN...	166
XIII. THE JEWISH WOMAN IN PALESTINE....	176
XIV. JEWISH RELIGION	191
XV. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION.....	204
XVI. A CITY IN EVOLUTION (TEL-AVIV).....	212

CHAPTER I

JUDAISM IN THE DIASPORA AND JUDAISM IN PALESTINE

WHEN the Great War had ended, a Jewish committee was organised for the purpose of securing political and cultural rights for the Jewish minorities, particularly in the new states that had sprung up as a result of the dismemberment of empires. This move was in keeping with the general tendency of the entente allies to proclaim, with the generosity of conquerors, the rights of national minorities—in somebody else's country.

Hopes were high at that time in Jewry; especially so among those who always used to shirk the Jewish problem, who tried to hide it under a bushel. Here was a chance for them to prove, what they had never been tired of declaring, that "the so-called Jewish problem" will be solved, *separatim* or *seriatim*, as it were, within the boundaries of the several states, particularly the new states, which had received a lease of life from the great powers, the conquerors in the war.

We know the results, the great disillusionment. Rights were granted on paper, to be ignored in life. You cannot prescribe to an independent

people an attitude towards its internal affairs. There is always a way to evade by subterfuge the promises elicited by force—the more so as the conscience of the prescribers themselves is not particularly clean.

But suppose the miraculous to have happened; suppose Poland and Roumania to have been faithful to their promises of granting the Jews national rights *de facto* as they had done *de scripto*. This would have naturally satisfied the “local solution” Jews. But would it have really offered a solution to the problem of Jewishness, of Judaism, of creative Judaism?

Some would be inclined to answer in the affirmative. For do not rights of minorities mean not only legal and political rights, but also national and cultural autonomy? Do they not mean the maintenance of the national schools of the minorities, the official recognition of their languages, etc.?

But how far can this apply to the case of Jewish minorities in the old and the new states?

The trouble with the application of social thought to Jewish affairs is, first, that in our optimism we are apt to project the past into the future. “There is nothing new under the sun.” History repeats itself, and the future will be but a reflection of the past. We have lived and created as a people under conditions similar to those of the present till now and we shall continue to do so in the ages to come. It is a sort of historic fatalism that we

resort to in order to exorcise the evil thoughts that haunt us concerning the future of Judaism. We forget that social forces are not so stable as natural laws, that their flux and flow is more changeable, and therefore the socially impossible to-day may be the possible to-morrow, and vice versa.

Secondly, we are apt to apply general principles to the exceptional Jewish case. Whatever fits into the system of other nationalities fits also into that of the Jewish people, and we ignore the differences of circumstances and the peculiar conditions under which the Jews everywhere live.

Let us take as an example the Poland of to-day. In that country there are a few millions Ruthenians and Germans and some three million Jews. These are all minorities struggling for recognition, clamoring for national and cultural autonomy. But how do they severally stand in relation to the majority, the Poles?

The Germans and the Ruthenians differ from the Jews in that they are territorial minorities, whereas the Jews are a "personal" or absolute minority. The former live in territories of their own, wherein they form, as in the case of the Ruthenians, a majority, or, at least, as in the case of the Germans, a large minority, and have the great additional all-important advantage of expanding their activities over all branches of life, agricultural as well as industrial and commercial. They are self-sufficient economically and linguistically. If cul-

tural autonomy is given them, it is practically territorial autonomy.

Not so the Jews. They are scattered all over Poland, among Poles, Germans, and Ruthenians, forming a majority in no province. They are engaged mainly in city trades and are thus immediately dependent, economically and linguistically, upon the nationality in whose midst they dwell. Even if national autonomy be given them, life, the street, the market, public activity, would rob them of their political grant. For life is nowadays a stormy sea, capsizing the insufficiently-ballasted national craft, swallowing up the loosely anchored group.

This is a picture of Jewish life and a forecast of the future of Judaism not only in Poland, but all through the diaspora. The Jews are an anomaly, a "peculiar" people, living under peculiar economic and cultural conditions. And no amount of comparison between the condition of the Jews and that of the other national minorities or majorities can argue away this peculiarity and its dangers.

To come back to Poland, probably the largest Jewish center in Europe, or, for that matter, Hungary and Roumania, the larger Roumania of to-day, may be taken as examples. You will, of course, ask: did not the same Jews lead but yesterday, under Russia and Austria, a more or less national life of their own? Why should this change come about in Jewish life with the mere change of

political hands? The reply is, that the political revolution has had a deeper significance for Jewish life than mere political change of hands. It has transferred the Jewish people from vast unwieldy empires of multiple nationalities to the power of almost national units. And the difference is immense. In the seething caldron of the twenty-one peoples and nationalities of the Russian empire or of the nine nationalities of the Austrian empire, the Jews could more or less hold their own. They were a sort of neutralized national force, remaining stable as long as the other forces were pulling in various directions. With the breaking up of these empires, the Jews have found themselves face to face with national units; the other minorities existing here and there hardly being of any consequence in comparison with the large and numerous minorities in the old empires—grim, determined not only to hold their own at any cost, but to impose their cultures upon the minorities in their midst. And what is of deeper significance for the latter, and for the Jews in particular, these units tend to build their renewed states upon the basis of popular education, thus increasing and intensifying their national cultures and making them more irresistible.

A situation such as this is not novel in Jewish history. We need not go far back for illustration. The German Jews spoke Yiddish till about the end of the eighteenth century. At that time, too,

Hebrew literature experienced a revival in Germany, its sponsor having been no less a personage than Moses Mendelsohn. In fact, modern Hebrew literature traces its origins back to that revival. And yet within a short period, Yiddish was forgotten among the German Jews and Hebrew literature had to look for other quarters, leaving Germany for Galicia, and finally getting a firm foothold in Russia. Historians pass by this significant fact without comment or with the explanation that Hebrew literature could find no permanent abode in Germany because the Jews rapidly assimilated there, an explanation that sounds like that of the chemist, when questioned as to why opiates have a tendency to put people to sleep—because they possess soporiferous qualities.

The fact is, however, that the Yiddish language and Hebrew literature could not survive among the German Jews and that the latter rapidly assimilated in Germany, because they had to face a national and cultural unit, the power of suction of which began to play at that time upon them. For those were the days when Germany was shaking itself free from French culture as a super-culture, as it were, and from the French language as the medium of the latter: the days of Lessing and Kant and Goethe, of the Jew Moses Mendelsohn himself, who contributed at least to the polishing of the German language. It is this culture, growing and expanding rapidly since then, that

has absorbed the selfness of the German Jews and gradually robbed them of their Jewish creativeness.

The same phenomena we observe in France, England, and other western countries. This is, moreover, the case not only with Jews living among units of highly cultured peoples, but even with those dwelling among backward nations; nay, the case is worse with the latter. For if they serve among highly cultured peoples as a ferment in the progress of those peoples, now and then wielding an able pen also in behalf of Judaism, the Jews may retain their own language, say, among more backward nations, but generally lose, at the same time, the power of national self-expression, without gaining, as a recompense, in general culture. The Jews of Turkey and Roumania are cases in point. The Turkish Jews have retained their own language, but have acquired, at the same time, Turkish customs and habits, creating nothing of their own nor anything of value to civilization. The Roumanian Jews are deficient both ways though forming a by no means vanishing minority in the country, having numbered, even before the war, some six hundred thousand souls—a number equal to that of the culturally productive German Jews—within a general population of four five millions. On the one hand, ignorance of Judaism is prevalent among them, and on the other, lack of general culture is pronounced with them, simply because the national

unit under whose sway they lived could have had only a negative influence on their national creativeness, but could hardly contribute towards their general culture, itself being of a low cultural status. The disintegrating effect of the national units upon the Jewries of the world is thus inevitable, the difference of the degrees of their cultural standing amounting, in terms of their influence upon Jewry, only to a difference of rapidity in the effect of dissolution upon Jewish nationality and Jewish creativeness.

Thus the breaking up of the vast empires in Europe meant for the Jewish people not merely the breaking up of large Jewish centers into smaller ones. It rather meant the placing of Jewish minorities under greater national disadvantages than heretofore, by bringing them under the sway and the influence of national units, thus narrowing their national scope and gradually diminishing their power of self-activity and self-expression.

Not that the very existence of the Jews and of Judaism is actually endangered in the diaspora. There will probably remain Jews everywhere as long as humanity will be differentiated in groups and peoples. But in proportion as the boundaries of states will continue to be readjusted in conformity with national entities, the Jews will lose in all countries of the diaspora their national identity. And what is still worse, they are tending to become more and more tribalized; their interests

tend to narrow and become circumscribed by the boundaries of the states within which they dwell. Werner Sombart may have exaggerated in stating that the "commercial revolution" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is to be ascribed solely or mainly to the endeavors of the Jews, whose mutual relations and intercommunication were, commercially and otherwise, world-wide at that time. The fact is, however, that leaving margin for the difference between the difficulty of communication in former times and the ease of communication nowadays, there was much more unity between Jews living in various countries formerly than obtains at present; there was much more brotherly feeling among them and much more of an intellectual give and take. Jewries are now self-sufficient. It would hardly occur to any Jewry to ask a knotty religious question of the rabbi of another Jewry, nor the solution of a civil problem of a Jewish sage of another country. If the American Jews are trying to do something for Russian Jewry, they do so, as Lewisohn would say, as a way to escape from many a troublesome question. There is hardly a true brotherly feeling in the act. It is looked upon as a higher brand of charity, the Russian Jews being regarded as paupers and greenhorns. Not a word is said in the press or on the pulpit about the debt we owe Russian Jewry for the great creative national services rendered by it to the Jewish people for at least the half-century preceding the war.

It is tribalism, national disintegration, cultural dissolution, towards which the Jewries of the diaspora are now tending. There is no way out of it. It is inevitable; no amount of Goluth logic will be able to explain it away, and no amount of argument from a historic fatalism will be able to argue away the more potent logic of another historic fatalism: that no people can make headway against the swift modern current, so long as it does not feel bottom underneath its feet. The struggle on the part of the Jewish people for national rights and cultural recognition in the diaspora will, of course, not be given up so easily; It will continue also in the future. But there will be everywhere increasing efforts and diminishing returns, and probably the final limiting of Judaism to a bloodless school curriculum and a whitewashed religion.

This is a picture of the future of Judaism in the diaspora that will, to be sure, not cause any apprehension to a certain class of Jews, namely, the assimilationist, the "German," "French," "of Mosaic faith," and the like; in fact, it will gratify their most ardent desires. It was this very outlook, however, of the future of the Jewish people that gave rise to the national revival within the last few decades and that sent a tremor through the body of Israel all over the diaspora. This has been a re-awakening actuated by the desire to stem the current of assimilation, but also prompted by

the misery of the Jewish people, and influenced by the struggle of the various submerged nationalities for freedom during the nineteenth century and their final attainment of it with the World War. And circumstances have favored it; the very assimilationists favored it by their political slogan that the Jewish question is to be solved locally, by their endeavors to obtain rights for national minorities. For did not rights of national minorities mean for the Jews at least the rousing of national hopes, if not their fulfillment? Yet, the reawakening would have been checked at the very beginning, the national hopes would have been nipped in the bud, were it not for the movement connected with it, that has been the most vital force in modern Jewry that has exerted the vastest and most powerful influence upon the latter—Zionism.

Why this influence? Not because of the sentimental reason that we have here an endeavor to rehabilitate the land of our ancestors, nor because of the economic and political reason that another haven of refuge has here been found for needy and persecuted Jews, but because new possibilities are hereby offered to Jews and Judaism to start life, creative, national life anew. For Zionism points to the only land where Jewish selfness has a chance of not being submerged, where it need not exert itself in order simply to manage to keep above water, to fight against odds, to spend its energy on a vain struggle for mere existence. For Palestine is the only land where the Jews can

ever hope to form a majority and thus be able to mould there their own destiny.

It is, however, not only the future of Judaism in prospect, which is merely firing the imagination; it is Jewish life in creation in Palestine even at present that is raising Jewish hopes. There, Jewish life can and does expand in all directions, its trend not being merely religious, as it tends to become in the diaspora, nor narrowed down economically to a few trades and industries. In Palestine, Jewish life is reaching out in all directions, extending over religious as well as secular domains, embracing agricultural, commercial, industrial, and cultural activities. In short, it is an actively creative life that has budded forth there under the influence of the Zionist movement—a life of all-round expression. And what has been done till now, with limited means and a handful of people, may serve as an index of the future possibilities for the Jews and for Judaism in Palestine. It is this all-round creativeness and the consciousness of these possibilities for the Jews and for Jewishness that have been the source of revival within the Jewries of the world. The revival will, to be sure, be but partial, incomplete, embracing only fractions of the Jewish communities of the world, and touching the rest only in passing. For the current of assimilation in the diaspora is steady, swift, and strong. Yet, one thing is certain: even if assimilation be inevitable, it also will undergo a change under the influence

of a rejuvenated Israel in his own land. It will no longer appear in the ugly form of cringing, of bowing one's head, of stealing into the other's camp through the back-door. It will occur with head erect and without denying one's identity. If the inevitable is to come about, let it at least be met with courage and decency.

There is no doubt, however, that there will remain a portion of the Jews in the diaspora, a chosen few, in whom Jewish sentiment will be strongest and among whom Jewish tradition will continue as a potent factor. These will have to look forward to Palestine for influence and inspiration. It will be the Jewry of that country that will become the central link connecting Jewry with Jewry, that will serve as a clearing-house for Jewish ideas and ideals. The diaspora may become barren as regards the creation of Jewish national values; but it will, at least, understand and appreciate the national values created in the national home.

CHAPTER II

THE OLD AND THE NEW PALESTINE

WHEN I first came to Palestine, some fourteen years ago, I took a trip to one of the Jewish colonies situated near Jaffa. Now, I had never been a farmer before, nor for that matter have I become one since; yet, when I neared the colony and saw the stretch of cornfields that lay before me, I could easily distinguish between the Jewish and non-Jewish fields. "This seems to be the boundary of the Jewish colony," I pointed out to my Palestinian companion. It was the boundary. There were sure signs of it. On one side, a pale meager ear, an undersized stalk, a thin crop, were humbly swaying in the air; on the other side, a full ear, a tall stalk, an abundant crop, were proudly rustling before us. The difference between them was the result of the difference in the mode of cultivation. On one side, the method was primitive, extensive, unscientific; on the other, it was modern, intensive, scientific.

This difference is characteristic or symbolic, if you will. It clearly marks off the old Arabic, from the new Jewish Palestine. The old Palestine is primitive, extensive—in the agricultural sense

of the word—unscientific; the new Palestine is modern, intensive, scientific. The disparity stands out glaringly in village as well as in town, in agriculture as well as in commerce and industry, in private and in public life, in education and in public institutions.

Enter an Arabic village. You will find squalor and misery. Low houses built of mud bricks, which were baked in the sun, and smeared over with clay. The windows small and hardly ever opened. There is no attempt whatsoever at artistic design. Not even a well-turned cornice anywhere. The streets are crooked and narrow, strewn all over with dung and rubbish, that smell foully. You will see dusky unwashed faces there, unkempt hair, dirty clothes, whose variegated patches surpass the original material tenfold, and filthy, sore-eyed children, wallowing on the reeking dunghills. No schools exist, with the exception of some recently established here and there by the Palestinian English government. No public institution is to be found there, and no elections are held for the government of the village. Hardly any trees or greens surround the village, except the vegetables that can be marketed in town. Mention need hardly be made of waterworks supplying the village with water; had there been such, faces and clothes might have been cleaner. As it is, use is made by the Arabic villager of the natural waterworks, the well or the spring at the foot of the hill on which the village happens to be situated.

There is a theory, fairly well proven, that the Palestine fellah or peasant, is the Ishmaelized descendant of the ancient Jewish farmer. Should you desire circumstantial evidence in proof of this theory, you might find it in the primitive way of life and work of the Arabic farmer—a life and work that strongly remind us of ancient scenes as depicted in the Bible.

Take the Biblical well scene between Eliezer, the slave of Abraham, and mother Rebekah: “And it came to pass, that, behold, Rebekah came out, with her pitcher upon her shoulder. . . . And she went down to the fountain, and filled her pitcher, and came up. And the servant ran to meet her, and said: ‘Give me to drink, I pray thee, a little water of thy pitcher.’ And she said: ‘Drink, my lord’; and she hastened and let down her pitcher upon her hand, and gave him drink. And when she had done giving him drink, she said: ‘I will draw for thy camels also, until they have done drinking.’ And she hastened and emptied her pitcher into the trough, and ran again unto the well to draw, and drew for all his camels.” It is precisely such a scene as this that your eye will meet at the village well, which is the social center of the Arabic woman today, just as it was that of the ancient Hebrew woman. You will notice here the Arabic women with the pitchers of water on their heads or shoulders, perhaps standing and discussing the latest village news or gossiping about their own husbands’ younger wives, or

flirting, in their primitive way—just as mother Rebekah did with Eliezer—with the young men coming to water their donkeys or camels, by pouring water into the trough for them.

Primitive also is the work of the Arab in the field. "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together," the Bible commands. It is precisely an ox and an ass together that we often see draw the Arabic plough—a plough that consists of a pointed stick, by which the soil is simply scratched up. The Arab is ignorant of the use of manure and of the secret of the rotation of crops. His system is the primitive three-field system, one field being left fallow each year. He toils hard, but he wastes his labor and energy and goes on impoverishing the soil, and is glad to obtain a yield of five-fold from his field.

A similar condition prevails in the Arabic town. I remember an episode during the war. The Arabic military commandant of Jaffa became ambitious under the influence of the Germans, and issued an order for the streets to be kept clean. The dalal (city crier) accordingly cruised the town proclaiming: "The streets of Jaffa must be kept as clean as those of Tel-Aviv"—a Jewish town, then a suburb of Jaffa. He was in a quandary, however, when he came to Tel-Aviv itself: what place could he set as an example to the latter paragon of cleanliness? His resourcefulness, however, did not fail even here; "Tel-Aviv must be kept as clean as Baris!" (the Arabic alphabet

possesses no equivalent for the letter *p*) he cried. Cleanliness in the Arabic town was, then, a mere ambition, to be carried out after the model of the Jewish town, but never fully realized. And if some parts of the Arabic towns are now kept fairly clean, if some streets are paved and straightened out, it is to be ascribed not to the endeavors of the Arabs themselves but to those of the English government in Palestine.

Of public institutions the Arabic town possesses none, nor for that matter will you find any public building there, with the exception of the town hall, the prison, the postoffice, and the mosque—the Christian church, wherever there is one, having been erected by missionaries. There is no public library there. Only in some places will you find a typically Arabic school, which is as old-fashioned as the old Jewish *cheder*. The more modern school is the creation of the missionaries or of the English administration.

There is hardly any place of amusement in the Arabic town, with the exception of an occasional motion-picture place, introduced perhaps by a Jew and run sometimes in partnership with an Arab. Should you wish, however, to stretch the term 'place of amusement,' you might discover it in the *café*, which may be termed the social club of the male Arab. There you will find the Arabs sitting on low stools, gurgling away at the *narghile*—the long pipe the smoke of which is inhaled through a *carafe* of water. At the same time they may be

sipping, from a tiny cup, the delicious Turkish coffee, playing cards, dice, or some other favorite game, and listening to the nasal trilling of an Arabic singer, from an out-of-date phonograph. Or they may perhaps, be narrating to each other the tradition from which sprang the custom of the Moslem woman's covering her face with a heavy veil, or discussing the question why the land has fallen into the hands of the infidel, and why the Jews increase and multiply in it.

The *café* and the market place are now for the Arab what the market place, "the gate of the city," and probably the wine-house, was for ancient Israel. Here Arab meets with Arab to strike their bargains, to drink a friendly cup together, and fight out mutual grievances, even with knife and revolver. It is a primitive life, as partly delineated in the Bible, a life that may be suggestive to poet or painter, but that has nothing of the modern spirit or of the creative element in it.

So far old Palestine has been dealt with; the new, the Jewish Palestine, has a different aspect. Not that everything Jewish in Palestine is modern. There is much of the ancient or the mediæval even in the latter. Palestine is a rallying point for Jews assembled from all corners of the earth. Here you will meet the Sephardic Jew with the Spanish lustre of the eye and the mediæval Spanish dialect, the almost Arabicised Yemenite Jew, for whom Palestine is really 'Eretz Israel' even in the economic sense, the Bukharian and Persian Jews, with the

customs, habits, and gaudy habiliments brought with them from the countries from which they happen to hail; and even the pious Jew from Galicia or Poland, clinging, in his conservatism, to the mediæval gaberdine and Polish mediæval fur *streimel* as his national garb. All this lends picturesqueness to Jewish life in Palestine, but it is far from being modern. It is in the new Jewish settlement, in the colonies and in the newly built Jewish town or *shechuna* (neighborhood, suburb), that modern life is throbbing and that the new Palestine is to be sought.

The contrast between the Jewish colony and the Arabic village is so glaring that there is no need of the eye of an expert to detect it. The orange-groves and vineyards, the eucalyptus trees and evergreens, the modern houses surrounded with flowers and gardens, and the fairly wide and clean streets—all this marks off the Jewish colony clearly enough. The school-house, the town hall, the 'people's building,' and generally the synagogue, are among the most conspicuous edifices there. Hardly a colony without its school, its modern school, in spite of all its faults; hardly one without its evening classes and lectures, and without its public library. Some colonies even go to the length of possessing a choir or orchestra of their own. Almost every colony has its physician, drug stores, dispensary, and here and there, even a hospital of its own, all of which are used by the Arabs of the neighborhood as well. Post-office and telephone are

used extensively. Water is generally supplied the inhabitants by waterworks, and wherever the colony is within the reach of a Ruthenberg power station, it is also provided with electricity. The colony is governed by duly elected officers; in fact, it had been so governed even before it was recognised by the present Palestinian administration as a township for itself.

The work in field and garden, in vineyard and orange-grove, in dairy and chicken coop, has practically been revolutionized by the Jews in Palestine. The Jews introduced the modern implements for the work in the field and scientific bee and chicken raising. They brought from abroad a healthier and sturdier type of cattle than that of the Arab, and provided for it the artificially grown fodder, such as alfalfa and clover, of which the Arab hardly knows anything, thus protecting the cattle against the frequent murrains that devastate the Arabic herds, as a result of malnutrition and carelessness. The Jews also introduced various kinds of grapes and almonds and improved the system of irrigation.

Foremost, however, of all the works of the Jews in Palestine that contributed to making the country habitable, has been the work of drainage. Various districts in Palestine are infested with malaria, due to the mosquito-breeding swamps in existence there. At first, the Jews were the victims of malaria in no less a degree than the Arabs. The story of the awful mortality of

Hiderah, a colony in Samaria, in its first few years, due to its situation in the midst of swamps, has gone down in the history of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. The eucalyptus tree was thereupon introduced—an Australian tree, a great water absorber, and it has been used since then with great effect for purposes of drainage. Hiderah, surrounded by eucalyptus groves, is now one of the wholesome colonies in Palestine.

The eucalyptus tree has acclimatized itself very quickly in Palestine. Large tracts of land around the Jewish colonies are now covered with eucalyptus woods. Besides the use of this tree for purposes of drainage, it has the additional quality of growing rapidly to a great height and of spreading a thick shadow, something very much needed in Palestine. It is now used for firewood, and there has recently been made an unsuccessful attempt to employ it in the match industry; a more successful attempt was, however, made with it in the making of furniture, the wood attracting attention by its gorgeous original color. Yet it has the disadvantage of digging with its roots, mole-like, to great distances, destroying things on its way.

For this latter reason, and for other reasons as well, another and more effective method of drainage has recently been introduced—drainage by means of canalisation. This work, which has fallen to the exclusive lot of the *Chalutzim*, has accomplished wonders in respect to the sanitation

of the country, practically destroying the breeding places of malaria, and making the very cause of the disease, the swamp water, a source of blessing, in some places, in that it may be used for irrigation and even for purposes of drinking.

This is the work done by the rural endeavors of the Jews in Palestine—a work which has gone far towards rendering sanitary and modernizing the country for the benefit of both Jew and Arab.

And as in the country, so also in town, the enormous difference between the old and new Palestine is plainly seen. The most prominent feature to be noticed in the Jewish town is education. Tel-Aviv was originally built around the Gymnasia Herzliah as a nucleus; and though you cannot say as much of other Jewish centers in Palestine, yet education occupies the foremost place in every Jewish town or community there. I cannot dwell too long, in this connection, on the workings of Jewish education in Palestine; a fuller description of it will be given in a later chapter. Suffice it here to say that the range of education in the Jewish town or community extends from the kindergarten to the high school, reaching here and there up to college. In brief, it is modern in its scope. Add to this the supplementary activities of general education, such as theatre and opera, concerts and lectures and you will have a fair conception of the educational standing of a Jewish town in Palestine.

As for the æsthetic effect of the Jewish town,

it is certainly hyperbolic to speak of a Tel-Aviv as of a second Paris. As in all other new settlements, there is very little individuality in the architectural style of the Jewish town. There prevails a confusion of styles, brought together from the various countries from which the different architects happen to hail. Yet endeavors in this direction have not been in vain. Here and there a neat and stately building springs up; now and then you meet with a really artistic touch, and sometimes you are even greeted by a breath and warmth of local color. Artistic transition is rather a slow process, but you feel that, at least, an attempt is here made at originality and artistic self-expression.

Otherwise, the new Jewish houses are hygienically built and are provided with comforts in direct proportion to the participation of the Jews in the management of the town. There is water, for instance, in every house of Tel-Aviv, and electricity is common there. The streets are paved and fairly well kept, a sanitary department supervising the work of cleanliness. Jewish hospitals, mainly those of Hadassah, are prevalent almost everywhere, and are used by Jews and Arabs alike. The town is governed by officers elected in accordance with the most modern system of elections, wherein women have the same rights as men: a system the Arabic town has not known up to the present moment, even under the English administration.

Commerce and industry are naturally connected

with the city. In both the Jews introduced modern methods. The Arabic merchants are petty, ready to haggle for hours for the sake of a penny, demanding twice the market price for the article and letting it go at the purchaser's last bid. They are distrustful of each other; they know of no cooperation and have created no bank of their own. In industry, the Arab still works with his primitive tools in a primitive way. There is no Arabic factory, in the modern sense of the word, in all Palestine.

The Jews introduced the fixed price, the corporation, the bank, the latter being used extensively by the Arabs. Modern industry may be said to be still in its infancy in Palestine. Lack of raw materials, of credit, of an extensive market, are a great drawback to industry there. Yet the sixty-seventy new industries and the six hundred shops and factories reported to have been established by the Jews within the last few years, most of which employ modern tools and methods, are not to be despised.

This is the new Palestine, in contradistinction to the old. It is a creative, modern Palestine that is being built up, one based upon the last word of science and of modern ideas.

CHAPTER III

THE "OLD SETTLEMENT" AND THE "NEW SETTLEMENT"

BY THE term "Old Settlement" (*Hayishuv Hayashan*) is meant that part of Palestinian Jewry whose settlement in the country had been going on for centuries previous to the influx of the Jews into the land under the influence of the Zionist movement, and whose principles of settlement and mode of life of old have been kept up almost intact to this day. The "New Settlement" (*Hayishuv Hehadash*), on the other hand, is the one whose history is coeval with that of the Zionist movement, the Hovevy Zion endeavors inclusively, and whose principles of settlement and mode of life are entirely modern. The "Old Settlement" still continues to absorb a part, though an ever diminishing part, of Jewish immigration to Palestine, whereas the "New Settlement" is not only being increased rapidly by the constant tide of immigration, but is even gradually invading the "Old."

The difference between the "Old" and the "New" settlements is thus not merely one that exists between the historically prior and the historically posterior; a whole abyss gapes between them. It

is the disparity between a society in dissolution and a society in creation, between one whose principles are and in whose interest lies to oppose innovation and retard progress, and one whose very existence is pivoted upon development and progress.

It is true that without the "Old Settlement" the "New Settlement" would have been more difficult, perhaps impossible. Having found groups of brethren here and there in the land, the first modern settlers felt more at home in Palestine. The holy places looked more familiar, the panorama of the country seemed more vividly Jewish to them, with familiar Jewish faces in the background. The Jews of the "Old Settlement" were also of material assistance to the new-comers in the purchase of land and in introducing them to the new Oriental surroundings that were foreign to the comers from the West.

And yet there has always been friction, open or secret antagonism, between the "Old" and the "New" settlements, the former serving as a great drawback to the endeavors of the latter.

Why this antagonism? Can it be explained on the basis of religion? Hardly, though there is a vast difference between the two settlements in this respect, the new settlement being rather lax in affairs religious. The antagonism is more deeply rooted than this; it lies in their very makeup. The "Old Settlement" fears the rapid progress of the "New" one, as entrenching upon its boundaries

and threatening its very existence. And its fears are not unfounded. The "New Settlement" does sweep it gradually out of existence. It is the modern that is sweeping away the old and worn out, the progressive that is driving out the retrogressive.

The basis of the "Old Settlement" is neither national nor economic, but religious, the national element being represented therein only insofar as the Jewish religion is, in the main, national. The Jews of the "Old Settlement" came to live in Palestine, just as the Templars did, out of religious considerations, the only difference between the two being that the latter created new agricultural sites of their own, whereas the former did not. These crowded in the old holy towns: Jerusalem, Safed (the seat of the Kabbalists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), Tiberias, Hebron. Hardly a foot of soil was acquired by them for purposes of agriculture. In industry they have created nothing to speak of. In commerce they have been as petty as their neighbors, the Arabs, in a great number of cases the male part of the family engaging in the study of Law and depending upon the female part to carry on their petty trade. They have shown no initiative, have had no national ambition, have possessed no economic backbone. They came to Palestine to lead a "godly" life and, generally to live as a public charge, as a charge upon the Jewries of the world exploiting the religious sentiments of the latter for the

purpose of keeping up a piece of mediævalism in modern times, and within a modern life that is now being built up around it in Palestine.

It is to the institution of the so-called Halukah that the allusion has been made in the previous paragraph, as the mainstay of the "Old Settlement," an institution which is an abuse in itself, but which has been the more abused by those standing at the head of it. It is a mediæval financial institution based upon a system of donations and collections from all the Jewries of the world, and designed originally for the maintenance of the students of the Law in the "Holy Land" In time, however, it became a source of bigotry, idleness, oppression, intrigue, and strife. It has been used not only for the maintenance of poor students engaged in the study of the Law, but also to fill the pockets of those who are in no need of it, being distributed very often not in accordance with need, but rather in direct proportion to the status of a person in the community. Moreover, as the money of the Halukah would come from various countries, it used to be divided into different *Kolelim* or treasuries, each one having its own board of trustees, each one making propaganda and collecting for itself, each one distributing the money collected to the members of its own *Kolel*, that is to say to those who hailed from the particular country from which that *Kolel* would obtain the money.

Thus the Halukah has by no means tended to

weld together the various Jewish elements in Palestine, but on the contrary, served as a source of strife. It helped to keep them apart, to maintain the customs, habits, and languages of the different countries from which they would come, to separate them in different synagogues, schools, localities. It may have helped to keep up the cosmopolitan aspect of Palestinian Jewry, its picturesqueness, to the delight of the Western tourist, but it was entirely detrimental to the spirit of unity required even for the population of the "Old Settlement," how much the more so for the modern settlement.

Nor has the educational system of the "Old Settlement" been conducive to the unification of the various elements of Palestinian Jewry. It is neither unified in its program nor does it possess a single common language of instruction. As in customs and habits, so there has been a diversity also in the system and method of education in the "Old Settlement," and in the language as a medium of instruction. The "Old Settlement" has, then, tended to keep apart the various Jewish elements under its sway in Palestine, just as it has striven to keep itself apart from the "New Settlement" and its influences. And if there exists any single Jewry in the world wherein tribalism is pronounced in its various elements, being at variance with itself, it is the "Old Settlement" of Palestinian Jewry.

It is not, however, in this alone that the vice of

the education of the "Old Settlement" rests; it lies also, and particularly, in the very essence of this education, being that of the old *Cheder* and *Yeshivah*, from which secular education is banned and where every hour of the pupil is occupied with the study of the Talmud and its commentaries.

A generation is thus brought up in the pale of the "Old Settlement" that knows of no unifying principle, one deprived of the means and the spirit of self-help and taught to lean on the generosity of others, a generation pusillanimous, without initiative and without backbone, unable to defend its rights even against the Arab, and hence not undeservedly dubbed by the latter with the epithet of *Welad almuth* (lifeless people), and regarding Palestine no more than a *Goluth* country, to be redeemed from the *goy* only with the advent of the Messiah.

And the "Old Settlement" is clinging to its old system, with its theocratic régime and the Halukah as its economic basis, with might and main, seeing in the "New Settlement" its natural enemy, that has come to destroy it. And in their bigotry, the people of the "Old Settlement" have shrunk from no Jesuitic means to combat this enemy. They have cut off the Halukah rations from those who showed an inclination towards the "New Settlement" and its principles; they have used the thunderbolt of excommunication unsparingly against their opponents, they have even gone to the length of denouncing their enemy to the government or of

instigating the Arabs against the Zionists. The history of the "Old Settlement" in Palestine is replete with cases of excommunication and denunciation of this kind, notable cases being those of the late Ben-Yehudah, against whom both means mentioned were employed; the declaration of Rabbi Sonnenfeld and the notorious De Hahn, (the latter a representative of the "Agudath Israel") to Abdalah, the Emir of Transjordan, which implied a denunciation of Zionism, and the whole activity of the same De Hahn, who left no stone unturned in order to rouse the sentiments of the Arabs and the public opinion of the world against the Zionists and the "New Settlement" in Palestine.

The "Old Settlement" is thus a piece of mediævalism vegetating amid the modernisation of life now going on in Palestine. It is a piece of *Goluth*, with all the policy, degradation, and tribalism of the latter, introduced into that country hundreds of years ago and existing to this day,—a day of the changing of values in Jewish history. In its present makeup, the "Old Settlement" cannot adapt itself to modern life. It must be impervious to modern ideas, for the latter would mean modernisation of its institutions. It cannot follow the national tendencies, for this would mean reformation of its schools. It cannot endorse the *Asefath Hanivharim*, the congress of Palestinian Jewry, not, as pretended, because of the "woman question," but because this institution is an agency of unification and stands for order and democracy. All this

would be against the interests of the "Old Settlement," would undermine its very existence, would tend to crush its whole edifice, whereas its strength lies in ultramontaniam, in its keeping up the old and worn out.

Thus the "Old" and the "New" Settlements in Palestine stand in contrast and in opposition to each other. The former is more "divine," holding out one hand in supplication to God and the other to their brethren for charity. It is conservative, non-national, and without any initiative or creativeness. The "New Settlement" is more human, progressive, energetic, and creative.

It must be understood, however, that when the "Old Settlement" is spoken of that part of it is meant which is organised around the Halukah as a center, in whose hands are the institutions of the "Old Settlement," and which is, consequently, the strongest element in that settlement. There is a large element, on the other hand, that though tainted by mere contiguity, has had nothing to do directly with the Halukah and has withstood its vicious effects; and this element is open to the influence of the new spirit now pervading Palestine. In general, it may be said that the "Old Settlement" is permeable to the influence of the "New" in inverse proportion to the relation of its various elements to the Halukah.

From what has been said of the "Old Settlement," not only does the difference between it and the "New Settlement" stand out in relief, but the

nature of the latter is clearly marked thereby. The "Old Settlement" tends to raise a generation of *schnorrers* and good-for-nothings; the "New Settlement" is not only conducive to the bringing up of a modern self-dependent, productive person, but to the creation of conditions favoring the further settlement of Jews in the country. Herein lies the vast difference between the two; but herein lies, furthermore, also the difference between the assistance given the Jewries elsewhere, say, in Poland, and the work done in Palestine, even though you strip the latter from its national significance. The help given the former is meant to be for the purpose of keeping things going, or, at most, of improving conditions; the sums spent on Palestine go not only for the purpose of reclaiming a country from its wastes, but of preparing it for the absorption of further immigration. The work done in Palestine is thus a national business proposition, the profits of which are to be enjoyed by the Jews of the world, an investment the dividends of which are to be distributed among the very families of the investors.

It is evident, then, that the Jews of the "New Settlement" in Palestine are not merely recipients, but are partners in the business, participants in the rebuilding of the country. And as a matter of fact, it is not at all certain which of the two participants, the Jews of the *diaspora* or those of Palestine, does most. Or rather it is quite certain, that the share of the "New Settlement" in the

rebuilding outweighs by far that of other Jewries. I am not referring merely to the energy spent and the sacrifices made in the process, but also to the actual monetary contribution to the rebuilding; and I may say with assurance, that in proportion to its population and its financial standing, no Jewry in the world is so much taxed for the maintenance of the institutions of Palestine as the Jewry of the "New Settlement."

It is in this light that the work for and in Palestine should be regarded, and then the difference between the "Old" and the "New Settlement" would glaringly stand out. It must be said, however, as indicated above, that the "Old Settlement" does not remain untouched by the "New." The latter would have been a poor factor, indeed, if it were not so. Not only are those elements of the "Old Settlement" who have had no direct connections with the Halukah, but who are standing under the sway of the latter as an organised force, amenable to the ways of life of the "New," but even from the midst of the Halukah recipients there is a gradual going over into the camp of the moderns—even their ranks are thinned by the influence of the latter. Some of the young generation, possessing perhaps more "spunk" than others and weary of the manna that has been raining down upon them from the heavens of the Jews of the *diaspora*, leave the pale, in the desire to try their own strength. And there is no doubt that with the establishment of modern settlements with-

in the boundaries of the "Old" and modern agricultural colonies around them, with the progress made by the modern educational institutions, not the least being the university in Jerusalem, the nest of ultramontaniam, but particularly with the abolition of the system of the Halukah, which has been the mainstay of the "Old Settlement," the whole structure of the latter will crumble away, leaving room for the building up of modern institutions and a modern way of life.

CHAPTER IV

CITY AND VILLAGE IN PALESTINE

SOME people are of the opinion that the rapid growth of cities in Palestine is a misfortune, inasmuch as it diverts the minds of the settlers in Palestine from the real source of a genuine national revival, the soil, and places them amid the same economic conditions in which they lived in the *diaspora*.

No doubt, there is much in favor of this opinion. To touch merely upon the idealistic side of the question: our aim is not merely to throw the gates of Palestine open for the Jews to come and settle there, as they list, but to create for our people such conditions as would tend to reestablish relations between them and nature, to reinstate them in all functions and walks of the life of a normal people. The ideal process for the Jewish people would have been, then, to rise with determination, turn first of all to Mother Earth, and say with contrition: We return to thee, Mother Earth, as the only source of our rejuvenation. We are full of repentance for the long neglect of thee, O life-giving element! We are now ready and willing to atone for it. With the sweat of our brow we shall

henceforth labor and eat the bread of thy yield.

Reality, however, knows of no would-be's, and the bitter fact is, that even where there is an internal and external "drive," movements, like physical phenomena, proceed on the line of least resistance. And the line of least resistance in our case is settling in towns. For this means merely a change of locality for the one who was a town-dweller in the *diaspora*, without involving any extra effort required by a change of economic level.

If we reckon, however, with the evil as it is and as it will probably continue to be for a great many years to come, we may find some good even in the rapid growth of towns in Palestine.

In the first place, this growth has been of advantage in the political strife of the country. The anti-Zionist Arabic activity issues not from the village in Palestine, but from the city. The growth of Jewish cities and of the Jewish population within the existing cities counteracts this activity. Not only does it contribute towards safety, which increases with numbers, but it deals a death-blow to the anti-Zionist movement among the Arabs. The latter are overawed by the rapid growth of the Jewish town, by the introduction of modern institutions, by the finer and more cultural life of the Jewish population, by the greater efficiency of their public offices, etc. The city of Jaffa is a case in point, where the anti-Jewish movement among the Arabs is practically dead, because of the rapid growth of Tel-Aviv.

Secondly, the city affords more educational opportunities than the village. And here again, the argument revolves upon the pivot of existing conditions. The reference is here to that worldly education to which the Jew has been used in the *diaspora* and which he can find, to a greater or lesser extent, in the town in Palestine. The town thus serves as a center of attraction for many a family wishing to give its children both a Jewish and a worldly education. Not only has many a family come to settle there because of it, but you will find many a mother coming from America and elsewhere and settling there temporarily, in order that her children may enjoy this sort of education. Tel-Aviv was built around the Gymnasium, now "The Hebrew College Herzliah," as a nucleus; and there is no doubt that Jerusalem, the modern Jerusalem, will be built around the University as a nucleus.

Thirdly, the city offers commercial and some industrial opportunities, which the village cannot give. It is quite possible that the industrial future of Palestine lies in agricultural industry. Yet the recent success of industries such as silicate bricks and tiles, textile works, leather industry, etc., have thrown new light upon the chances of city industries in Palestine. At any rate, the city industries have so far appealed to the initiative of the Jew coming to Palestine more than the agricultural industries; they have been more within the reach of their previous experience.

Finally, the town only can offer in Palestine a minimum of comforts, to which people grew accustomed in other countries. The town only can thus serve as a rallying point for that class of people who could not become inured to the hard life and deprivations of the village.

It is arguing in a circle, in a vicious circle, then, when we try to justify the crowding in cities in Palestine. The city is in many ways an undesirable thing in itself, but it possesses many points of attraction to draw people to Palestine—in order, again, to crowd in cities. Yet such are circumstances, and this is the good that can be argued out of them.

The danger of crowding in cities is, however, graver than the mere drawing away of the Jews from the soil. It has been said of Vienna, the capital of Austria, that it now resembles an enormous head without a body, the latter having been cut up, after the war, into various independent states. That is what the Jewish towns in Palestine tend, in a way, to become. It has become proverbial that Tel-Aviv has been built on a foundation of sand, not only in the literal but also in the figurative sense of the word, as it has no Jewish *hinterland* behind it. Now, the material existence of a people may be endangered in two ways: if its import is greatly in excess of its export, and if there is somewhere a leak in the circulation of the national moneys, when there is somewhere an oozing out of the national financial

life-blood within the country itself. Palestinian Jewry has been suffering from both these evils. In the first place, as a non-industrial country, it has had to cast its money constantly over the waters, that is, to import everything from abroad, from a match to a piano. This evil is being gradually obviated, however, by the creation of industries in Palestine.

It is the second evil that the Jewish population in Palestine is now facing, one that is on the increase in proportion to the growth of cities in the country. In America or in any other civilized country, the circulation of the national money is free and natural. The city is never in danger of being drained to monetary anemia by the village. The money spent by the town in foodstuffs returns to it in the form of purchases of factory goods, luxuries, etc. In Palestine there is a constant drain of Jewish money of the town by the Arabic village, with no chance of ever returning even 2 per cent of this money to the Jewish town. The Arab who sells the produce of his field or his garden to the Jew, never returns this money in the form of purchase of goods in the Jewish town. He changes the money gotten from the sale of his commodities into gold coin, puts it into jars and buries it in the ground, or, what is as bad, buys with it a wife or two, in addition to his original wife. And if he does need to buy something in town, he goes to his brother Arab, with whom he can haggle

about the price, in itself a pleasurable affair, and from whom he can buy cheaper than from the Jew.

It is evident, then, that should we want to do away with this evil too, we must endeavor mainly to get hold of the *hinterland* of the country, not only for its own sake, but also in order to make the Jewish town self-supporting.

When we come, however, to this inevitable conclusion, the next difficulty lies in the means of its realisation. As is well known, there are two main types of colonies in Palestine: the private colony and the one built by national money on national land. Now, there is an opinion prevalent among some Zionists, that the building of Palestine as a whole should be left to private initiative. And one of the leading American Zionists formulated this opinion in the sweeping statement: We cannot afford to make socialistic and communistic experiments, meaning thereby practically all the colonisation done by the Keren Hayesod on National Fund lands, and generally run on a cooperative basis of some sort or other. There is danger lurking in a view such as this. In the first place, the private colony has, from the national angle of view, not proved a complete success. The employment of non-Jewish labor, much as it has been harped upon, is not yet exhausted as a potent argument against the private colony, as endangering the prospect of a Jewish majority in Palestine. Moreover, the private colony has, so far, not tended, except in rare cases, to create the ideal type of

farmer: the sturdy, frugal, tiller of his own soil. What is, however, of much weightier importance as an argument: *private initiative now goes, as a matter of fact, not to the country, but to the town.*

Leaving the settlement on land to private initiative would, then, be a much more dangerous experiment than even the settlement of "socialistic and communistic" groups of workmen on national lands.

I am, of course, well aware of the grievances against these Kevutzoth and Moshevey Ovedim: large expense and small returns, constant deficits, uncertainty of their future. It is curious, however, how easily we forget that those private colonies which are now mostly self-sustaining, have been incomparably more expensive to the nation—no matter whether the money came from the treasury of Baron Rothschild, the J. C. A., the Hovevey Zion, or the Zionist Organisation—and have taken a much longer period to become self-sustaining than the Kevutzoth.

Then, again, the very argument of an experiment with the Kevutzoth and Moshevey Ovedim is somewhat irrelevant. An experiment can be declared to have proven a failure when made in a laboratory equipped with all material, implements, machinery, necessary for the process. In this sense, the Zionist Organisation can hardly be said to have ever made a genuine experiment with the Kevutzoth. For it has hardly ever given, or given in

time, the means necessary for their full and final establishment. I was witness to a very characteristic case in Tel Adash, then a Kevutzah, now a Moshav Ovedim, in the Valley of Jezreel, between Afulah and Nazareth. It was during the war, and a few hundred francs were necessary for fixing and deepening a water-well. The Zionist Organisation had no ready cash to spend on that well and the consequence was that two extra men and two mules were employed day in day out, for years, for the purpose of bringing water in barrels from a well a couple of miles distant. Think what a waste of money and energy this involved! And this is one case out of many. The work of reconstruction in Palestine is so exacting that the means gotten together by the Zionist Organisation for this purpose can hardly cover even the minimum budget of a year's work. True enough! But if the Kevutzah, or the Mashav Ovedim, is not given the means in time to buy grain immediately after harvest time and horses before the work season begins, it will have to pay later so much more for them, and if it is not originally provided with the minimum number of milch cows, no reasonable demand of self-sustenance can be made.

This is one of the secrets of the "deficits" of the Kevutzah or Moshav Ovedim: the insufficiency of means to start with and the failure of these means to come in due time. There are, of course, other causes, too, for these deficits, such as the lack of agricultural experience on the part of some

members of the Kevutzoth, and the previous exploitation and the exhaustion of the soil by the Arabic farmer, and his primitive method of working it. Yet, both the improvement in the skill of the workman in agriculture and the improvement of the soil by modern methods of tilling are national assets, in the long run, and are worth the expense of the experiment.

And yet, if this type of colonization were let alone for some time, without our constantly tugging and plucking at it, as at a step child, with the cry, "How long!" and "We cannot afford!" it would prove in time to be a power in our agricultural policy in Palestine. Even as it is, there has been a marked progress in the Kevutzoth. He who knows them internally, not from a mere flying automobile visit, will testify to this effect. There are already some independent and self-supporting Kevutzoth. There is now less waste, more foresight, more efficiency and orderliness in the work done, and there is an ardent desire everywhere for thorough independence.

The force of the argument lies, however, principally in the intrinsic value of the Kevutzah and Moshav Ovedim. The very principle underlying them of non-employment of hired labor, let alone foreign labor, and the insistence of following out this principle, are what justifies their existence and their support, from the national point of view, as tending to create the prospective genuine farmer. Furthermore, the significance of the Kevutzah lies

also in its pioneering spirit. Palestine is not yet entirely safe, hygienically or socially. Large tracts of land are still to be reclaimed from fever-infested swamps and defended against marauders. It is true that the private farmer in Palestine, too, knows how to combat these evils when he stumbles against them; but no private initiative will intentionally and originally go to places where danger lurks for purse and life. It is the Kevutzah which has always done this pioneering work and is still ready to do so any time the call is made upon it. Not the private colony Metulah, but the neighboring Kevutzah Tel-Hai remained the Massadah of the north of Palestine, practically to defend the northern boundaries against the Arabic marauders, in their rebellion against the French, immediately after the war.

It should not be construed, however, from what I have said, that I mean to disparage entirely private initiative in agriculture. Far be it from me! Could the genuine Jewish farmer of Canada, Russia, and elsewhere be induced to settle in Palestine, no voice, even of the extreme Kevutzanist, would be raised, I think, against encouraging or even supporting him in his enterprise—perhaps with a proviso or two in the contract, for the sake of national safety. . . . Then, again, there seems to be plenty of room for private initiative in agricultural industries, such as the sugar industry—something that has been sorely neglected in Palestine. But, as far as the village as such is con-

cerned, that is another matter. Since at present private initiative is, on the one hand, loath to go to the village and, on the other hand, is ready to fly off, once there, at a tangent from our purposes and aspirations, there is nothing left for the Zionist movement but to create a type of colony which would vouchsafe the national interests of the Jewish people in Palestine. And that is the type of the Kevutzah and Moshav Ovedim.

I know that the saner Zionists understand all that. There is, however, a growing tendency to disparage this type of colonisation, though only an attempt and not a real experiment has so far been made with them. I want to raise here a warning voice against this tendency.

I should split, then, the slogan of private initiative as regards, Palestine, and say: The growth of towns, and even agricultural industry, should be left to private initiative; the village as such must be the concern and stand under the control of the Zionist Organisation. Only in this manner of building Palestine can we hope effectively to guard our national interests, to create a class of genuine farmers, to lay a real basis for the prosperity of city and village in Palestine.

CHAPTER V

AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

IF I AM subsuming the three subjects, agriculture, commerce and industry, under one heading, it will of course be understood that I do not mean thereby to exhaust the subjects. What I really intend is to lay a finger on their most salient characteristics, give their status, and discuss some of their vital problems. No statistics or details, are, therefore, to be expected in this chapter, only a general outline of the situation.

Palestine has always been in the main an agricultural country. Being subtropical, however, and its soil greatly varying in composition, its agriculture is not confined to grain producing, but is also devoted to fruit growing, particularly the fruits of the warm zones. It is "a land of wheat and barley, and vines and fig-trees and pomegranates, a land of olive trees and honey," up to this day, to which may be added the almond, mentioned elsewhere in the Bible and now a staple article of export, and the orange, of which the Bible does not seem to know at all, besides other fruits of lesser importance. This variety it is that lends Palestine its peculiarity and makes farming there a different

process from farming in many another country. In fact, from all indications it may be judged that farming in Palestine, at least, in a great many parts of the country, can be successful only when it is done on the basis of "mixed management," that is to say, when it is devoted both to grain and to fruit producing. In this way, the farmer can always fall back upon one branch of agriculture when another fails him and can do well in an all-round successful year.

The Arabic farmer is mainly a grain producer, and his method of cultivating the soil being, as indicated in a previous chapter, very primitive, the results of his hard labor are very meager, barely enough to keep body and soul together. He engages also in honey production, and in poultry and cattle raising; but there is no approach to anything like a modern method in any of these branches. The bees are left almost in their wild state; the poultry is puny and subject to frequent pestilences, and so are his cattle. The Arabs have comparatively few orange groves; on the other hand, they possess most of the olive groves in the country, yielding an olive not of the best kind, which is used for food and for oil, the latter being pressed out by means of an ancient sort of oil press. Of grapes the Arabs possess only a couple of kinds of table grapes. They are however the chief providers of grain, vegetables, meat, and eggs to the market, and their milk trade is considerable.

The Jewish agricultural endeavors extend over

a much larger variety of production, in which modern methods are employed. In grain or fruit raising, in private colony or Kevutzah, modern machinery is coming more and more into use. The varieties of agricultural production are generally connected not only with particular colonies but with particular areas. The Jewish colonies may be divided, in conformity with their produce, into three types: fruit producing, grain producing, and mixed farming. They are grouped accordingly in various zones. Around Jaffa are situated mainly fruit-producing colonies: Petah Tikwah, Rishon, Rehovoth, and others, growers of oranges, grapes, almonds. Farther south and in Samaria, in which latter place the two large colonies, Zichron Jacob and Hedera are found, besides a number of small ones, there is generally mixed farming; and farther east and north, as in the valley of Jezreel, the chief seat of the Kevutzoth and Moshevey Ovedim, and in Galilee, is a net of colonies largely engaged in the production of grain. This division is by no means purely accidental; it has much to do with differences of soil and climate. It is to be remarked, however, that there is a tendency, particularly among the grain-producing colonies, to go over to mixed farming, as the safer method. But hardly any of the Jewish colonies cultivates the olive-tree extensively, apparently because its first crop lets itself be waited for many a long year. The annointer of kings, "the honorer of God and men," will thus have to wait, it seems—in order to

regain his prestige of old—for the mountains which now stand all over Palestine in all their naked and desolate majesty, expecting to be redeemed by means of the Jewish national funds. For only national funds can afford the extensive cultivation of this tree.

The standing of the various types of Jewish colonies varies with the type. The condition of the purely grain-producing colony was rather precarious. Recently there has been a change for the better, due to the opening of the flour mills at Haifa. Till then the market price of the wheat, for example, was rather low, the wheat being exported at a low rate and flour being imported at a high price from Australia and elsewhere. The opening of the flour mills has meant, at least, the control of the internal market by the native grain. And it is symptomatic of developments in this direction, that instead of importing Matzoth from abroad to Palestine, as had been done hitherto, because of the pooriness of the Palestinian flour, this article now began to be exported, after the opening of the flour mills, to other countries, America included. Yet the grain-producing colonies will, in the long run, have recourse to plantation and other branches of agricultural industry, outside of grain growing, at least as a subsidiary means of existence.

Of the staple fruits of the Jewish colonies, the grapes and the almonds may be mentioned first. Both were brought to some perfection by the Jews. Various kinds of vines were introduced, and the

wine-press at Rishon-le-Zion is reported to be the second or third largest wine press in the world. In fact, the Palestinian wines were already entering the world market, gaining a foremost place there, when the war broke out and gave the whole process a setback. Not only did the war make the export of wines from Palestine—and, for that matter the export and even import of articles of all kinds—difficult and finally impossible, but it served them a worse turn. It lowered in some countries, such as Russia, Germany, Poland, Austria, which had served as markets for Palestine wines, the *valuta* of their money. Thus it not only disabled these countries as purchasers of wines from Palestine, where the money has been normal since the English occupation of it, but caused them, for the same reason, to go, for the purchase of this article, to countries where the *valuta* has been low, such as France, Italy, etc. Since the last war, the Palestine wines have therefore experienced a tie-up that is only gradually being again loosened up by the improvement of the internal market, with the inflow of immigration, and by the stabilization of the money market abroad. And the very same conditions prevail in the almond industry. It will take some time yet before the after-effects of the last war will cease to be felt in the two industries mentioned; but there is no doubt that the hardest time for them is over, and there are sure signs of the normalisation of conditions in the near future.

The best seller, however, is now the orange.

Being probably the best fruit of its kind in the market, the Palestinian orange fears no competition from the oranges of countries of low *valuta*. Its chief market is now England, where there is still room for many times the quantity of oranges absorbed by it. There is, therefore, a growing tendency to recommence the planting of orange groves in Palestine.

The scientific raising of poultry is comparatively new in Palestine, dating back to shortly before the war. It is now pursued by practically all the Kevutsoth and Moshevey Ovedim, and here and there also by some private farmer. As a new experiment, its influence on the market has not yet been felt to a considerable extent; but its success is beyond doubt. Very fine breeds of poultry, both pure and mixed, are produced, and Jew and Arab come from far and wide to the Kevutzah, to purchase eggs and chickens, at a high price, for breeding purposes. The results of this experiment will undoubtedly fill in the future, a great gap in the Palestinian market, now filled to a considerable extent by Egypt, eggs being imported from there. And it is quite probable that other things being equal, this product will even become a staple article of export.

In connection with this, I should like to call attention to an enterprise for which there is a crying need in Palestine and which would surely prove successful there; a cold storage plant. At present, Palestine lives, as far as seasonal produce is

concerned, from hand to mouth. Not a grape is seen in the country between January and July and not an orange between July and January. Eggs are three or four times as high in winter as in summer. Other similar anomalies, too, are usual in the market of the produce of the Palestinian soil, because there are no facilities for keeping things out of season. A cold-storage plant would prove a great beneficial factor in agriculture as well as in commerce and industry, in a country whose high temperature stretches officially over seven or eight months and unofficially over all months of the year. It would practically balance the seasons; it would smooth the roughness of prices in the market, give greater variety to the table, and make things more normal. There is great opportunity, I think, for this undertaking, both for the initiator and Palestine.

A difficult problem is the raising of cattle. The condition of the Arabic cattle has already been pointed out. The Arab generally relegates the matter of feeding his cattle to Allah and nature. He hardly knows of any provision for them other than sending them to the field to make the best of it. And they very often make the worst of it. Not only do they not get enough food for themselves there, but they frequently get into trouble by crossing into the neighbor's field—the neighbor happening to be very often a Jew. Moreover, in their voracity, that is to say, in their constant state of being underfed, they are very destructive to

plant life. The goats, in particular, are so, being allowed to gnaw off the young shoots and leaves of the trees—a fact that greatly contributes to the devastation of the country.

The Jewish farmer could not, of course, employ the same principles in raising his cattle. It hardly pays doing so, whether one should want to raise a milk-giving or meat-providing race of cattle. In the first place, another sturdier type of cattle than the native one, had to be introduced, in order to make cattle raising a paying proposition. The experiment was really made; but it was found that the European type of cattle did not thrive in the Palestinian climate. Next, the mixed breed of the European and Arabic cattle was tried, with results that have so far proved satisfactory. Then there arose the problem, how to make the cattle immune against the frequent murrains that devastate the Arabic herds. The first remedy that naturally suggested itself as a preventive was to remove the cattle from those of the Arabs. Hence, in some Jewish colonies, the cattle are kept under such strict surveillance, that all contact is forbidden with those who even come near the Arabic cattle. A more effective means, however, has been the simple natural one of providing good nourishment. And precautions have, to be sure, not been taken in vain. The year 1926 was a terrible one for murrains in Palestine; and yet the Jewish flocks and herds were hardly touched by them.

All this, on the one hand, the unproductivity of

the Arabic cattle and the frequent pestilences occurring among them and, on the other, the cost of experimentation and the expensive maintenance of the Jewish herd, greatly affects the milk and meat market of the country. Milk and meat are expensive articles in Palestine; cream is a rarity there—the deficiency of the butter supply is made up by imports from Egypt and from even as distant a country as Australia. What is, however, to be remarked, in this connection, is that within the last few years the dairy business has been engaging the attention of the Jewish population more and more—the Mashbir, the workmen's supply store, doing particularly good work in this respect.

Mention must also be made of the honey produce. The Palestine honey is of a superior kind and can, with some slight effort, gain for itself an honorable place on the world market. So far, however, the honey trade has been neglected. The same may be said of the Palestinian tobacco, which has almost spelt ruin for many a farmer in 1923-4; for in that year the planting of tobacco was raised, by rumors of a prospective market, to fever heat, whereas the market has so far been very slow in absorbing the produce. There is no reason, however, why this produce should not become a staple article, its quality being of a grade that is as good as that of any in the market. As for cotton and silk, they are both still in the stage of experimentation, though the silk produce seems to be evolving into an industry, an impetus

having been given to it by the recent opening of the silk factory in Tel-Aviv.

The difficulties of agricultural endeavors in Palestine are great and many. The land has to be reclaimed not only from its waste, but, which is worse, from the exhaustion caused by the primitive method of work that has continued for hundreds of years. Again, the variety of the Palestinian soil requires a thorough investigation before an approach to its cultivation can be made. Many an agricultural undertaking failed, because no such investigation had previously been made. Moreover, the difference between the Palestinian soil and climate and those of the temperate zones makes it difficult for the Jew, though he be a farmer, to settle in Palestine without proper guidance. It is for this reason that settlement on land there is more expensive and requires more perseverance than in many another country. Many a scheme for agricultural settlement in Palestine in the easiest and least expensive way has been formulated since the first days of Jewish immigration in that country. There has been much of the utopian in the formulation of these plans; yet some, now in process of experimentation, appear feasible. Great means have been wasted and great means as well as energy will have to be wasted, before the right path in this direction will have been reached; but there are unmistakable signs that it will be discovered sooner or later.

There is, however, one serious external obstacle

to agricultural endeavors in Palestine, which will have to be speedily removed, if success is to be attained in this domain; the system of tithes as rural taxes. This form of rural taxation is an ancient institution, being used also by the Turks. It may have fitted into a system of official arbitrariness as that of the Turks, but is entirely out of date with a progressive government, and is an evil whose baneful effects are telling upon modern agricultural undertakings. Lately there has been talk about its abolition; so far, however, no "satisfactory substitute" for it has, according to the statement made by the government, been found—a strange statement to have been made by representatives of a European government, the English administration of Palestine. At any rate, the tithe is an oppressive burden upon the shoulders of the farmer and a great hindrance to agricultural development in Palestine; and its abolition cannot be urged too soon.

Lastly, I should like to mention the fact that there is a number of institutions intended to be of assistance in the settlement on land. Of these, the oldest is the agricultural school Mikweh Israel, near Jaffa, established by the Jewish Colonisation Association, and from which many a skilled farmer came, now tilling the ground in many a colony in Palestine. And it may be remarked, in passing, that in recent years a thorough change has come about in this institution in another direction than that of agriculture—from an institution that had

been French in spirit and employed French as a medium of instruction; it became thoroughly Hebrew—a sign of the times. Further, an agricultural school for girls has recently been established in the Moshav Ovedim Nahalal; and the Palestinian government is about to open an agricultural school for the Jews, from the Jewish share of the money bequeathed by the Jewish millionaire Kaduri, for purposes of education in Palestine. On the other hand, the rural school, with the exception perhaps of the schools of the rural workmen, has not yet found a way of combining a program of general education with rural training. Then, there is the Agricultural Experiment Station, founded by the Zionist Organisation and now headed by Professor O. Warburg—an institution that does good scientific work and is of great assistance to agricultural endeavors in Palestine.

These are the official institutions in Palestine, created or about to be created for the purpose of facilitating agricultural work. There are, however, a number of unofficial institutions that also serve as preparatory schools, at least in a practical sense, for agricultural pursuits. These are connected only with the workers organisation. Such are some of the girls' agricultural groups, which serve as practical schools for the uninitiated. Similarly, the workers' group Hama-avir, in Petah Tikvah, serves the same purpose for workmen of both genders and for all-round agricultural work. Finally, every Kevutzah practically does so, in that

it constantly absorbs some new elements, tyroes in agriculture and changes them into skilled workmen.

I have sketched in broad outline the nature and the main features of agricultural endeavors in Palestine. I have also pointed out the difficulties connected with these endeavors. Yet there is no doubt that the Palestinian soil is capable of maintaining ever so many more people than it does now. Not only can economy be attained by working the soil more intensively and scientifically, but great stretches of waste land now lie untilled, for some reason or other, waiting for the tractor and the threshing machine. The mountains, too, now parched by the rays of the sun and browbeaten by storms, and presenting a majestic but dismal appearance, are waiting for the forests and groves to cover their nakedness. Palestine still presents many agricultural possibilities.

Agriculture in Palestine has been an ideal and an ambition for the immigrant. The same cannot be said for commerce. Nor can much be said in favor of the latter as a factor in Jewish life. Commerce is now going on in Palestine on a small scale. And naturally so. The needs of the people hardly go beyond necessities; luxuries are still luxuries in Palestine. Besides, commerce is dependent there largely upon import, export being more limited, inasmuch as industry is still limited. Furthermore, there is another great factor conducive to business on a small scale. For the

reasons indicated above, settlement on land is not as easy as settlement in town. The waves of immigration, therefore, crowd the Jews in towns, where they generally turn to the occupation to which they were used in the *diaspora*, trade—in their condition as immigrants, necessarily, the small trade. Add to this the fact that there is hardly any credit on a large scale in the country. There exists, it is true, a few large banks and a number of small ones in the form of loan associations, run on a democratic basis and which do some good work in the direction of self-help; but so far they have been only in rare cases of assistance to business on a larger scale. As a whole, the Jews have hardly introduced anything original in Palestine, in the domain of commerce. They have, to be sure, improved upon the primitive system of trading; but this can hardly be regarded as a great compliment to them. In general, the picture presented by Jewish commerce in Palestine resembles that of the smaller places in Europe. Small stores multiply, some of which can face wind and rain and may be successful; others, on the other hand, will crumble, away, until they reach a point which would amount in other countries, with a large credit system to official failure, but which means in Palestine simply failure to replace goods on the shelves when the previous stock is exhausted. The department store, in the American sense of the term, can hardly be said to exist there, and the system of cheques is only just beginning to come

into use. The import and export business, however, with the increase of population and the development of industry, is gradually assuming larger proportions; and there is no doubt that the improvement of the Palestinian ports, now planned by the administration of the country, will give impetus to commerce.

As accessories to the status of commerce in Palestine, may be mentioned: the merchants' guilds and the chambers of commerce, the latter generally run by Jews and Arabs together, and the three or four commercial schools, in the hands of the Jews.

One might think that in a country where there are neither raw materials nor coal, industry would play a very insignificant role in the life of the country; and yet, as a matter of fact, next to agriculture, industry seems to be on the way to occupying a very important place in the development of Palestine. In such large industries as iron and steel, Palestine will undoubtedly count for nothing in the world market, so long as the invaluable ore will not be yielded by its mountains, though a not unsuccessful attempt has been made, first by Germans and then by Jews, to supply the internal iron market. It is, however, in the industries that are somehow or other connected with agriculture or whose raw materials are found in the country itself, that the industrial future of Palestine lies. If we take into consideration the fact that within the last few years since the war, some 160 shops

and factories, large and small, are reported to have been established in Tel-Aviv alone, and that the industries in the country include such big industries as silicate bricks and tiles, silks, modern flour mills, soap factories, salt works, oil, asphalt, leather, etc., the situation looks hopeful. And there are a great many industries directly connected with agriculture, such as sugar, perfumes, canned fruits, that are still waiting for their turn.

Industry in Palestine, however, also finds other hindrances than lack of fuel and raw materials. In the first place, the English administration in Palestine seems to be interested in not having Palestine develop into an industrial country, which might injure the commercial interests of England there. This was obviously the reason why the English administration not only put a high import duty on raw materials imported into the country, but even a duty on exported goods—a procedure that caused the silk factory in Tel-Aviv to be closed and Mr. Delphiner, the manufacturer, to come out in public with a criticism of this regulation. If this be the real motive of the Palestinian administration for raising the custom duties, its economic principles are certainly at fault. For Palestine cannot be compared, in this respect, to other colonial countries of England. Other countries, such as India, are not countries of immigration. If England keeps down their industries, it may gain thereby in that its goods might acquire a ready market for themselves. The keeping down of native industry in Palestine would

mean, on the contrary, more loss than gain for England. For since Palestine is a land of immigration and since the immigrants are of a kind that will use imported goods much more than the natives, the keeping down of industry, which would mean the keeping down of immigration, would consequently be a loss to English commerce. It is true that Palestine may produce some goods that are manufactured in England; but this apparent loss to England would be entirely offset by the increase of imports of other commodities from England, in proportion to the increase of immigration to Palestine. That there is truth in this reasoning may be seen from the statistics of the imports to Palestine. These imports rose from £5,125,000 in 1923, to £5,590,000 in 1924; and to £7,604,000 in 1925; and of all this Great Britain got the lion's share. The jump of the increase in import from 1924 to 1925 has thus been almost five times as large as from 1923 to 1924, though the year 1925 reached the apex of the establishment of industries in Palestine. I do not know whether it was this sort of reasoning or the loud criticism pronounced by the Jews of Palestine and elsewhere on the policy of the English administration that finally prevailed with the latter to abolish, in June of 1926, duties upon certain imports, such as cotton yarn, wool and wool yarn, silk and silk yarn—in other words, upon goods and raw materials for the use of Palestinian industry, partly relieving the latter from the incubus that has been pressing upon it. Yet, the evil has not been

entirely eradicated. Then, again, the introduction of an industry, like the settlement on land, in Palestine, requires comparatively more means, patience, and perseverance than elsewhere. To make calculations upon credit there would be sheer miscalculation. One must, moreover, be prepared to combat the long standing tradition of no-industry, to fight prejudice and suspicion. Several factors must be taken into account. The dealer, accustomed to import goods from abroad, and the storekeeper, who sells imported goods, are interested in discouraging native industry. On imported commodities the profits are usually larger; there is no one in the country to exercise control over the sales. In the native manufacture, it is the manufacturer who sets the price and controls it—particularly if he is anxious to push his goods, as new articles, into the market. Moreover, the dealer can, after all, offer the foreign merchandise at a lower price than the native, in a country where manufacture is in its incipient stage and where production is, therefore, on the whole, more expensive than in an old industrial country. The latter reason is also a drawback as regards the purchaser. It is true that there is a number of people who will favor, for patriotic reasons, native manufacture, though they pay the dearer for indulging this sentiment. The general run of people, however, will be loath to pay a higher for what they can get at a lower price, even though the difference may, in the end, return to their pocket, in round-about ways.

Then there are the psychologic factors. Foreign goods serve everywhere as a sort of fad. "Made in Germany" used to be a label of industrial distinction before the war, just as "foreign manufacture" is one now even in the highly industrial America. And in Palestine this factor is more potent, inasmuch as the Jews, coming as they do from various countries, are used to the products of those countries. Then, there is, finally, mistrust of the new product as new, though it may not be inferior to the old.

All these are serious hindrances to industry in Palestine, that one has to foresee and be prepared to cope with. In spite of all this, however, some 600 shops and factories were reported in Palestine, most of them of recent date. These are, no doubt, an industrial asset, and may serve as an indication as to what can be done with energy and perseverance, even under adverse circumstances. Here too, there has been great waste of capital and energy in the process of industrial evolution in the country, due to inexperience, lack of scientific principle, or lack of knowledge of the resources of the country. Yet the trail has been blazed; and with the proper instrument for industrial development, the instrument most needed in the country—capital for investment—the future of industry will be assured there.

CHAPTER VI

JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT

THERE is an opinion current, not only among non-Jews but even among the Jews themselves, that self-government is foreign to the very nature of the Jew. Place the Jews in an environment of their own, where they will be face to face with themselves and must practice self-government, and they will immediately fall a prey to disorder. This opinion is supposedly based upon observation: there is hardly any order in Jewish commercial life; there is mismanagement in Jewish institutions—there is personal and factional conflict in the carrying on of their affairs. And this opinion is, of course, made ample use of in the argument against the reestablishment of the Jews in an autonomous Palestine.

There may be some truth in the first premise, and yet the conclusion does not follow as a logical consequence. For you cannot infer from Jewish life in the *diaspora* to that of Palestine. In the former, Jewish life has never been self-determining or self-governing. The activity of the Jewish community has been narrow in scope. It has been confined to religious affairs, charity activities, and educational institutions. It was within this cramped situation

that energies had to be exercised, ambitions to be satisfied, wills to be asserted. And the natural consequence was: stepping on one another's toes, clashing of wills, crushing of ambitions.

It is only in a place like Palestine, where the Jews enjoy even now a great measure of autonomic self-government, at least locally, that the test could be applied as to their ability of governing themselves. Have they stood the test?

In Jewish self-government in modern Palestine, two periods are to be distinguished: the pre-war and the post-war periods. In the former, Jewish communities had no official recognition from the Turkish government, that is to say, they had no more rights than the Arabic communities—both of them being under the heel of the Turkish pashah and his arbitrary rule.

And yet there was a modicum of self-government in the Jewish community even in the time of the Turks. The rule of the Turkish government, as a government, in the country, was as a matter of fact merely nominal. Every consul, representing a foreign power, had judiciary and other autonomic rights in Palestine, as well as in Turkey as a whole. Every Turkish official was a satrap for himself, and every community, if at all desirous to lead a modern life and not be ruled merely by traditional *mores* and folkways, as in the case of the Arabs, had to organize their internal self-government in the form of representative government. It was thus that Tel-Aviv and the Jewish colonies, which had not yet

been recognised by the Turkish government as entities for themselves, came to have their boards and councils to manage their own affairs. And the terms, communal self-government and the arbitrariness of will of the Turkish official, were not necessarily contradictory. The Turkish official was always amenable for a consideration, approving or acquiescing in any form of local government, even though it be not in keeping with the principles and traditions of the central government. The Jewish community thus organized its own system of elections, its own system of taxation, its own schools, water-works, street cleaning department, etc. And the government of the Jewish community was fairly efficient; it not only proved satisfactory to the community itself, it even elicited admiration, trust, and respect from outsiders. A Jewish institution was regarded with respect; a Jewish bank or community was trusted implicitly in monetary affairs.

I remember, it was at the beginning of the war. The French coin, which had been the standardized current coin in Palestine before the war, was declared out of use. The only money now in use was that of Turkey. And as the Turkish pound began to sink rapidly, with the entrance of that government into the war, and as the moneys coming from abroad for the Palestinian Jews had to go through the ordeal of being exchanged into this pound, the young Jewish settlement was in danger of tumbling down hill together with it. In order to obviate the calamity, the larger Jewish communities,

like Tel-Aviv and Petah-Tikwah, hit on the idea of issuing notes to serve as current coin for the community. These notes were accepted at their face value not only among Jews, but also among Arabs, at the same time that the Turkish banknote was among both elements of the population on the constant decline. This device could have very much alleviated the situation in Palestine, but for the interference of the Turkish government, which saw in it a sort of declaration of independence on the part of the Jewish population, an assertion of a state within a state, and suppressed it. However, the fact remains that the Jewish community, the community in its larger aspects and functions, if left to itself, was equal to the various situations which confronted it, and practised self-government not only to its own satisfaction, but to the admiration of its neighbors.

It has been, however, in the post-war period that real Jewish self-government found well-rounded expression in the Palestinian community. What then occurred was the recognition of the Jewish communities by the administration of the country, as townships for themselves. The Jewish communities thus assumed the double function: that of autonomous self-government within, and of communal responsibility to the central government without.

The recognized "territorial" townships are, however, not the only Jewish communities in Palestine: there is also a "personal" type of community. The rights of the former is based upon the territory it occupies, which is clearly marked off by its boundar-

ies from other territorial communities. Tel-Aviv, for example, and the Jewish colonies, form territorial communities, having been recognised as townships for themselves, with all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of townships. The "personal" community, on the other hand, is one within a territorial community. It is formed in cities of a mixed population. Jerusalem or Haifa Jewries, for example, are, as organised bodies, personal communities. This sort of community is based upon religious denomination or national entity. It is recognised by the government more as a religious than as a civil body, having no right of levying taxes, with the exception of the tax on Basar Kasher, which has been the privilege of the Jewish community for centuries, even in the *diaspora*, but which has been connected with religious institutions, the income going towards defraying the religious expenses of the community. Nor is it allowed to perform any other function of the township.

The personal community, or Kehillah, is thus mainly of religious tenor also in Palestine. It is generally connected with the rabbinical offices, which are maintained by it. Its income is the tax on Basar Kasher, vountary donations, payments for the issuing of birth certificates and ratifying applications for bringing members of families from abroad, etc. In spite, however, of its religious tenor, the Kehillah has been favored even by the radical Jewish elements in Palestine, because it has a semblance

of political representation towards the government, particularly in towns with mixed populations.

These towns have been a source of grievance to Palestine Jewry, not only where the Jews form a minority, but even where they form a majority. Take for example, Jerusalem. Here the Jews have formed an overwhelming majority for the last half century, and yet the city has been ruled by the Arabs since the British occupation of Palestine. Why? Because, desiring to be just to the tradition of Palestine, as a country holy to all three revealed religions, the British administration chose an equal number of representatives from all these religions: Mohammedan, Christian, and Jewish, regardless of the respective numbers of their adherents, to form the governments of the towns. And as both Christians and Mohammedans are Arabs, the Jewish representatives in the town councils are overruled by an Arabic majority of two to one. It is so, as said, in Jerusalem as well as in other Palestinian towns of a mixed population; and it may be said parenthetically, that the system of selection by the government and not by election of the people has been in force to the present day in all but the purely Jewish communities.

The result of this system has been injurious to Jewish interests in many ways. No Jewish labor is employed in Jerusalem and other towns of mixed populations in public works; officialdom is kept fairly clean from Jews there; water is stinted the Jewish population; the Hebrew language, one of the

official languages of the country, is officially ignored in those towns. Moreover, there has been oriental mismanagement in the general affairs of the towns; and there is no doubt that had there been Jews at the head of the government of Jerusalem, the water question would have been settled there long ago, just as it was settled decades previously in the purely Jewish community.

This system of appointment to the offices of town management has come down as a heritage from the military administration, immediately after the British occupation of Palestine. It is alleged to have been a necessary step at that time; for no elections could be held then. Again, it is argued that this step was politically not detrimental but beneficial to the Jews. For as an occupied territory, Palestine had to be administered, for some time, according to the rules of occupation, in conformity with the Turkish law, and according to the Turkish law, the right of vote is granted only to the holder of property. And since the majority of real estate holders in Jerusalem and elsewhere at that time were the Arabs, the Jews would have had no great chance of returning even considerable minorities to the city halls. There may have been some truth in this assertion; but things have changed since, both as regards the law of elections itself, inasmuch as the English have ruled the country long enough to permit the change of the law or its modification, and in respect to the holding of property. It is high time, then, that this wrong, crying aloud to civilisa-

tion, be righted for the benefit of the Jews and of the country as a whole.¹

It was largely in coping with the evils accruing from this abnormal state of affairs that the personal type of the Jewish community, the Kehillah, was created. For the Kehillah has served the purpose of presenting a united front to the outside rather than that of a unifying element, a real body politic within. In short, the Palestinian Kehillah is no more and no less than the Kehillah in the *diaspora*: a loose, voluntary organization, endowed with no political rights by the government, but taking upon itself political duties towards the government.

It is in the purely Jewish community, then, in the Jewish township, that real self-government is to be found. This type of community was recognised by the government as a township for itself in 1921. It has the right of levying taxes, of electing its responsible officers, of issuing permits for building, business licenses, industry grants, etc. And in the case of Tel-Aviv, also of managing its own police force. Thus, the Jewish township in Palestine is in full control of its own affairs; in other words, it is a self-governing body, having its own system of elections, and maintaining its own institutions.

And the experiment has by no means been unsuccessful. The Jewish town is a modern creation. Its system of elections is liberal; fairly good sanitary conditions are maintained; endeavors are made

¹According to the latest reports, the Palestinian administration is preparing for elections for the administration of towns.

that not a child be left without education. As for crime, the Jewish town is conspicuous for its rarity, and can serve as a model in this respect, to many a town in Europe and America.

The Jewish town, however, is not without its trials and tribulations—not only because it has to go through the throes of a newly born place. The modern Jew, coming from the West, brings with him the traditions of culture and civilisation. He can no longer be satisfied with oriental conditions. He must live up to those traditions. But these do not square with the economic situation of the country. The latter is not yet ready to balance cultural demands with economic supply. The Jewish town, therefore, lives beyond its means. Moreover, political conditions, too, are herein at fault. The English administration of Palestine clearly favors the Arabs at the expense of the Jews. There is absolutely no exaggeration in saying that the Jews are, in proportion to their numbers, the greatest taxpayers in the country. The Jewish immigrants, outnumbering ten or twenty fold all other immigrants to Palestine, pay ten or twenty times as much headtax as the other immigrants. The Jews use larger amounts of imported commodities than the Arabs—the custom duties of which go into the treasury of the government. They pay more taxes from industries, because it was they who developed industries, and in whose hands they are now found; and they use the post office, telegraph, telephone, and railroad more. The income of the government from the Jews is thus

comparatively much larger than that from the Arabs; and yet the benefits of this income, such as the maintenance of education, the sanitary care, etc., are reaped mainly by the Arabs. Hence the burden of taxation that weighs heavily upon the Jewish township—the double burden of taxation by the government, from which there are meager returns, and the internal taxation, in order to keep the town at the tiptop of modernism. It is this fact that probably presents the most difficult problem of the Jewish town and has been the cause of strife in many a Jewish township in Palestine, bursting forth recently in a bloodless civil war in Tel-Aviv between the holders of property and the propertyless.

Among the institutions indicative of Jewish self-government in Palestine, are two that are playing a great role in Jewish life—nay, in the social evolution of the country—and that therefore deserve honorable mention in this connection. And these are: “The Hebrew Civil Court” (Hamishpat Hashalom Haivry) and the Waad Leumi (the National Committee), the latter being the mouthpiece of the Asefath Hanivharim, i.e. the congress of Palestine Jewry—their particular importance lying in the fact that their jurisdiction is not only local but national.

The Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri is not an entirely novel creation. It has evolved from the “houses of judgment” (Batey Din), which the Jews have always possessed in the *diaspora*. Its novelty in Palestine lies in the fact that it has divested itself

of its religious aspect, is modern in its procedure, has been recognised by the government as of judiciary authority, and that it has become a national institution, spreading its branches all over the country, and thus becoming a very pronounced expression of self-government.

Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri was established in Jaffa some sixteen or seventeen years ago. Other motives than purely national lay at the root of it. Palestine under Turkey was in a state of juridical chaos, just as Turkey as a whole was in a state of political chaos. Turkey being under the law of "capitulation," just as China, or parts of it, are nowadays, its law was valid only for Turkish subjects; for non-Turkish subjects there was a multiplicity of laws, varying with the different consuls and their bias, who were the protectors and sole judges of the subjects of the countries they represented. Nor could any justice be obtained in the Turkish courts of law, the decisions of which depended upon the amount of bribe that this or that party could afford to offer. The Jewish rabbis, again, not being united then, as now, could have no unified judiciary system, would be divergent in their judgment as far as jealousies could divert them from the written Jewish law. In such a state of affairs where corruption reigned in the Turkish court, conflict in the judiciary procedure of the various consuls, and dis-unity in the Jewish Beth-Din, there could be no stability of law, nor hope of obtaining true justice. Hence there arose a desire among the more

progressive Jews—among the Jews of the “New Settlement”—to create a judiciary institution, which should do away with these evils, but which should at the same time be a modern institution of justice, free from the rigidity of the tradition of the Jewish law as well as from the prejudice of modern law; in other words, an institution in which the Jewish and the modern law should predominate only insofar as they conform with equity and common sense.

Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri was, then, in its essence, at first only an institution for arbitration. It was, of course, not recognised by the Turkish government. It could not be recognised by it. The Turkish government had enough trouble with the consulates of the various governments, which were politically and juridically states within the state. Besides, as it was, the Turkish government looked askance at the penetration of the Jews into the country. In fact, as is well known, the Turkish government had issued a decree against Jewish immigration into Palestine, and it was only by roundabout means that the further inflow of the latter was effected. And here was another institution, which might seem like another attempt, at least, to interfere with the system of justice in the country. The attitude of the Turkish government towards this institution was revealed during the war, when it called a number of Jewish representatives to account for some political “transgressions,”

among which was also the creation of this judiciary institution.

Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri was just beginning to gain in popularity when its career was cut short by the commencement of the war, thus closing the first period of its existence. It was only after the war that its activity was resumed and that it assumed an entirely different character. Instead of being, as before the war, an institution created to mitigate the evils of judiciary conditions in the country, it now became a phase of autonomic national government. Instead of having been a semi-secret institution, carrying on its activity in obscurity and depending for the execution of the judgment upon the good-will of the parties in the lawsuit, because it had no power whatsoever to enforce it, it now became a legalised institution, whose decisions are carried into effect by the government.

As indicated above, Hamisphat Hashalom Haivri is steadily gaining in popularity. There seems to be a consciousness among the people that this is an institution of their own, to which none need come tremblingly, and yet where one may be sure of finding unbiassed justice. It is an institution where every Jew can speak and be understood in his native tongue, where no oath is administered, and where rigid formality, the appendage of time-honored institutions is done away with, but where strict legal procedure is practised and decision is based upon the empirical testimony of witness and document. But above all, it is not prejudiced by the hoariness of

either Jewish or other legal tradition, both being used as far as their applicability to the modern case on hand goes, but both being sifted through the medium of common sense. It is an institution that works to a great extent on the principle of arbitration; yet it is no mere court of arbitration—it is more than this. Not only regular legal cases come up there for trial, but cases which would be out of place in a regular court; not only legal but social justice is sought there. It is sought and found there. Among the judgments and precedents already established by Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri there is one in particular that is very illustrative of the spirit of this institution, namely, the precedence already in force, that if a monthly or yearly workman or official be discharged without sufficient reason, he is to be remunerated with a month's wage or salary for every year he served with his employer. In short, Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri is an institution pointing to national autonomy, one of educative influence and significance, teaching the people not only how to create their own laws, but how to administer social justice.

Finally, a word about the technicalities of this institution. Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri is composed of three degrees: (a) courts of the first degree or local courts, composed of three judges at each session; (b) circuit courts of five members at each session, to which also appeals are made; and (c) a supreme court, composed of a membership of eighteen and having all the functions of a supreme

court. Judges receive no salary and are elected by the people or by the community and town committees. The institution is almost self-paying, getting its main income from court charges; for the rest, it is supported by the various townships.

Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri is an institution of internal self-government; its function is national rather than political, at least, as far as its relation to the mandatory power is concerned. The government, as said, has not hesitated to recognise it. And if it has had its trials and tribulations, these were merely internal, and not serious ones at that. If it has not yet been recognized by the rabbis, it is a pity, but the institution can afford to ignore the fact. If it has raised dissatisfaction here and there, as all good popular institutions are liable to, it would try and localise and lessen this dissatisfaction. Serious opposition it has not met with, be it merely for the reason that this institution is, after all, not coercive but voluntary, at least, up to the moment of the signing of the two parties to obey the decision, whereas its popularity is growing to the extent of gaining here and there the confidence of an Arab to present his grievance even against a Jew to Hamishpat Hashalom Haivri.

Not so with the other institution, the Waad Leumi. The struggle for its existence within, and for recognition without, has been long and hard, and is by no means at an end. The reason for this prolonged struggle lies in the fact that the recognition of this institution is of political importance for Palestinian

Jewry. Internally it would mean the control of Jewish affairs by a general committee which would be tantamount to a governmental body. Externally it would mean a grant, in a measure, of autonomic rights to Palestinian Jewry. And both these things have found opposition as such. Externally, the government seems, for reasons of its own, to be loath to grant the Jews this autonomic right—at least, so far there has been a long or rather indefinite delay in recognising the Waad Leumi. Internally, again, there is an element in Palestine that is interested in not having any unity in Palestinian Jewry, particularly if this unity is to be invested with power to levy taxes and enforce order and system.

The history of the Waad Leumi is the history of the struggle of Palestinian Jewry for self-government and political self-expression. Long before the war, an attempt was made by Mr. M. Ussischkin to organise Palestinian Jewry. The attempt was, however, abortive. It could not but end thus. The organisation could never hope to obtain recognition from the Turkish government, and as an organisation in the abstract, it could not have sufficient power of attraction to keep together the extremely varying elements in Palestine. It was only after the war, when expectations were stimulated and hopes of effecting internal unity and obtaining governmental recognition ran high, that there was room for the organisation of Palestinian Jewry.

The organising of the Palestinian Jews has, however, so far not been very smooth sailing. As soon

the Waad Leumi was on the point of becoming a representative body, that is, as soon as general elections for the Asefath Hanivharim, the congress of Palestinian Jewry, which was to elect the Waad Leumi, was decided upon, the internal trouble began. It was not party strife that caused it; the voices of parties were silenced in the hope of unifying the Jews. It was the difference between the "Old" and the "New Settlements" that here, too, came to the fore. It was the lords of the Halukah that were first to withdraw. The avowed pretext for this withdrawal was, it is true, the refusal on the part of the Asefath Hanivharim to comply with the demand of these Halukah people to deprive the woman of the right of participation in that assembly. It required, however, no particularly penetrating eye to see through their real motive, to see that this was merely a means of covering a separatist move on their part. For did they not acquiesce in it at first? It is only after they had become aware of the spirit of the Asefath Hanivharim and after they had realized that it was going to become a democratic force, endeavoring to bring order and system in Palestinian Jewry, that they withdrew. They had to withdraw, for order and system are by no means compatible with the conditions prevailing in that part of Palestinian Jewry that stands under the sign of the Halukah. And it was not only the Halukah people who withdrew; they were followed later by the Mizrahi party, a loyally Zionist orthodox organisation, that felt uncomfortable now that

they were left in a small minority in the Asefath Hanivharim. It was only with difficulty that the latter was prevailed upon to rejoin the organisation, and only with hesitation and half-heartedly that they did so.

Thus the Waad Leumi, the National Committee, that was elected by the Asefath Hanivharim to represent the interests of organised Jewry in Palestine, is the representative of the "New Settlement" and of that part of the "Old" that stands farther away from the baneful influence of the Halukah. The Halukah people will probably continue staying away from it, especially now that their forces have been swelled by the Jesuitic organisation, Agudath Israel. This organisation, which has recently focused its activity on Palestine, has all the time been endeavoring to undermine the authority of the Zionist organisation with the League of Nations, and that of the Waad Leumi with the Palestine Administration. It has a distinct separatist tendency, aspiring to be recognised by the government as a religious community for itself in Palestine; and their joining the forces of the Halukah signifies the greater resistance of the "Old Settlement" to renovation and the unification of Jewry.

It is undoubtedly due, in a great measure, to the activity of the ultramontanists that the Waad Leumi has not yet been recognised as a legal body by the Palestinian government. At any rate, this failure of recognition places the Waad Leumi in

the same position as the Kehillah, namely, as a body the existence of which depends upon voluntary adherence, having no legal or political power whatsoever. Yet even as such, the Waad Leumi is a force to be reckoned with in Palestinian Jewry. It is an important factor in developing the sense of unity among the Jews and it serves as a staunch defender of their rights, bringing their grievances before the government and their political claims before the League of Nations.

CHAPTER VII

JEWISH EDUCATION

THERE are only some 30,000 Jewish children of school age in Palestine; yet Jewish education there is fraught with problems and difficulties.

Jewish education in Palestine has undergone a veritable revolution within the last half century. The first Jewish settlers of the "New Settlement" found a chaos in education. The Jewish population was too poor to maintain a system of education of its own. It had to depend upon the charity of the Jews abroad for the maintenance both of the life of its members and of its school system. It goes without saying, then, that this school system was of religious tenor; in fact, the schools in existence at that time in Palestine were really *Chedarim* and *Yeshiboth* of the old type, where the Bible, the Talmud and their commentaries were the backbone of the curriculum. Hebrew as such was regarded as too sacred a tongue to be employed in every-day use and even as a medium of instruction. For Hebrew as a medium of instruction would imply the endeavor to revive this language as a vernacular, and this would have been too

monstrous an idea for the pre-modern settlement in Palestine. The school language was then, as it is now in the surviving schools of that type, any Jewish vernacular but Hebrew.

As for secular education, whoever wanted his children to enjoy it, had to send them to a school of another type. There were the schools of the "Alliance Israelite," where religious instruction occupied the center of attention, but where secular subjects played an important part in the curriculum. The education given in this type of school was, however, imbedded in the French language, which was taught not as a foreign tongue, but as a vernacular, being even the medium of instruction in other subjects, and was, moreover, inoculated, so to speak, upon the pupils as the language of a sort of second fatherland. This phenomenon was due to the fact that the Alliance schools were run by an organisation that was primarily French in sentiment, and was supported by the further fact that French culture had laid a strong impress upon the Near East. Hence the influence of the Alliance schools upon Palestinian Jewry, and for that matter, upon the Jewry of all Turkey.

There were, however, other educational influences in Palestine, too, some of which came later upon the scene: the schools of the German-Jewish "Hilfsverein" and the Anglo-Jewish school of "Evelina de Rothschild." Finally, there were various missionary schools in Palestine, which took

their tribute from the children of even the extreme orthodox wing.

It was a variety of educational influences to which Palestinian Jewry had fallen a prey. It was a tugging and pulling in various directions. There was the inoculation of various languages, the persuasion of different cultures, the inculcation of conflicting patriotic sentiments.

The disintegrating effect of all this upon Palestinian Jewry is evident. Without unity of principle, of system or language, education in Palestine tended to split up the Jews into elements varying among themselves in sentiments, inclinations, and sympathies. In short, education in Palestine was in a state of chaos when the Zionist movement wafted the first Jewish national immigrants to the Palestinian shores. Now, to bring order and unity into this state of chaos, and to lend it a national color meant not to reform but to re-form it, mould it anew, eliminate the extraneous matter and stamp it with the unity of one language, the national language—Hebrew. But this also meant war waged against powerful antagonists, ingrained traditions, widely recognised institutions; and it meant, besides, a strongly organised body with enormous means at its disposal behind the movement of the reshaping of education in Palestine. And this the first modern settlers were far from possessing. Moreover, they lacked the chief tool for reforming education in the national sense. Hebrew had been

only a literary language for some two thousand years; in order to adapt it to everyday use, to whet it as an instrument for sciences, it was necessary to forge the language on the anvil of life, to stretch and solder it. In the matter of language, the advantage was surely on the side of the existing schools. Even Ahad Haam, the protagonist of Zionism, and the philosopher of Jewish nationalism, on his visit to Palestine, as late as 1891 and 1893, found that Hebrew was not equal to the treatment of sciences in the schools.

The first schools of the modern settlers in Palestine were thus hardly of the re-formed type. Both in content and in form, that is, in the medium of instruction, they were not far advanced from the old type. Yet it was the consistency of the new movement that required the re-formation of the school and the revival of Hebrew as a vernacular. It was this consistency that led the late Eliezer ben-Yehudah to make the beginning and introduce Hebrew as a vernacular in his own family, and it was this consistency plus the influence of Ben-Yehudah's endeavors that gradually secured a place for Hebrew in the house and school. And the endeavors of Ben-Yehudah were not confined to its introduction into the home; he settled down to create new words and terms, that is, to adapt it to modern life. And it really was a forging on the anvil, a stretching and a soldering; and the Hebrew language was indeed being adapted to life, was

being fitted into the frame of a school curriculum. And it came there to stay. Even an Ahad Haam could not prevail to abrogate the right of the Hebrew to sciences. Ahad Haam is an evolutionist, believing in gradual modification rather than in sudden mutation, and had modern Palestinian Jewry followed his precept, there would have been a yawning gap in the dictionary of a Ben-Yehudah, there would have been left a vacant space in the Hebrew school as a Hebrew school. As it was, national consistency proved more logical than this. The scientific Hebrew vocabulary grew with the accumulation of sciences in the Hebrew school, climbing up the scale of classes: public school, gymnasium, up to college, until Hebrew as a medium of instruction and even as a vernacular is now beyond debate or question.

So long as the Hebrew school, in its purely Hebrew aspect, had to present its data for verification, its certificate of maturity, it had to be on the defensive against enemy as well as friend. As soon as it began to feel firm ground under its feet, it assumed the offensive. Some reckoning had yet to be made; some accounts had to be settled. A blow had to be struck for the unity of the Hebrew school. And opportunity offered itself for that.

It was on the eve of the great war. The "Hilfsverein," whose schools had hitherto been nearest in spirit to the purely Hebrew school, became of a sudden patriotically German and issued a decree to

the effect that those scientific subjects which had been taught in Hebrew should henceforth be taught in German. This was an act of direct provocation; it was simply throwing the gauntlet to the Hebrew sentiment already prevailing in the country. The Hebrew school took up the challenge. It was a question not only of measuring the strength but of sounding the depth of the Hebrew sentiment among the population. Well, the fight was short and decisive: a boycott on the schools of the "Hilfsverein" and a few meetings of protest held, and these schools were closed one by one. And as the war soon broke out, there came an end to the educational activities of the "Hilfsverein" in Palestine.

Now it is true that the schools of the "Alliance" still kept to their tradition of teaching the sciences in French. But the "Alliance" did not go back upon itself, as the "Hilfsverein" had done. Besides, time was not yet ripe for trying issues with the "Alliance." The influence of France grew with the war and the French language was still in great use in the Near East. Moreover, the effects of the struggle with the "Hilfsverein" were telling also upon the schools of the "Alliance," whose management seems to have been cowed into introducing a few changes, thus bringing the schools nearer to the Hebraic sentiments of the people. Only now and then it came to a breaking of lances between the two types of schools.

There remained, then, the other two kinds of schools to be dealt with: that of the missionaries and that of the old system. And here we have come down to present history, to be spoken of in the present instead of the past tense. Now, as for the missionary schools, the endeavors of the "New Settlement" succeeded in wresting the Jewish youth from its influence; and if there is still a number of Jewish children who continue attending them, it is such a negligible quantity, that it is hardly to be taken into account, when education in Palestine is spoken of. It is the other type of school, the old type, that presents the most difficult problem. This type of school has neither grown out of the needs of the country nor is it supported by funds of the country. It is an outgrowth of medieval conceptions of education and is maintained by religious devotees all over the *diaspora*. It still extends education to a great portion of the Jewish youth in Palestine, particularly in the towns holy to the Jews: Jerusalem, Safed, Hebron. Thus a great portion of Palestinian youth is brought up in bigotry, other-worldliness, without any preparation for life, and in opposition to all the modern activity that is going on around them. And the fight against this type of school is made the harder inasmuch as their Achilles' heel is not to be gotten at in Palestine, but elsewhere. For this type of school is a part of the system of the Halukah, nay, it is its backbone; and as such, it is in the interest

of the Halukah people to keep it up at any cost, because in keeping this up, the whole system of the Halukah can be kept up intact. And the Halukah—does it not draw its resources in their entirety from abroad? So long, therefore, as there will be some Jews in the *diaspora* that will be deluded into thinking, that the Halukah is an institution the maintenance of which is of utmost importance for Palestinian Jewry and for world Judaism, it will be almost useless for the modern school to fight a system of education that has no basis in life, but will have to wait for its natural decay.

This is the history of the internal growth of the Hebrew school in Palestine and its relation to other school-systems there. It has been an evolution from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, tending to introduce unity in system and medium of instruction. The cycle is far from being complete; but there is no doubt of its completing itself with the growth of the consciousness of unity in Palestinian Jewry and with the growing conviction among them, that education is an unfolding of personality, of selfness, is a preparation for life, *is life*, as Dewey would insist, and not a bringing up for helplessness, utter dependence, nor a preparation for other-worldliness.

There is one more line of development, however, that should be recorded: the evolution from multiplicity of ownership of the Hebrew school to that of single ownership by the Zionist Organisation.

Till the war, the Hebrew schools, even where there was more or less unity of purpose and of program, were under the supervision or in the possession of various organisations: the Russian Hovevey Zion, the J. C. A., the Zionist Organisation, private organisations or Maecenas. The war brought about a change in this, as it did in many other respects. Aid coming from only one source, the other sources having failed at that time, and via one medium—the Zionist Organisation—the modern Palestinian schools had *eo ipso* to unite under one monetary, and consequently under one educational system. Even the Jewish Colonisation Association, automatically, as it were, though later, gave over its schools, together with its support, to the education department of the Zionist Organisation. The latter thus became the owner of the majority of the Jewish schools—of the most progressive ones—in the country.

What is the Hebrew school in Palestine? For an American Jew, who used to look upon the Hebrew school as a side issue of education, confined to religious and Jewish studies, it would be difficult to understand its real place in Palestine. Well, the Palestinian Hebrew school is not like the American; it is not limited merely to Jewish subjects. But neither is it simply a parochial school. It is true that the government maintains some schools of its own; but these schools are attended only by Arabs.

Now, if the determining factor in the appellation "public school," is numbers, the government schools may have a slight advantage over the modern Hebrew school in Palestine—the former having been attended in 1925 by some 19,000 pupils, and the latter by some 13,000. But if the curriculum and the scholastic standing of the school be taken into consideration, the advantage will decidedly be on the part of the Hebrew school. It is clear, then, that the latter is the public school for the Jews in that country.

The system of the Palestinian Hebrew school, as regards the class division, the range and division of the subjects, and the matter of days and hours of teaching in the week, is modelled after the European school system—that of Russia before the war, Austria, Germany. The child is admitted into the kindergarten at the age of three and is kept there to the age of six. Now, the kindergarten offers everywhere more opportunity for experimentation, for the personal equation of the teacher, than does the public school. And so does the Hebrew kindergarten in Palestine—the more so, as there is an ever increasing number of private kindergartens, due, on the one hand, to a constant increase in demand, and, on the other, to the failure of the department of education of the Zionist Organisation, for obvious reasons, to supply this demand. All this contributes to the freedom of the *kindergartner* in dealing with her material. Hence the

multiplicity of systems, ranging from the personal idiosyncrasy of the teacher through Froebel and Montessori to Rabindranath Tagore, one of whose pupils, who had studied his school system in India, having recently established a school in Tel-Aviv modeled on his.

More unity is to be found in the system of public schools, meaning thereby the schools conducted by the education department of the Zionist Organisation and perhaps also the schools of the "Alliance," which approach more and more the type of the Zionist school. The public school consists of eight classes, equivalent to the eight grades of the American public school; in some studies, such as some of the sciences, they are slightly higher than the latter. Besides Hebrew and the sciences: mathematics, nature study, geography, history, etc., which are, of course, one and all taught in Hebrew, the study of the Bible and the Talmud, chiefly the Agadic part, occupy a prominent place in the curriculum. Similarly, drawing and singing, gymnastics and manual labor, go into the make-up of the program. A special Palestinian feature is the study of English as a foreign language or rather as one of the official languages of the country, from the fifth class upwards. Add to this another important feature: school hikes to the different parts of the country, several times a year, for the purpose of studying the country geographically, visiting historical places, or making geologic and botanical

studies, and you will have a fair idea of the work done in the public, that is, the Hebrew school in Palestine.

The Gymnasium, too, is modelled after that of continental Europe. It consists of eight classes, beginning with one which is equivalent to the fifth grade of the American public school. And though the number of the scholastic years of the American public and high schools would tally with the Palestinian public school and gymnasium, making twelve years in each case, yet the more intensive work in the latter, in which the pupil gets as many as thirty-five hours a week of instruction, puts the Palestinian pupil scholastically in advance of the American, so that a graduate of a Palestinian gymnasium gets between one and a half and two years' credit in an American college. This gymnasium, like the one in continental Europe, is thus a sort of high school and junior college combined. The difference between the American high school and the Palestinian gymnasium can easily be seen on comparing the programs. In the latter, besides the regular high school courses, higher mathematics, geology, an introduction to philosophy, higher physics, and chemistry are given. In foreign languages, too, more intensive work is done. English is taught for eight consecutive years; Arabic for six years; French—which has still a hold of the Near East; and Latin: languages that are substitutive for each other, four years each. Manual

work is a very important feature in the Gymnasium also. Up to the fifth class the pupils do gardening, cartonage, bookbinding, carpentry, poultry raising. In the higher classes, cartography is done and the preparation of tools for the science courses, such as electric batteries and solids for mathematics, etc.

This is in brief the program of the Palestinian school. With all its faults, the latter will not compare unfavorably, both as to its curriculum and its staff of teachers, with other school systems. Yet it bristles with problems and difficulties, springing mainly from lack of proper provision for Hebrew education.

Let us first compare some statistics. In 1914, only 12 schools, containing 1,064 pupils and 91 teachers, stood under the supervision of or were supported by the Zionist Organisation. In 1925, the number of schools under the supervision of the latter rose to 132, having 13,246 pupils and 550 teachers. Of these schools, 43 were kindergartens with 2,337 pupils; 75 were public schools with 9,030 pupils; 3 were gymnasia with 1,009 pupils; 3 were teachers' seminaries with 277 pupils; 4 were manual training schools with 256 pupils, and 4 were professional schools with 337 pupils.

If we compare these statistics, the progress seems to be considerable. It means not only the accumulation of educational institutions in one hand, but it also means bringing unity into education in the country. Should we, however, take into considera-

tion what was to be done and was not done, we would not feel elated at what has been done. In 1925, there were still about as many children outside the schools of the Zionist Organisation as there were in them. That is to say, there were then some 13,000 children of school age in Palestine, who either did not get any education at all—though such children are a very negligible minority—or else they got their education in the schools of the old type, or even in missionary schools. This means, in other words, that with all our progress in education in Palestine, more children are now brought up in the old chaotic system of education and in a babel of tongues as the medium of instruction, and under the influence of anti-oranationalistic and anti-modernistic educational tendencies, than before Zionism got hold of Jewish education in Palestine.

This evil is due, as indicated, to the lack of provision for the maintenance of the Hebrew school. There are, however, other difficulties, too. Take, for example, the distribution of the Jews over the country. Under normal conditions, a community of some 150,000 souls (the Jewish population, probably, in Palestine now), would not have needed, had they lived in a compact mass, three gymnasia, three teachers' seminaries, three or four commercial schools, etc. It is because the Jewish community is scattered over a rather wide area that a comparatively large number of schools, both primary

and secondary, is required. This fact, of course, involves a larger expenditure on education and adds to the monetary difficulties of the latter. A more serious question, however, stands before Palestinian Jewry, namely, the question as to the sources of income wherewith to cover the expenses of education. To a person of a civilized country this question would sound strange; or rather, the answer would be right at hand: the government that collects the taxes should provide for a system of education for its subjects. In Palestine, however, this is not the case. Not only is the Palestinian government too poor to meet all the educational requirement, but even the minimum provision made for education by the government was made for the benefit of the Arabic, not for the Jewish school. And it was so done, strange to say, originally with the acquiescence of the Zionist Organisation or at least of its political representative in Palestine, Dr. Eder, who assented to this decision of the government, when it was first announced to the Zionist Organisation. Thus a precedent was established in disfavor of Jewish education in Palestine, to combat which very much effort and energy has since been spent by the Zionist Organisation. It is true that even should the Jews get their share of the appropriations made by the government for education, the question of the provision for the Jewish schools of the present will not be solved; for, as stated, this source is still

insufficient to cover the educational necessities of the country. The question does not revolve, however, so much upon present realities as upon future possibilities, when the country will be sufficiently developed to be able to sustain its inhabitants and fully supply their intellectual needs. It is herein that the danger of this precedent lies. Moreover, there is the larger principle involved of not letting the Jews of Palestine be regarded as political supernumeraries.¹

Next comes the question as to the share of the Zionist Organisation in the budget of education. Now it is true that if we take into consideration the fact that of the sum of \$575,000 spent on the schools under the supervision of the Zionist Organisation, in 1925, \$300,000 were furnished by the latter, conditions do not seem normal. But neither are things more normal in other Zionist activities in the country. And yet education in Palestine is regarded by some Zionist leaders as an extra burden on the movement to be dealt with summarily. This is an unfortunate mistake. Education should be

¹After the above had been written, the news came that the Palestinian government promised the appropriation of the sum of \$62,000 for Jewish schools. This appropriation seems to have been made in accordance with the census of 1922; for according to the estimation of the present Jewish population, which has almost doubled since that year, the Jewish schools should get, as their share, about a hundred thousand dollars. It remains, however, to be seen, whether the principle of allowing the Jews their due share gained here the upperhand, be it even in conformity with out-of-date numbers, or whether the appropriation was simply accidental.

regarded as a political factor. It has been so everywhere; was it not said that it was the German teacher who was victorious at Sedan? And it is so particularly in Palestine. The influence of the Jews has been felt there out of all proportion to their numbers, largely because of their higher cultural life. Then, again, as shown in another connection, educational opportunities in Palestine serve as a power of attraction for many a Jewish family to come and settle there. It is, therefore, as a political factor that Jewish education in Palestine should be regarded, and as such provided for—until it will have reached the stage of being provided for from the resources of the country itself.

Some Zionist leaders do not comprehend all this. Hence the frequent attacks on the budgets of education in Palestine at the Zionist congresses, and the conflicts between the teachers and Zionist officialdom in Palestine. This fact, plus the lack of provision for the school, do great harm to education. Classes are overcrowded; there is a lack of school materials and of text books; the teachers do not receive their salaries regularly, and so have to waste their time and energy in grumbling and trying to patch up a livelihood.

Hebrew education in Palestine is, however, also beset with other problems than that of the budget. In the first place, the linguistic problem. If Hebrew has carried off a complete victory in school, having fully mastered all branches of instruction,

it has not yet entirely conquered the house and the street. It is true that the number of families going over to Hebrew speech is rapidly on the increase—the teachers and workmen having been the first consistently and persistently to introduce Hebrew into their families. It is also true that the number of Hebrew-speaking people is also constantly on the increase among the immigrants, Hebrew being more and more studied among the Jews of the *diaspora*. Yet a number of native Palestinians, notably of the “Old Settlement,” and the majority of the immigrants to Palestine, are ignorant of Hebrew. Nay, you will find some of the most intellectual families in Palestine, for some reason or other, speaking any other language than Hebrew. This fact is a drawback not only to the evolution of the Hebrew language, but also to the unity and development of education. In cases such as these, the school is at a disadvantage in that it does not serve, as in other countries, as a complement to the house and the street, but must counteract the effects of the latter.

Secondly, there is the question of literature. With all the progress Hebrew literature made within the last half century, it is rather poor, particularly so in sciences, not being enough to satisfy the literary voracity of a Jewish school child. Of late there has been quite a literary output in Hebrew, both of original and translated works, for the young; still the demand is much greater than the supply—and the supply is insufficient due to lack of funds. The

teaching of English, which begins at an early school age, is meant partly to satisfy this need; but you cannot, of course, compare the literary benefit derived from reading in your own language, with that which you derive from reading in a foreign tongue.

Thirdly, Palestine does not possess those institutions that supplement the school, such as museums, herbaria, art galleries, children's theatres, or other amenities of life that would interest and benefit the youth.

Finally, there is the question of discipline in the Palestinian school. Not that the behaviour of the Jewish child in Palestine is worse than that of any other child; but that he seems to have less respect for the school and teacher. Several reasons may be adduced for this phenomenon. First, the attitude of the street and the house towards the teacher is, in some measure, still that of the traditional attitude to the Melamed of the old *cheder*—an attitude more or less of scorn. Then again, there is the consciousness of the child that the school and teacher are dependent upon him, in that he pays them directly in the form of tuition fee. Furthermore, as a new country for civilization, Palestine does not yet possess any established code of etiquette, either in the relation between man and man or in the relation between pupil and teacher. Finally, there is the psychologic factor of feeling at home in the Hebrew school in Palestine, particularly on the part of children that come from countries like Poland and Roumania, in whose schools the Jewish child could

hardly have this sort of feeling. But it may be remarked, that if, on the one hand, this feeling may be exaggerated into looseness of behavior, because of it, the child becomes, on the other hand, easily attached to the school, and to the country as a whole.

Of late there has been a marked improvement in the matter of discipline, particularly with the young generation of teachers.

There are other aspects of education in Palestine, such as the experimental work done therein. These, however, are connected with the endeavors of the workmen's organisation, and their discussion will be reserved for the chapter, "The Life and Institutions of the Workmen."

CHAPTER VIII

CULTURAL LIFE

THE Jews have come back to Palestine as spiritual paupers. Their literary productions fill the literatures of a world; their artistic creations crowd the museums of other peoples, their scientific achievements have become the heritage of many a nation. They have returned to Palestine with little more than they had when they left it: the Bible, the Talmud, and the bit of literature they succeeded in creating for themselves in the *diaspora*—during hours of overtime. There is a gigantic task before them: not only to rehabilitate a country and rejuvenate a people, but to reach up culturally to a world that has progressed for millenia and keep pace with the modern time machine that is rushing headlong, wheeling over centuries within the space of a year. It is a task requiring enthusiasm, perseverance, gigantic means. The Palestinian Jews seem to possess plenty at least of the former two. They brought back with them a craving for cultural life, which they had drunk in with the air in the countries where they had lived and where they had participated in creating the highest and the best. And now they can no longer be satisfied with mere embryonic

beginnings, but desire to unfurl at once the standard of culture to the full breeze.

Now, culture is a matter of tradition, a product of a stable and settled life. It is the spice of life, not its primary necessity, and in a country of immigration it is tardy in coming. Yet Palestine is not merely a country of immigration, where people seek new economic opportunities; it is rather a land of restoration, not only in the economic and political, but also in the cultural sense of the word. This is one of the reasons why you find in Palestine a number of intellectuals, writers, artists, etc., entirely out of proportion to the Jewish population. Say what you will about the economic advantage or disadvantage of this phenomenon; for cultural purposes, it is bound to be a stimulus of a high degree. It is these intellectuals who have been the standard-bearers of culture, and are responsible for the existence of cultural institutions—creations far beyond what might be expected from a population so small, poor, and scattered as that of Palestinian Jewry. It was all done, to be sure, with great exertion, with enormous sacrifices; it was a going beyond one's means, an overdrawing of one's account. But it was persisted in with the same tenacity with which the Jews have been clinging to the ideal of Zion, with which they are now clinging to the reality of Zion, and with which the Jewish workmen are eliciting a response from the exploited land of Zion. If the means of the community are not equal to its cultural aspira-

tions, persistence, readiness and strength of will are drawn upon to make up for the disparity.

There are not too many diversions in Palestine, and there is an air of provincialism about the relation to cultural activities. Such activities as are of every-day occurrence in highly civilised countries, noticed only in passing, are events in Palestine, to be discussed, written about, and prepare oneself for. There is an air of solemnity about a concert, a theater performance, an opera, even about a school concert or a motion picture performance that is somewhat out of the ordinary. Yet another psychologic factor, besides provincialism, is probably here at play: a deep appreciation of a community for cultural values that it saw evolve and that contributed to its evolution, and a tribute paid to those persons who, with self-abnegation, energized and vitalized these cultural values and institutions. For the Palestinian public is highly appreciative in this respect.

Cultural life in Palestine depends, for intensity, upon the type of population, the bigness of the town or the village, the type of the village and its remoteness from the town, etc. The "Old Settlement" hardly knows of any cultural activity, in the modern sense of the word. It is puritanic in its taste. The "movies," the theatre, the concert, the opera, are abominations to it; even a modern lecture does not appeal to it, is regarded by it with suspicion. Its cultural activity consists in the solution of a knotty religious question or in the conquest of a difficult

passage of the Talmud or its commentaries, and its cultural as well as its social center is the synagogue, the Beth Hamidrash, where this activity is generally going on. Culturally, then, there is in this, as in other respects, a wide unbridged gap between the "Old" and the "New Settlements." It is in the latter that cultural life is throbbing.

The town is, as everywhere else, most intensive in cultural activity, spreading its influence within a certain radius. Comparatively small places like Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, each keep up one or more music schools and maintain between them a theater and an opera—both of the latter laying just claim to artistic achievement. It must be understood, of course, that neither the theater nor the opera is so elaborate an affair as those of Europe or America. In scenery they are rather poor and their casts are limited; they do not even have playhouses of their own, and they must, moreover, make the round of the larger towns, in order to keep themselves and their art alive. But their artistic significance is unquestioned; and the fact remains that there is a vivid interest in and a thoro appreciation of them on the part of the public—the town of Tel-Aviv appropriating a yearly allowance towards the maintenance of the opera. As for concerts, not only is native talent exercised, but foreign talent is frequently drawn upon. For Palestine serves as a point of attraction for visiting artists not only as a country where there seems to be an interstimulation between the oriental and the occidental, but also as

one where the money value has been normal since the war and where, therefore, many a talent comes to recuperate from the money depreciation in his native place, say, Vienna or Paris. And all this is taken in by the Palestinian public with an eagerness that has roused the admiration of the chance visitor.

The town has, besides, evening classes for the study of the Hebrew language and the practical sciences and people's universities, i.e., systematic series of lectures on arts and sciences, all of which are maintained by various organizations, whereas the town of Tel-Aviv runs a series of popular lectures on the topics of the day. The town, moreover, is, as everywhere else, more pervious to modern ideas, stands under the direct influence of the newspaper, is in close contact with higher educational institutions, is the first to welcome the new-comer, the visitor and the immigrant, and thus more subject to the flux and flow of ideas. The town is more keenly interested in politics, is more sanguine in the discussion of ideas, and is the one to set behavior patterns for the new settlement.

The cultural status of the village differs with the nearness and farness from a town. In the outlying colony there is very little cultural activity. The colony nearer a larger center enjoys the benefit of the better communication. The difference is, however, greater with the type of the colony. The private colony, that is, the colony composed of private farmers, is more sedate, less responsive to intellectual incitement. Yet, what is going on cul-

turally in it is by no means to be despised. Evening classes are generally run and now and then a moving picture performance, a local concert; a library, a choir, an orchestra, are general features, at least in larger colonies. As for higher artistic enjoyment, it is generally sought in town, where you will often see a row of rustic wagons and automobiles lined up in front of the playhouse, in the evenings when a concert is given, an opera or a theater performance is held. A special feature in the intellectual life of the colony is the sports and games, foot ball playing and horse racing, the latter particularly during celebration. Sports and games are, however, a feature not confined to the colony alone, but is prominent in Palestine as a whole, and is connected with the school, with the boy scout movement, with the young generation as such,—a feature that has elicited many a sigh and complaint from serious Jews of the old school. But there is another intellectual tendency in the private colony, not so innocent and wholesome as that of games and sports, and that is, the tendency of sending the children to town to study in the higher schools, in order to prepare them for a life other than agricultural.

A rural element that is most wide awake to intellectual incitement, most responsive to cultural stimulus, is that settled in the Kevutzoth and Moshevey Ovedim, in other words, the agricultural workmen. Sociologically, the rural population is known to be more conservative, less receptive to

cultural amenities. The reasons for this phenomenon are too well known to be dwelt upon here. There is, however, one reason that needs mention, as it bears directly upon our subject, and that is, the fact that the village is constantly drained of its young people, who are drawn to the city. This is true, in some measure, also of the private colony in Palestine. Among the Jewish agricultural workmen the case is different. Here is a population that is, in the first place, flowing in the opposite direction, from the city to the village, and, in the second place, that has come from large cultural centers, where it participated in higher intellectual life, nay, where it went in advance of the general run of the people in respect to progressive ideas. It thus brought with it to Palestine, to the Palestinian village, broader views, not merely to be theorized about, but to be carried thru in life. The Jewish agricultural workman is, therefore, highly responsive to cultural stimuli; in point of fact, he serves as an intellectual ferment wherever he settles, whether in the Kevutzah or Moshav Ovedim, as a free worker, or in the private colony as a day laborer. Wheresoever he is found in larger groups, he introduces cultural life, running entertainments, opening evening courses, even for the benefit of the private farmer, his employer, arranging lectures on general questions and discussions on the topics of the day. The cultural activities of the Jewish workmen in Palestine, as an organized body, will be dwelt upon in a later chapter; suffice it here to say, that comparatively much

more systematic work is done, in this direction by them than by the rest of Palestinian Jewry taken together.

I was speaking of artistic endeavors in Palestinian Jewry. Now, the question has been so far of the concert, the theatre, the opera—artistic activities that have everywhere been, in a great measure, incorporated in the program of the general education of the people and that, therefore, partake more of a social character. The less social arts, too, painting and sculpture, are being cultivated in Palestine. As for the former, mention should be made in this connection of the fact that not only drawing but painting is taught in all modern Palestinian schools, and that these subjects are taught by people some of whom are endowed with real artistic talent. Art, as may be imagined, is not yet a payable affair in Palestine, and artists who come to settle there must take to teaching in public schools for a living. Yet, the country has become a rallying point for artistic talent. It is not the national movement alone that has effected this; the country in itself offers an allurements to the artist. What of the oriental atmosphere and landscape, of the historic background, which is of varied and colorful interest. All this can offer food enough for the artist's pencil, be he even of the modernist school; here he need not go to the length of seeking new expressions for old themes and sentiments, indulging in the quest of the holy grail of the modernist; here he can find new wine to put into the old bottles. Some, however, of the young

artists, who have swarmed into Palestine within the last few years, are by no means satisfied with the old bottles; they prefer clothing the new themes, too, in new forms. Hence there is a good deal of a modernist output in painting. And herein, too, the Palestinian public is very appreciative. I know of no other place where there have been, within the space of the last two or three years, comparatively so many art exhibitions as in the three Palestinian towns: Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa. It must be said, however, that, sound artistic criticism being absent, the Palestinian public sometimes becomes the dupe of its own artistic admiration, in that tinsel is at times offered it instead of pure ore.

All this is true as regards painting; the case of sculpture is somewhat different. Here production is not so easy in Palestine. Not only because sculpture is a rarer art than painting, but also because the former is looked upon with greater aversion by the pious Jew than painting. For, tho both these arts are subsumed under the prohibition: "Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor any manner of likeness," yet, the emphasis has, for obvious reasons, been laid by the orthodox upon the first part of the commandment. And there was at least one case of denunciation of sculpture in Palestine, when exhibited in public. This art will, therefore, have not only to wing but to fight its way to recognition. At any rate, so far it has not been so diligently cultivated there as painting.

Of the other arts, music is taught in all modern

schools and there are, besides, music schools in the larger Jewish centers. These schools supplement the musical activity of the public schools; for in the latter attention is paid principally to Jewish music, whereas in the music schools proper, the purpose is to develop talent and give instruction in classical music.

The sister art of music, dancing, is not a great favorite in Palestine as an art. Not that dancing is unknown in the gravity of Palestinian life. There is hardly another place where dancing has become not only a public amusement but a public passion as there, particularly with the working class. But this dancing is done spontaneously, and it is less the expression of an artistic craving than of a desire for self-utterance, less an individual excitement than a public enthusiasm. The European or the American dances are little practised there and dancing parties are a rarity; it is the primitive communal dances that are prevalent. Yet, there exist a couple of schools for artistic stage dancing, and a recent, not unsuccessful, attempt was made to introduce Jewish themes into the latter.

A school that stands midway between art and life is the Bezalel school in Jerusalem, headed by Professor Schatz, himself an artist of considerable talent. It is a school of long standing, doing most for the development of arts and crafts and endeavoring, successfully so, to create a distinctively Jewish style in this line.

In the domain of literature, some good work has

been done. Hebrew literature is, to be sure, greatly deficient in respect to sciences: exact, social, or speculative; but as to journalism, belles lettres, and particularly poetry, it can stand comparison with many another literature. It represents varied life interests and many literary currents and tendencies find expression therein. It is kept up with enormous exertion by a population that is no bigger than that of a small American town; but it is done so with expectations for the future and with an eye directed upon the Jews of the diaspora. Of all cultural activities, perhaps with the exception of the school, literature is, as elsewhere, the greatest social force in Palestine.

Literature, at least the press, is effective in the creation of public opinion. The latter presupposes a more or less settled life and stable customs and habits. In Palestine, as a country of immigration, public opinion is still a feeble social force, at least, in the "New Settlement." Nor, for that matter, do *mores* and folkways exist in the latter, tho they are to be found aplenty in the "Old Settlement," particularly among the Sephardic and Yemenite Jews. Yet, public opinion seems to be gathering around the newspaper, which is, in fact, its prompter everywhere.

Of other amenities of cultural life, the piano has been long in use in Palestine; as a matter of fact, it became the cause of censure, for its extensive use among the Jewish colonists, as profaning therewith the simple rustic life of the village. The victrola is

still an event, tho its number has rapidly been on the increase. Radio is gradually coming into use, both for purposes of news service and for the enjoyment of music,—the people thus being able at times to steal snatches from an opera or a concert wafted from Italy or France. Of other indoor amusements, card playing is rather rare; on the other hand, chess is the favorite game—chess clubs having been established here and there. Parties are frequent; but never degenerate into heavy drinking and wind up by singing as well as by dancing. As for outdoor amusements, sports and games, principally for the youth have already been mentioned. Another feature may be added: carnivals once or twice a year—on the festival of Purim, the Jewish Hallowe'en, and on some other festival. This feature is, however, necessarily confined to the mono-peopled Jewish town, such as Tel-Aviv.

Cultural life in Palestine cannot be said to be a settled affair, a matter of established cultural habits and traditions; it is rather in the process of creation. Yet, there is the background for it; there is a true craving and undoubted potentialities for it, and, above all, there are beginnings whose artistic and cultural significance is beyond doubt or cavil. On a background such as this, it will not be very difficult to place the individual figures and scenes in their proper positions, in order to complete a picture of cultural life, which will probably be as fine as any.

CHAPTER IX

HEBREW LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN PALESTINE

THE evolution of the Hebrew language is as peculiar as that of the Jewish people. As a vernacular Hebrew seems to have functioned only till about the restoration of the Jews to Palestine, after the Babylonian captivity. When the latter part of the Bible was written, the Jews, no longer used Hebrew in everyday life, at least, not the masses of the Jewish people. The language spoken by them during the second temple was Aramaic, a Syrian, that is to say, Semitic dialect, which the Jews imbued with their own genius and in which a great part of their subsequent literature was written. Since then the vernacular of the Jews was, or, rather, their vernaculars were multifarious, varying with the countries and peoples, under whose flags the Jews found refuge during the long years of the diaspora.

Yet Hebrew has not stopped growing all this time. It has had its period and processes of evolution. The Mishna, the only purely Hebrew part of the Talmud, added to the imaginative, hyperbolic style of the Bible, a drier but a more practical and pre-

cise turn of phrase and a considerable terminology, ranging from natural sciences to everyday speech. Nor was the "Aramaic" part of the Talmud backward in this respect. Not only has it proved to be an almost inexhaustible mine of Hebrew words and terms, but it has added flavor to Hebrew terms and style and even to the Jewish vernaculars. The Yiddish style of a Mendeli Mocher Seforim, or a Shalom Aleichem, as well as the Hebrew prose of a Bialik or an Agnon would certainly lose much of their raciness, were the spice supplied them by the highly seasoned Talmudic expression or turn of phrase, taken from them. Then there came the "Golden" (Spanish) period of Hebrew literature with its contribution of philosophic and grammatical terms. Finally, there came the all-round development of Hebrew in the latest renaissance period, when Hebrew literature reached out in all directions, grappling with various modern problems, handling a multiplicity of literary forms. All this tended to make Hebrew richer, more pliant, more plastic, blazing the way for its rebirth in its ancient home as a vernacular.

It was with the rehabilitation of Palestine by the Jews that the revitalisation of Hebrew as a vernacular took place. Nothing more natural and consistent could occur. For if the point was to take up the historic web again, and continue weaving it, it would be a flimsy fabric indeed for serviceable national purposes, without its warp, the Hebrew language.

Yet Hebrew did not re-enter Palestine with flying colors as a national tongue, with the first Jewish settlers there. It had to fight its way to the fore. The first schools opened in Palestine by the colonists were conducted in any language but Hebrew. The force of habit, the habit of the diaspora, still had its grip upon the new settlers. Hebrew, to be sure, was for them no longer a "lashon hakodesh," not to be used for profane purposes. They were too progressive for a view such as this. But neither was it adapted for everyday use for them. It was not a theory with them; it was a question of practice. Surely, they would not have objected to a Hebrew vernacular; but the vernacular was not yet there. It was still to come.

The enormous task of reintroducing it was left to one man. Eliezer Ben-Yahudah, on settling in Palestine, not only proved, by introducing Hebrew into his own family, as a medium of communication, the possibilities of this language as a vernacular, but he also settled down to readapt it, consciously and artificially, to life. The two processes had to go together. The ushering in of Hebrew into an intellectual family as a vernacular meant either the rapid expansion of the language or the failure of the attempt from the start.

The endeavor was crowned with success. It has been imitated by others, and since then Hebrew as a spoken tongue has gradually pervaded the school, the lecture hall, the theater, the street. As for the endeavors of Ben-Yehudah as such, these have ac-

cumulated and have been embodied in a voluminous Hebrew dictionary, of a dozen volumes or so, begun to published during the author's lifetime and continued now after his death.

And this life-work of Ben-Yehudah has indeed been an accumulation. The vocabulary embodied in this dictionary is several times as large as that of the biblical Hebrew. The addition to the latter is, of course, not all of Ben-Yehudah's own make. He delved in all Hebrew literature to reclaim unused words and terms. He ransacked the sister languages of Hebrew, such as Arabic and Syriac, for forms upon which to model Hebrew words. He even dared to graft Hebrew forms on Aryan roots. Nor were his own creations the least part of the new vocabulary. And the new Hebrew vernacular absorbed all this, or nearly all of it, thirstily, assimilated it with the greed of a vernacular famished for thousands of years. Naturally to the chagrin of the purist—he who seeks to enforce a law of pure linguistic food taken directly from the biblical storage house. A Mapu would probably have felt dizzy looking at the steepness down which Hebrew has travelled since his day from the top of his own lofty biblical style.

Ben-Yehuda, however, by no means exhausted the subject. Hebrew as a living tongue is still in process of creation. It is still on the anvil of life to be formed into shape. Life's agencies are at work everywhere, creating and shaping it in the house and the school, in public and private life, with the workman at his work and with the child at his play. Jew-

ish life is making rapid strides in Palestine, and the Hebrew language is following suit, making perhaps some missteps in its hurry; losing a dagesh here, violating an established grammatical rule there, and indulging in a barbarism elsewhere. All this, however, is a sign of life and growth; and we are bound to take it with all its slipshod forms, just as we take life itself with all its carelessness and its solecisms and barbarisms. As for overstepping the bounds, there is the watchful eye of the school, the press, and the Waad Halashon (the philologic committee in Jerusalem), seeing to it that no such thing occur.

The Hebrew language in Palestine, however, is also confronted with other problems than the mere linguistic and stylistic ones. In the first place, there is a considerable number of people who still regard Hebrew as a "lashon hakodesh," as a tongue too sacred to be used for everyday purposes. These people not only stick to their Yiddish speech, but use the latter in their schools even for purposes of transmitting Hebrew lore to their children. Then, there is a number, tho small, that oppose Hebrew out of Yiddishistic principles and that sound at times a discordant note in the general harmony in Palestine. Finally, there is the problem of handling linguistically the adults and children stranded on the shores of Palestine by the constant wave of immigration. It is true that there is an ever increasing number of people with a Hebrew knowledge among the immigrants. It is also true that the vastest majority of these immigrants are in favor of Hebrew. Still there is a

vast number of them without a knowledge of Hebrew, thus bringing in a Babel of languages into Palestine. But what is more serious is the question of providing a Hebrew education for the immigrant children. The influx of children of school age is entirely out of proportion to the provision made for Hebrew education in Palestine. It is quite natural, therefore, for the surplus of children, not absorbed in the system of the existing modern Hebrew schools, to flow into undesirable channels, such as the old-fashioned Heder, a number of which have lately sprung up in the country, and in which Yiddish is the prevalent language.

There is, however, no danger for Hebrew from all that. The historic Hebrew tradition is strongly alive in Palestinian Jewry. Again, Hebrew serves as a cementing force between those Jews who have no other linguistic medium of communication and mutual understanding,—as between the Ashkenazi and Yemenite or the Sephardic, between the occidental and the oriental Jew. The handful of those who oppose Hebrew as a vernacular in principle will not be able to retard the process of Hebraization now going on in Palestine. The most vital and intellectual elements; the workers, teachers, and writers are standard bearers of Hebrew and its staunchest defenders, and the thousands of pupils, yearly leaving the Hebrew schools and entering upon all walks of life, are a great asset for the Hebrew language. The very fact that Palestinian Jewry is now pervaded by a Babel of languages serves as a

strong impetus to the aspiration for a common, unified medium of expression, with the weight naturally being thrown on the side of Hebrew.

The fate of the Hebrew language, is of course, bound up with that of Hebrew literature. Modern Hebrew literature is not a Palestinian product. Beginning in Germany as far back as the time of Moses Mendelson, who was its sponsor; it had a short period of respite there. It passed thence to Galicia, where its main contribution consisted in the creation of the so-called "Jewish Science" (Hochmath Israel), and thence to Russia, where it experienced the storm and stress of the Haskalah movement in the third quarter of the last century. It budded forth, however, later, simultaneously with the nationalistic movement, into no mean medium of thought and expression. Modern Hebrew literature, thus begun as a meandering stream at the end of the 18th century, broadened out into a lordly river at the beginning of the 20th century, bearing on its bosom a national craft, which has been managed by such skillful pilots as Ahad-Haam, Bialik, Tchernichovsky, and a host of others. At no period, however, in the diaspora, not even at the period of renaissance in Hebrew literature in Russia, did the odor of the soil, the national soil, pervade Hebrew literature, as it does now in Palestine. If Palestine has become, in a great measure, the rallying point for the Jews of the world, it has become so, in a still greater measure, for Hebrew literature. The Russian-Jewish center having been

destroyed, at least for Jewish cultural purposes, and the Jewish centers in some other European countries having been severely shaken, Palestine has become a place of refuge for a great number of Hebrew writers who would otherwise have been perhaps active now outside of that country. You will, therefore, find there now a galaxy of shining luminaries of Hebrew literature to be found nowhere else. It is not this factor, however, which makes Hebrew literature in Palestine tingle with life. It is the fact that this literature has made common cause with a national life in expansion. In the diaspora, even in its most flourishing period, Hebrew literature had, after all, hardly ever been the mouth-piece of a people in active self expression. It had rather been the organ of a nation in the abstract, in its potentialities. Nor had it ever reflected the actual life of the people there. The bulk of the Jewish people had very little to do with it; it had not given of its life's blood to vitalize it. If the first Jewish socialists had originally adopted Hebrew as the medium of their propaganda, they soon had to abandon it for a fitter medium, when they wanted to appeal to the masses,—Yiddish, the vernacular of the latter. Again, secular education the Jewish youth sought in a European school, a European language, a European literature, though the inducement thereto may have come from the Hebrew. Hence Hebrew literature was practically narrowed down to Yehaduth, to a *Jewish* content. Ahad Haam furnished a theoretic and practical

setting for this tendency. In all Hebrew publications in which he was interested: the monthly "Hashiloah," the publication society "Ahiasaf," the prospective encyclopedia "Ozar Hayehaduth," he practically banished subjects with no Jewish tenor in them. He did it not out of narrow-mindedness. He himself had enjoyed an extensive secular education, making ample use of it in his theories of Jewish history and life. It was simply a matter of national economy with him. The very limited material and spiritual means at the disposal of Hebrew literature was not to be squandered on luxuries. It was to go solely towards vitalizing Jewish thought, towards deepening Jewish sentiments as such. However it be, Hebrew literature in the diaspora had narrowed down, and there is certainly a modicum of truth in the accusation of the radicals there that it had become the inheritance of the middle class—in the diaspora.

The case is entirely different in Palestine. Here Hebrew literature has become the expression of a fully evolving national life. The material and spiritual means at the disposal of Hebrew literature are even there very limited; but it would be absurd to apply now the principle of the national economy of Ahad Haam. He himself would repudiate it now. The very system of the Hebrew school would be a live protest against it, would make it a mockery. Life in Palestine is crying out for need of a broader vision, a wider grasp of things. Nay, there is no longer room for the exercise of prin-

ciples and casting about for pros and cons therein. Life is the decisive factor in this respect. Agricultural experiments necessitate a diffusion of agricultural knowledge among the Jewish farmers, and an agricultural literature is springing up. The rural worker feels the necessity of an organ for practical work in field and garden, and an agricultural magazine ("Hasadeh") is created. The need is felt among merchants and manufacturers of widening their commercial and industrial knowledge, and a new magazine ("Mischar Wetaasiah") is established. And similarly is the case with the Theater and the opera, with the medical association, with the teachers' organization, etc. "Need" and "possibility," around which war was waged by Ahad Haam and his opponents in the diaspora, as to the policy to be pursued by Hebrew literature, are not at all debatable terms in Palestine. Life is the determinant of both.

Hebrew literature is thus a really live factor in Palestine. It reflects life, being its verbal representative. It is not a "luxury," nor a matter of mere national romanticism; it is a piece of national reality. Again, it is no longer the exclusive heritage of any group or faction; it has become the common possession of all classes of Jewry. Three Hebrew dailies are now issued there, representing the three social or political classes: "The Doar Hayom" representing the interests of the conservatives, the "Haaretz" those of the liberals, and the "Hadavar"—those of the workmen. What points, however, to

a hold upon the life of the masses is the fact that a number of Hebrew folk songs have of late anonymously been broadcasted in Palestine.

The aim of this chapter is not to make an evaluation of Hebrew literature in Palestine, but rather to indicate its social and national status. It will be, however, to the purpose to point out its most salient characteristics.

In the first place, Hebrew literature in Palestine is not without its literary currents, each practically running in its own channel. The "Hashiloah," a monthly established by Achad Haam and originally devoted to the "purely Jewish" tendency, has changed colors under the editorship of Achad Haam's disciple, Joseph Klausner, and particularly lately, under the joint editorship of the latter and Jacob Fichman, a poet and critic of note. It not only admits into its pale a wide range of worldly subjects, but it even tolerates mildly modernist vagaries. It keeps up, however, in the main, its classic literary tradition.

Less assuming than the "Hashiloah" is the "Hedim," a bi-monthly, neatly and fairly tastefully edited by the two poets and short story writers, Asher Barash and Jacob Rabinovitz, the latter also a journalist of some ability. The "Hedim" does not publish any scientific stuff or insist upon original productions as the "Hashiloah." But it has contributed towards the polishing of literary taste, particularly among the youth, and popularized a

number of European writers, even such as Lord Dunsany, by translating them into Hebrew. This magazine stands between the classic and the modernist literary tendencies, but with decided leanings towards the latter.

A recent creation has been the modernist monthly "Sedan," edited and published single-handedly by the violently modernist poet, Uri Zewi Greenberg.

As for the content and literary variety of Hebrew literature in Palestine, the following points may be emphasized: (a) The poem and the novel, which dealt at first with the life and nature of the diaspora, is now drawing more and more upon the sources of Palestinian life and natural scenery. (b) Exact and nature sciences have so far been confined to text books. Social sciences, with the exception of history and geography, have hardly been touched upon in the schools and have only been treated sporadically in Hebrew literature. On the other hand, there has been a distinct advance in another direction: the study of Palestine itself, which has been till now in the hands of non-Jews. Equipped with enthusiasm for the subject and with those particular historic and philologic tools drawn from the storehouse of the Talmud and later Hebrew writings, at the disposal of the Jewish people more than of others, it is to be hoped that herein the Jewish student, and, in consequence, Hebrew literature, will display true scholarship and originality.

CHAPTER X

JEW AND ARAB

“MAN is measure of all things.” We are liable to create our gods in our own image and interpret distant phenomena in terms of our own immediate environment.

It is characteristically so in the conception the world has of the relation between Jew and Arab in Palestine,—a conception that has been prejudiced by Western civilisation. Even those people who go to Palestine with good intentions, who wish to learn the truth about the relation between the two, go about it with what might be called an anthropologic fallacy. They project the political and economic ideas, the political and economic environment, say, of the United States or England, into the life of the Arabs in Palestine, whose economic environment and political ideas are still primitive. Hence, if they go to interview a Musa Kazim Pasha, the self-styled “uncrowned king” of the Arabs, and hear from his own lips, that “there will never be peace between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine,” or that “England should learn the lesson from Syria,” they immediately sound the alarm. They fancy him to be a man standing at the head

of a strong national party, backed by tens of thousands of people and with a wide-spread public opinion behind him, and think that his utterances issue directly from the nationalistic, anti-Zionistic sentiments of the Arabic people.

There are, however, some other categories of people, who do not go about this matter so innocently, but who are interested in magnifying the gravity of the situation. There are, in the first place, some very Christian Christians: monks, missionaries, etc., in whose subconsciousness lurks a hidden fear, lest the settlement of Palestine by the Jews harm the interests of the Christian religion. They, therefore, seek to discredit the Jewish settlement there and endeavor to exaggerate the opposition of the Arabic people to Zionism. Again, there are some English officials in Palestine who are interested in widening the gap between Jews and Arabs. This class of officials generally come from English colonies, where they were used to deal with "natives." In Palestine they find again the "native" in the Arab; but, at the same time, they meet with another class of people, the Jews,—Europeans like themselves, standing upright and not to be dealt with arbitrarily. Here the English official feels, that though he is politically the more favored, the Jew is socially and culturally, to say the least, not his inferior, and can even be his rival in highest officialdom. The Arab is, therefore, more convenient for him; he is the typical "native," more pliant

and more submissive. Hence a more favorable attitude towards the latter—at the expense of the Jew. This type of official, however, seems to be diminishing in number, in proportion as the Jews multiply in the land. Officialdom is simply beginning to reckon with facts as they are, and, besides, there is a better acquaintance with the aims and activities of the Jews in the country.

Then there is still the opposition to Zionism, and hence the exaggeration of the animosity between Jew and Arab, on the part of some English newspapers. It is an opposition that is partly traditional, hailing from the time when the liberals and the laborites were in power; and holding to the old principle of beating your neighbor's Jew when you are at variance with your neighbor, they employed this principle in their opposition to those governments, which had decided upon Palestine as a home for the Jewish people. Partly, however, this opposition to Zionism is clearly to be ascribed to an ingrained anti-Jewism. Yet this attitude, it must be said, has of late been relaxing in the English press.

Finally, there still remains the class of newspaper men in general who are interested in marketing fancy for fact, having to feed the printer's devil with sensations.

Facts are, however, far from being such as people imagine or want to make others believe. One must be for some time in the east in order

to understand, for instance, how such "leaders" as Musa Kazim come to the fore and maintain themselves there, and to learn that their vainglorious utterances are far from being the expression of the real sentiments of the people.

The bulk of the Arabs in Palestine, the *felahin* (the peasants) and the majority of the town dwellers are simple people leading a primitive economic life and knowing nothing of politics. They have much ado getting their bare subsistence. It would never occur to them to establish any political organisation as such. They are glad to be let alone politically, if only an opportunity be given them to improve their condition economically.

If, therefore, we read about the protests and utterances of the "Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arabs," we should not be misled into thinking that an elective body is here speaking, as the mouthpiece of the Arabs in Palestine, who stand as a solid body at their back. *The Executive Committee of the Arabs in Palestine is, in reality, a self-appointed committee or rather a committee appointed by 30-40 effendis, semi-feudal land proprietors and primitive manufacturers, oppressors and exploiters of the Arabic peasant and the Arabic workmen, who come together, and, self-appointed, select from their midst a number of people whom they call the Executive.*

It is to this faction, then, that the Arabic self-styled Executive owes its existence. It has nothing

to do with the bulk of the Arabic people, in whose name it makes pompous declarations; it stands aloof from them. In all the years of its existence, it has "executed" nothing whatsoever for the benefit of the people. It has opened no bank for them; it has established no school; it has not even created the smallest fund for purposes of education or relief or any other public utility. Its activity has consisted all this time in sending telegrams of protest, in inditing lying accusations against Jews and Zionism, in swaggering and vainglorious threats of revolutions.

And it is not out of love for their people that these "representatives" carry on their anti-Zionist activity. In the first place, they have private grievances against the Jews. The latter have been a factor in estranging their workmen from them, in emancipating the Arabic laborer from these semi-feudal lords, by offering the former a higher wage than they have ever been getting in the service of the latter. And not the least factor in this work of emancipation has been the endeavors of the Jewish workmen to organise the Arabic laborer against exploitation. Again, there has been the fear of direct competition in the economic field, as government officials or as industrials. Nablus, for example, with its primitive soap-manufacturing is in deadly fear of Haifa or Tel-Aviv with their modern soap factories. But instead of having recourse to modernizing his industry in order to

become a successful competitor of the Jew, the Arabic manufacturer would prefer solving the problem by getting rid of the Jew together with his modernism.

Finally, a psychologic factor, too, is here at work. These notables, as members of the richest families in Palestine, played a great role in the pre-war society there. From them the higher government officials were taken; they were chosen (not elected) to the Turkish parliament in Constantinopol, and they were the "representatives" of the Arabs in Palestine, to whom the latter were subjected and to whom they looked up as to patricians. This idyllic state is now passing out of existence,—and through the fault of the Jews. It is the latter that now divert the eyes of the Arabs from them. It is they who are now being looked up to, who attract the eye of the Arabic people by their higher culture, by their greater energy and initiative, by their more modern way of life. And this fact it is that is resented by the Arabic notables.

Psychologically, then, the whole opposition to the Jews and to Zionism on the part of the Arabic "executive" and its immediate followers is simply a manoeuver to keep their position as "leaders of the people." Here they have a chance not only to challenge their enemies, the Jews, but to change their slogan and pose as political leaders, instead of feudal leaders, as they have been till now. But that they are not in dead earnest in their opposition

to Zionism may be gathered from the well-known fact, broached even by the Arabic press, that "*some members of the executive and their immediate abettors are Jewish agents for the purchase of lands.* Moreover, just as in the times of the Turks these notables were a faction for themselves, representing the people only insofar as the specimen in the museum represents the species, so now, too, they form a category for themselves, neither representing the real interests of the people nor doing anything for their benefit nor leading them, having no appreciable following from among them.

For the great bulk of the Palestinian Arabs are by no means opposed to the coming of the Jews, but, on the contrary, are interested in having the Jews settle in the country. The coming of the latter means for the Arab the sale of his labor, his lime, his garden and field produce, his land, at prices never dreamed of before. It means his opportunity to cure the sore eyes of his children almost gratis in the Jewish dispensary, and the chance of getting support from the Jewish workman in the struggle against exploitation on the part of his "leaders."

Now a story is current abroad that no land is to be gotten by the Jews any longer in Palestine, because of the anti-Zionist sentiment prevailing there. This is mere fiction. The Arabic population has no objection whatsoever to the sale of land to the Jews. Enter an Arabic village and you will immediately be approached as to the purchase of

land. There is a legend among the Arabs to the effect that the Jews will ultimately regain the country, and in their fatalistic Islamic belief, this purchasing of land by the Jews is, in their eyes, simply the fulfilment of that legend. Only that this simple legend of yore has now become a golden legend for the Arab. Let the means be forthcoming, and their golden legend will become a brilliant reality for the Jews.

An objection to all that has been said here is, of course, at hand. How can you reconcile all this with the recent outbreaks against the Jews in Palestine? The answer is, that these outbreaks have as such nothing to do with anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish sentiments on the part of the rioters. They were not spontaneous, rising from the main-spring of national and political sentiments. They were the result of instigation, backed by the promise of immediate material gain, in the form of loot, on the one hand—a promise almost enough to tempt even a law-abiding people into disorder—and, on the other hand, by the connivance of the government. It was with the cry “dola maana” (the government is with us) that the rioters first spread over the streets of Jerusalem in the year 1920.

And the government—the military administration of Palestine at that time—really was with them, at least in their sympathies. Peruse the book of Colonel Paterson, *With the Judaeans in Pales-*

tine—which, parenthetically, deserves more attention than has been paid it, as a book that offers invaluable material for the history of perhaps the most critical period in the history of Zionism,—particularly the last part of it, and you will be convinced of the truth of the above statement. And if in the year 1921 the government, the civil administration, was not in sympathy with the rioters, there are proofs extant that the fingers of some officials, whether still serving the government or not, were in the pie, and there were also sure signs that the officials of another government, too, were mixed up in the instigation.

The governments, however, have learned a better lesson since, and the rank and file of the Arabs have come to understand that riots do not pay any longer. They did not pay even in 1920 and 1921. It is questionable who sustained greater total losses then, the Jews or the Arabs. But they surely do not pay now. The Jews have multiplied in the land and are no longer the vanishing minority that they were then. Tel-Aviv has grown to about twice the size of Jaffa, and a Jewish majority in Haifa is merely a question of a couple of years. Jewish and Arabic merchants rub shoulders in the market, and not to the disadvantage of the latter. The Jewish flour mills at Haifa raised the income of the Arabic farmer by paying him higher prices for his grain, which he had been compelled to sell at a lower price, for export. Between the Arabic and

the Jewish workman there is growing a mutual understanding. Arabic young men come in considerable numbers to Jewish schools and evening courses. Surely, the Arab has not lost but gained by the influx of the Jews into Palestine.—And riots no longer pay.

Hence the “Executive” is disobeyed more and more in its orders to “protest.” Hence, in spite of the excommunication of Balfour by that committee, some three hundreds sheikhs from the villages around the central Palestinian station, Ludd, assembled to meet and greet Balfour on his arrival in Palestine, in April, 1925. Similarly scores of Bedouins and Arabic farmers came to pay Balfour their respects on his arrival in Balfouria, in the Valley of Jezreel. Hence, the “Executive” is becoming more and more ludicrous with its swaggering threats.

So far the discussion has touched upon the relation of the Arabs towards the Jews. There is, however, another side to the question: the relation of the latter to the former. And here, too, there is one moot point that has to be cleared up before one comes to a conclusion. It is the movement against employing the Arabic workmen in agriculture and industry—a movement shared in even by the Jewish workmen in Palestine.

How can this movement be harmonised with what has been said above as regards the present

and prospective good relations between the two nationalities. In fact, this has been a point most misunderstood and eagerly snatched at by the enemy to prove the narrowness and jingoism of Zionism. Superficially the charge appears very grave, irrefutable. One need, however, know conditions and do a little bit of thinking to see its futility.

There are two considerations, which not only perfectly justify this attitude towards the Arabic workman, but make it a necessity. In the first place, there is the question of national self-preservation. The Jews are still a minority in Palestine. Our future there lies in our becoming a majority in the country. We must have this majority not in order to be able to outrule and oppress others, but in order not to be outruled and oppressed by others, when a democratic autonomy is finally granted to Palestine. And in order to achieve this aim, we cannot afford to let the Arabic workman pervade all branches of agriculture and industry, at the expense of the Jewish workman, and thus endanger our very future in Palestine. We may as well not enter the lists, knowing beforehand that the race is lost for us. We do not mean to drive the Arabic workman from the position that he is now holding. We could not do so, had we even wanted to. Economically the Jewish workman cannot compete with him, as a cheap laborer. And had there been the slightest move on the part of the Arabic

population to employ Jewish labor, the case would have been different. As it is, not a single Jewish workman is employed by an Arab in all Palestine. Again, the resources of the country are far from being unlimited. Should we, therefore, allow things in Palestine to develop on the lines of least resistance, we would be swamped with Arabic labor, which would mean not only the blasting of our hopes, of a majority in the country, but also the shattering of our dream of seeing the Jewish people reach out after forms of life which have been foreign to them in the diaspora.

The negative attitude towards Arabic labor is, then, not chauvinistic, but one of national self-preservation. It is not dictated by antagonism towards the Arab, but by solicitude for our future. It is not directed against the employment of the Arabs as such, but against their exclusive employment. It is only a temporary means of self-protection, which is getting out of date in proportion as the Jews increase in numbers in the country and the Jewish workman gains a firmer foothold there.

Secondly, there is the attitude of the organised Jewish workman. And here I want to set at ease the troubled conscience of the very Socialistic Socialists, at the "gross injustice" done the Arab worker, and say: The latter is not only a political and national problem to us; he is also a troublesome economic factor. He is unorganised, a cheap

laborer, a scab. He is, therefore, a constant menace to organised labor, to a higher scale of wages, to a higher standard of living for the worker. And this has not been the least reason for the attitude of the Jewish workman towards him.

The sense of justice of the Jewish workman, however, did not let him stop short at this negative attitude. Instead of breaking lances with the Arabic workman as an enemy, he found it more to the purpose, to the labor ideal, to make common cause with him, to organise him and face about towards the common enemy — capitalism. This means, naturally, first and foremost, the organisation of the Arabic workman. The story of this organisation will be given in a later chapter. What may be pointed out in this connection is the fact that the endeavors at organisation have met with more or less success only in those branches of industry or in those quarters where the interests of the Jewish and the Arabic workmen do not clash. Where they do come in conflict, the workmen of these two nationalities have so far not warmed up to a mutual good feeling. Yet with the general understanding constantly growing between them, the old slogan "kibush haavodah" (the conquest of work) had consistently to be given up and replaced by a new one, more consonant with the new situation that has arisen between the Jewish and the Arabic workmen: "War upon cheap labor and scabism."

Thus, neither the Jewish workman nor, otherwise, the Jewish nationalist opposes Arabic labor out of chauvinistic motives. This opposition is a phase of a struggle for national and economic existence—a struggle the edge of which is becoming blunter with the deeper striking of roots in the Palestinian soil on the part of the Jewish people.

CHAPTER XI

LIFE AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE JEWISH WORKMEN

THE life of the Jewish workman in Palestine differs from that of the Jewish workman elsewhere, not only because general conditions in that country differs from those of other countries, but because the Jewish workman there organised his life differently from the very beginning. It is a life of his own, expansive and largely self-determined, the chief characteristics of which are: selfness, initiative, and clarity of aim—characteristics that are reflected in the numerous institutions that he is in process of creating.

The Jewish workmen in Palestine fall into two general categories: city and rural workmen, both of which may be subdivided into hired and independent workers. According to statistics, drawn up on Dec. 31, 1925, the city workmen were engaged in the following trades: building, manufacturing building materials, stone cutting, wood work, metal work, electricity, transport, painting, printing, carton work, needle work, textiles, leather, baking, bookbinding, beadle and janitor trades, butcher

trade, waiting, clerkship, sanitation, railroad, post and telegraph. In these trades, the majority of the workmen are wage earners; but there is a large number who are either organised in cooperatives for themselves: tailors, shoemakers, metal workers, printers, carpenters etc., or are employed in the workmen's institutions or in trades which are in the hands of the workmen's organisation. Such are, for example, the road and house building trades, which are carried on largely by the Solel-Boneh,—a building institution connected with the workmen's organisation. Among the rural laborers, on the other hand, there are more independent workmen, distributed in Kevutzoth and Moshevey Ovedim, than wage earners, employed by Jewish farmers.

The economic condition of the workmen varies with their life in town or in country. The workman who comes to Palestine, generally does so with the intention of settling in the village; but agricultural opportunities being limited, he settles temporarily in town, engaging in a city trade, say, building, in the hope of going over or of being transferred some day to a rural occupation,—a vain hope in most cases. Thus, a class of workmen has been created in the Jewish town, that serves as an index of industrial development of the town, that is a power to be reckoned with in politics, and that becomes a problem in time of unemployment.

In town, the Jewish workman in Palestine leads

a life resembling that of any other city workman, leaving, of course, margin for the industrial non-development of the country. He makes a living when there is work; he starves when there is unemployment. For wages being rather low, there can be but little saving for a rainy day. In time of unemployment, he is, therefore, immediately set adrift. Then he has to fall back upon collective assistance. It is this collective assistance, given by the organisation of the workmen, that has not only made life bearable for him, but that lent him a status in the Palestinian town, and it is this organisation that has fought out for him tolerable conditions of subsistence,—a fight that has by no means been easy. He who knows the relations between the workmen and the employers in Palestine only from afar will wonder at the frequency of strikes occurring there,—a fact that is entirely out of proportion to the industrial conditions of the country, and that has given food for complaint to many a grumbler, who would seek in Palestine “different” industrial conditions than elsewhere. The fact is, however, that it is the minimum of existence around which the fight generally goes on. The workman, coming to Palestine as an idealist, as one desiring to participate in the building of the country, is glad to get any work, even at a starvation wage. The employer, on the other hand, coming to Palestine as to a non-industrial country, makes his calculations upon the underpayment of

his workmen. He may not do so out of hard-heartedness. He probably came there with insufficient funds, to initiate an industry, for the introduction of whose product into the market he has to fight hard against prejudices and to replenish the initial deficits of which there is hardly any credit in the country. But the workman cannot organise his life in keeping with these calculations or miscalculations; the time comes when he begins to realise that in order to make both ends meet it will not do merely to stretch any more what has already been stretched to the point of snapping, but that something must be added in order that the other end may be met. Thus a series of wrestling begins in the form of strikes, which, however, but gradually yield results. And yet a series of advantages has been fought out for the Jewish workman in Palestine; together with a minimum wage, there has been established an eight hour work day and the principle of payment of a certain percentage by the employer to the treasury of the workmen's organisation as sick benefit for his employees. All this has been realised mainly by the endeavors of the workmen's organisation; but it must be said with satisfaction, that the Jewish community in Palestine at large has been keenly and impartially interested in this industrial struggle. In its desire to settle things amicably, it appointed, through its representative body, the Waad Leumi, a committee of fifteen, to which

difficult cases of dispute between employer and workmen are referred,—an opportunity amply made use of.

One of the difficult problems of the city workman is the question of housing, especially in such places as Tel-Aviv, where rental is high, in normal times, much too high for a wage earner. A movement is, therefore, on foot among the workmen to establish special workmen's quarters, on national fund lands, around the towns,—some such quarters having already been established. Meanwhile, however, the workmen do the best they can under the circumstances: they live several in one room; they dwell in tents, and wherever wooden barracks are permissible, they build barracks for themselves, being exposed to all hardships and difficulties of the same. The city workman has his trials and problems, but he also occupies a very prominent place in the city, economically as well as politically. There some of his most efficient cooperatives are found, and there he carries on a most effective educational activity. In town he is a powerful factor in politics, and, what is most important, in town one of the most effective of his institutions is at work—the Solel-Boneh.

The Solel-Boneh is a "Jewish Workers Cooperative association for public works, building, and manufacture" and is run by the workmen's organisation. Its object is: "I. To unite on a cooperative basis workers engaged in all branches of public

works, building, and manufacture. II. To carry on cooperative business and manufacture, and carry out contracts of all kinds of public works, building, and manufacture. III. To assist members in specializing in all branches of work and to improve their condition materially and morally, on the basis of mutual assistance."

This is an institution at first assisted by the Zionist Organisation, but gradually working its way to success, and in 1925 it could even record a profit. But what is of importance is that it is particularly this institution of all institutions of the workmen in Palestine that marks off the Palestinian from all other Jewish workmen, and, for that matter, from any other body of workmen, outside of Russia. For it is this institution that lends a new aspect to the life of the worker, that bestows a new function to his organisation. For, unlike other labor organisations, whose business is merely to protect the interests of the workman as a wage earner, there is here an endeavor to make the body of workmen industrially independent, to combine the capitalist and the workman in one, as it were, to fraternize labor and capital and lend them a common purpose. The Solel-Boneh is thus a novel experiment in the history of labor outside of Russia, whereas it occupies a very prominent place in the development of Palestine, in that it is the largest contracting concern in the country, building houses,

streets, and roads, and doing similar work of construction.

This and other institutions, most of which work in the country as well as in the city, are bright spots in the life of the Jewish city workman in Palestine, and therein lie his possibilities in the developing town.

The agricultural workmen may be differentiated into several classes. There is, in the first place, the main division between those working in private colonies and those who work independently in groups or as individual farmers on national fund lands. Again, those who work in private colonies may be further subdivided into hired laborers and workers in contracting groups. The former are the most handicapped of the two, inasmuch as they have a constant economic menace in the cheap Arabic farmhand, with whom the Jewish laborer cannot possibly compete. As a hired workman, the Jew is, therefore, hardly successful in the private colony. On the other hand, he succeeded in establishing himself there, at least, in the larger colony, in another way, namely, in contracting groups, undertaking the general cultivation of an orange grove or a vineyard. There is now a slowly increasing number of farmers giving over their orange groves or vineyards to the Jewish contracting group for cultivation. This group has, however, another function, the one indicated in a previous

chapter, of serving also as a practical school for some newcomers, who are sent there by the workmen's organisation to get their agricultural training. Thus it serves as a sort of transitional group, preparing workmen for future groups to be established on land.

A more independent type of workmen's group is the agricultural groups formed around the towns and villages, and engaging in dairy products, in the raising of poultry, and the growing of vegetables. There is a fair number of these, among them several women's groups. They work on National Fund or hired lands, sell their products in neighboring towns and villages, and are perhaps the most flourishing types of workmen's agricultural groups.

It is, however, the third type of agricultural groups that are the most numerous, the most interesting, and about which there has been so much controversy within the Zionist ranks. It is the general type of the agricultural "settlement" groups. A small number of them is settled on lands belonging to the J. C. A., but the largest number is settled on the national fund lands, the means having been furnished by the Keren Hayesod. These groups may be classified into three subtypes: (a) Moshevey Ovedim (workmen's settlements). These are established on the basis of private ownership, but on the self imposed condition of work without hired labor,—a condition followed out to

the letter. There is, however, a good deal of co-operative work done in the colony as regards cultivation of the soil, buying and selling of products, keeping up public institutions &c., whereas the colonists themselves are one and all members of the workmen's organisation. (b) The second subtype of workmen's groups is that of the co-operative agricultural groups. These work and enjoy the produce in common. They differ, however, from the communistic groups proper, those of the Gedud Haavodah (work battallion), in that they are individual groups; and though their life is arranged on a communistic basis, they are not communistic in principle. (c) The Gedud Haavodah, the communistic groups proper. These should be distinguished from the party of communists, which counts a couple of hundred members, all told, who are scattered through all trades in Palestine. The latter are not nationalistic, nor are they Zionist or Hebraistic. As a political party they have no constructive program. Their policy is dictated, directly or indirectly, by Moscow, and consists in the opposition to everything done by Zionism in Palestine and in the instigation of the Arabs against England and the Zionists.

The program of the communistic Gedud Haavodah is diametrically opposite; it is entirely constructive as regards Zionist work. The communists of the Gedud are nationalists, Zionists, Hebraists, and it is from this angle that their

communism arises. Only in a communistic way, they maintain, can Zionism be successfully realised. In a poor country like Palestine, where needs by far outstrip means and where things are started with faith rather than with sufficient funds, there must be an interlacing of groups, an interconnection between trades, a close relation between city and village, if we want to make things work. Hence the Gedud Haavodah is not confined to the village, but is distributed over many trades and towns. And this theory is systematically carried into practice, in the various groups. Ready cash gotten from city trades is sent to the agricultural group, at the same time that the produce of the soil goes the other way,—care being taken that the distribution is equal among all members.

The three types of agricultural groups do not form economic entities for themselves, but rather represent tendencies within the general workmen's organization, whereas the establishing of the groups are carried out in accordance with the inclinations of the agricultural workmen to form this or that type of group. As for the success of the various forms of settlements, the whole affair is still in the process of experimentation; and when experience will be ripe enough to give results, there will probably be a natural elimination of the unfit type of settlement.

The life of the workman in Palestine is naturally hard, whether he be a hired city laborer, a farm

hand, or an independent agricultural worker. In the city he works fewer hours and is free from the worry and responsibility of the management of his trade; but, on the other hand, he works from hand to mouth, having to fight out economic advantages step by step. The independent rural worker is, at least, assured of a roof over his head and, generally, of his daily bread, and his position is more stable. He is also freer in his activity. He has no conflict with any employer, from whom he tries to wrest better conditions; he only has dealings with mother nature, coaxing her into yielding her bounty. But nature is a hard mistress in Palestine; having been exploited for hundreds of years by unskilled hands, she is niggardly in yielding. Some hard work and rich gifts are still required in order to propitiate dame nature and make her yield liberally. The Jewish workman knows this and works hard and long hours, at times suffering and working himself into disease, never complaining, however, except when his work remains unappreciated and his name is disparaged by his opponents, who misunderstand his aims and his ambitions. But he works himself gradually into the right path. He goes on improving the soil, enlarging his experience, heightening his skill. He gradually gets better yields, and grows more independent even of the national "budgets." He desires nothing more than this. The taunt of the "budgets," constantly cast into his

teeth by his Zionist opponents, haunts him like a nightmare, embitter his life. His most ardent desire is to get rid of them; and he does shake them off gradually, laboriously.

A strenuous life such as this tends to be serious; and the life of the Jewish workman in Palestine is indeed serious. This seriousness, however, is not of a morbid nature; it is rather earnestness and directness of purpose by which it is marked,—it is clearness of aim, that brings with itself perseverance and persistence, but that yields also the joy of self-sacrifice and buoyancy of spirit. It is true that there are moments of despair in his life: but this springs not so much from his private suffering as from the web of intrigue that is woven around him by his political opponents. It is these moments of despair that sometimes come to the fore at his meetings and conferences: what is all this for? the question is hurled in the air. Why work and suffer, if no proper response is gotten? Nay, it is probably due to these moments of despondency that the rate of suicides is comparatively higher among the Jewish workmen in Palestine than elsewhere. These spells are, however, transitory; as a whole, there is a great deal of buoyancy in his life.

This buoyancy of spirit spurts forth wherever the workman happens to live in larger numbers, in village as well as in town, breaks the monotony of everyday life, and fills the atmosphere with song

and merriment. I know of no other place in the world where the Jewish workman as such feels so free as in Palestine, and where this feeling of freedom bursts forth in so much song and such merriment as there. Hardly any provocation is needed for this jollity; no prearrangement is made for it,—no external stimulant is necessary to bring it to a pitch. It bursts forth spontaneously like the song of the bird. It is the intoxication of the pure air of freedom that works here, the spontaneity of unrestrained sentiment, the feeling that here something substantial is being created,—a creation the greatest share in which has fallen to his lot. It is a feeling that is expressed in the motto current particularly among the workmen: "It is good to live in" and just as "good to die for our country."

And it is not only in song but also in dance that this spontaneity of sentiment bursts forth. Dancing, public dancing, is another Palestinian feature that strikes the eye of the observer. But it is not the individual dance, just as it is not the individual song, that prevails, but it is the communal song and the group dance. It is perhaps the "Hora," with its powerful savage trot, the remnant, may be, of an old war dance,—into the trot of which only the mighty can fall and the length of which only the most enduring can outlast. Or perhaps it is the gentler "rondeau," which keeps on widening its circle—a symbol, one might say, of the ever

widening circle of sympathies for humanity within the breasts of the dancers,—rapidly engulfing, like the old dances of the “bene neviim,” the bystanding Sauls, the lookers-on, be they wearers of fashionable robes, of patched work shirts, or of kitchen aprons. In vain you stand by and criticise the monotony, the lack of esthetics in all this,—you yourself are drawn into the circle and whirl round, until you stagger out flushed and breathless. It is the vortex of life, of social life, that has drawn you into it.

This communal singing and group dancing is indeed symbolic of the group activity that marks the life of the Jewish workman in Palestine, that gives it zest, that lends it power and endurance to fall into the trot of the Hora of life, to whirl about in the rondeau of existence, that enriches it and makes it an object of wonder alike to friend and foe. Were it not for this group activity, the life of the workman in that country would have been not only the poorer, but hardly endurable.

It is this group activity that has created for the workman a series of institutions, economic, political, medical, and educational, which have been the admiration of a world. By group activity, however, is meant in the case of these institutions, the activity of the workman's organisation. The Jewish workman in Palestine is organised, not only in political parties, but also in a federation of unions. It would be an error, however, to think

of this federation, or, as it is called, Histadruth, in the terms of the American Federation of Labor or the Jewish Gewerkschaften. The Palestinian "Federation" is not merely an organisation whose purpose is to protect the interests of labor versus capital; it also has the function of doing creative work. Palestine is a country upon which capitalism has not yet had time to lay its impress. Hence there is still room, even in the economic field, for initiative other than purely capitalistic. Herein the Palestinian workmen saw their chance and have created a net of institutions that do not have their equal in any other body of workmen outside of Russia.

I have spoken above of the Solel-Boneh,—an institution characteristic of the creative and independent activity of the Jewish workman in the building of Palestine. There are other economic institutions, however, that are also indicative of his creative spirit. There is the "Mashbir," (the provider), which serves in the capacity of a social heart, circulating the economic blood of the workmen. This institution was created in 1916, during the war. It was originally intended to serve humble purposes: to provide grain for the Palestinian workman at a low rate, and primarily to buy grain from the Kevutzoth for this purpose. Since then, however, it has assumed large proportions, branching out into multifarious activities. Look at the program of this institution and you will see how far its activity

reaches. It has now become, in all truth, the clearing house of the produce of the workmen, in town and village, taking in the products of the industrial cooperatives, the Kevutzoth, and Mosheve Ovedim and redistributing them according to demand. But its activity is not confined merely to the workmen; it renders its services to a great part of the population, having a chain of stores all over the country. And it must be said that its activity is greatly felt there; not only does the Mashbir assist the workmen by disposing of their produce and giving them credit in time of need, but it has been one of the great factors in bringing pure food on the market. The importance of this institution can be seen from its rapid growth. In 1917, its circulation amounted to the sum of \$3,200.00, in 1923—to some \$500,000.00, and in 1925—to \$900,000.00. Its profit alone, in 1925, was some \$85,000.00, whereas its assets grew from about \$1,500.00 in 1916 to \$40,000.00 in 1923 and \$330,000.00 in 1925.

Another financial institution is the “Bank Hapoa-lim” (the workmen’s bank), whose beneficial effect is markedly felt in the life of the workmen. It is an institution of recent date. It was established with the assistance of the Zionist organisation, the latter having given half the capital for it. The other half is being subscribed by the Jewish workmen all over the world. This bank is doing all kinds of transactions, barring speculation; but its characteristic feature is, the loaning of money not to individuals,

but to groups and cooperatives. So far the Zionist organization has had control over this bank equal to that of the workmen's organization; but the bank will free itself from this control as soon as the proper subscription of the workmen themselves will have reached a certain amount, which is about to occur. There is, however, another point to be made here, and that is, that this bank has now superseded another workmen's institution, the Kupath Poalim, which had functioned previously as a fund simply for assisting the workmen and their institutions. And this is a very significant fact. It is indicative of the direction the workmen's organization is taking. It gradually eliminates those institutions which savor of charity and philanthropy and organises its other institutions on the basis of self-support, and independence, and business methods. Like the Hamashbir, the Bank Hapoalim is a business co-operative institution.

The workmen's organization is in possession of other institutions, which are as comprehensive and as effective, if not more so, than, its financial institutions. The Kupath Holim is one combining hospital, dispensary, sanitarium, and sick benefit in one. It does not confine itself, however, to practical medical work, but is active also as an agent of enlightenment, in that it arranges lectures and issues pamphlets on medical, hygienic, and sanitary subjects. In short, its activity embraces and provides for the medical and hygienic needs of the organized

Palestinian workman, be he Jew or Arab, if only he is affiliated with the Jewish workmen's organization.

The importance of this institution cannot be too highly estimated. The Palestine Jewish workman, a pioneer in the rebuilding of the country, aggressive in reclaiming nature, necessarily has to pay the price of pioneering, to pay the dues demanded by dame nature for yielding for the first time to a more skillful manipulation. The draining of swamps, the building of roads, and the preparing for settlements in what used to be desert places, are naturally attended with fever, and the exposure to the sun is accompanied by other diseases. All this requires special means of prevention or cure,—something that can be provided only by an institution of the workmen's own. Yet, the work of reconstruction done by the workman cannot be looked at merely from the angle of employment, but must be regarded as national pioneering, the responsibility for the results of which should fall not only upon the shoulders of the workmen, but also upon those of the Zionist organization and the public at large. In point of fact, this conclusion has been reached by the latter two; and so the expense of the Kupath Holim is being covered not only by the dues paid by the workmen, but also by a percentage paid by the employers and by sums appropriated by the Zionist organization, Hadassah, etc.

The importance of the Kupath Holim, too, may be gathered from its rapid growth. From a member-

ship of 2,000, in 1920, it has grown to a membership of 14,000, in 1925, and 15,000, in 1926. The institution now possesses 75 branches all over the country, three large dispensaries in towns and 45 smaller ones in villages, and one central hospital of 49 beds and another of 16 beds, besides smaller hospitals in towns, two sanitariums, four country drug stores. It also has in its service 59 physicians, 25 of whom are specialists, 53 nurses, and 19 druggists.

Lastly, the educational institutions, which are in the hands of a special committee, and the work of which is manifold and ubiquitous. Here, too, the Palestinian workmen markedly differ from any other body of workmen, in that they not only give an opportunity to the workmen to supplement or complement their education, but that a great part of education as a whole, both of children and of adults, is in their hands. The educational work includes: schools and kindergartens in country and town, evening schools for youthful workers, clubs for the same, where sections are formed for literature, nature study, the working world, gymnastics, drama, music, trades lessons for youthful and adult workers, evening classes for the study of Hebrew and other subjects, the geography and topography of Palestine, given by special wandering lecturers. Of marked efficiency are their artistic activities. Special opera performances, concerts and dramas are given at a low rate, for the benefit of the workmen, from which, however, the public at large is

not excluded. Free lessons are given in the plastic arts and orchestras and glee clubs are established. Some useful books are published by them and a central library is maintained, possessing over fifty thousand volumes and having branches all over the country, wherever, that is to say, there exists a group of workmen.

The most noted, however, of these educational institutions of the Palestinian workmen are the work schools, that is to say, schools established on the basis of work, and the nurseries. The former are schools formed on the model of German and Russian schools of the kind. Not much can yet be said about the success or failure of this type of school, as it is still in the process of experimentation. What may be remarked, however, is that here, too, as in all other institutions of theirs, the Jewish workmen in Palestine know how to square theory and practice, how to bring reality in conformity with their ideals.

Something more definite may be said about their nurseries, of which they have a considerable number in towns and villages. These are not of the American type of day nurseries, where the sole purpose is to assist mothers in being able to earn their daily bread. The nurseries of the workmen's groups in Palestine are an organic part of the education of their children, of the makeup of the group as a whole, nay, it is a part, and probably the most important part, of the whole system of cooperation and

self-work among the workmen. The infant goes into the nursery almost as soon as it is born, and remains there all thru its infancy and childhood, up to school age, when, it is planned, the school will be to him in his school age what the nursery was to him in his infancy and kindergarten age. And the institutions are not merely *maintained* among the workmen, but the greatest regard is paid them. They are provided with the best of provisions; the last drop of milk is spared for them, the last cent is spent on them. For is it not the young generation upon whom the greatest care should be bestowed, particularly in a social life that is to be built up on a new basis?

This institution is intended to solve many a problem in the life of the workmen. In the first place, there is the solution of the problem of bringing up the child in the true social spirit, in the spirit of community of interests. Then the welfare of the individual child comes into consideration. The latter can be brought up in more healthful conditions, if he is brought up communally. For if the parents happen to live in a malarial district, the child could not be removed from the effects of the disease individually, but he can be removed in a group and placed under healthful conditions. And last, but not least, there is the solution of a problem that has troubled the mind of the workwoman in Palestine: the question of her place in the world of work. This problem will be more fully discussed in a future chapter. Briefly it may be said here, that the

workwoman in Palestine is by no means satisfied, as elsewhere, with the role of mother, but demands an equal share in work with the men. With the establishment of the type of nursery described, the problem of the woman in the group of workmen is fairly solved. It gives the woman enough freedom to attend to her work, giving her, at the same time the opportunity to work, when her turn comes, in the institution where her baby is found, or to visit the latter as the call of the mother or the child urges her to do so.

This is the life, the work, and the institutions of the Jewish workman in Palestine. It is, to be sure, a hard life that he is leading there. He labors under difficult conditions; he has to toil hard in order to coax an exploited land into yielding sufficient produce and, at the same time, to coax a people into putting faith in his ability to do so. He has to combat conservative prejudice as regards his good national intentions and radical prejudice respecting his social ideals. There is a world against him; but it is his own world that he is here creating. And it is with energy, with devotion, with earnestness, with almost superhuman exertion, that he is accomplishing this. But he *is* accomplishing it, in spite of all hindrance. His mode of life, his institutions, his organisation, one and all testify to a new departure in the life of the workmen and their possibilities, to a new departure in social and communal life. Not only a national, but a world experiment is here made.

CHAPTER XII

PROBLEMS OF THE JEWISH WORKMEN

A LIFE such as depicted in the previous chapter cannot but be fraught with problems and difficulties. And these problems are as intensive and many sided as the life of the workmen itself. Some of them have been hinted at or more fully discussed in the foregoing pages. Here I shall confine myself to the most unique and fascinating of them all: that of the economic versus the political organization of the Jewish workmen in Palestine and that of the relation of the latter to the Arabic laborer.

The Jewish workmen are, in their large majority, organized economically in one organisation, the Histadruth. As indicated above, tho the latter is a federation of unions, it is much more than this; it actually embraces the whole life of the workmen: social, economic, and intellectual. Now, in a country which is still backward socially as well as economically and politically, and in which two peoples are running a race for political power, the people that will succeed in making the greatest social and economic progress will be likely to become the greater political power. In other words, econ-

omic, social, and cultural development goes, in a country such as this, more than elsewhere, hand in hand with political progress. Ten colonies built in an economically strategic place like the Valley of Jezreel are not merely an economic but a political advantage. Hence, a party that controls, to a large extent, the economic issues of its constituents, in a country such as this, should naturally be the arbiter of their political issues. To complete the syllogism then, the Histadruth, fulfilling the condition of controlling the economic interests of the workmen, should also represent their political interests. In reality, however, it is not so, but their political life is in the hands of various parties, which stand outside and, politically, above this organization.

Why this anomaly? It is a result of tradition and example. The workmen's parties preceded the Histadruth. They were formed at a time when the union in Palestine was merely a union, divested from all political power. The boundaries between the union and the political party were thus clearly defined, as much as they could be so in a non-political country, such as Palestine was at that time,—the party being only potentially political. There were two such parties among the Palestinian workmen: the Poaley Zion and the Hapoel Hazair, the former Socialistic, the latter democratic. Their influence was considerable, not only upon the workmen, to raise their class and national consciousness, but also upon the young Jewish settlement, at least in not

letting the minds stagnate into peacefulness,—something dangerous to a youthful community. Incidentally, their influence was telling in another direction, too, in clean journalism and in literature proper; for they succeeded in gathering around their publications the sincerest and most talented men of letters in Palestine. Otherwise the political activities of these parties were almost nil, except perhaps in the way of mutual bickerings and in the establishing of unions, each party in conformity with its own credo.

This division of functions between the union and the political party was carried into practice in imitation of conditions in the western countries. It may have been appropriate in the pre-war conditions in Palestine. But things have changed immensely since then. The Jewish workmen in Palestine occupy a strong position; they are organised in a powerful economic organisation, and they are a political force because of this organisation. Yet, tradition and example are still at work as regards the division of functions between the union or the Histadruth and the political party.

This discrepancy between life and tradition has resulted in many an inconsistency and confusion in the activities of the workmen. The Histadruth, that has an imperialistic sway over the life of the workmen, relegates to the “political” parties the defense of the interests of the workmen at the Zionist congresses. In some Kehilloth and townships, the His-

tadruth puts out candidates for elections, whereas in others the tendency is for the political parties to do so.

All this is confusing to the workmen,—a confusion which probably marks, however, the transitional stage from the dual to the monistic period in the organization of the workmen.

It will, of course, be argued, and truly so, that there are various political opinions within the body of workmen, which naturally tend to organize themselves into groups. The answer is, that what is meant here is not the stifling or the leveling of opinions, but bringing them into logical coherence. The differences of political opinions may crystalize themselves in factions, fighting their battles within the large organised body of workmen, but not stand outside and above it, not trying to divide what is really indivisible.

Another problem, which is very acute in the life of the workmen in Palestine is the relation between the Jewish and the Arabic workman. The question is by no means simple. The Jewish workman is not only organized; he is also a higher wage earner and has a higher standard of living than the Arab, who is unorganized, underbids the labor market, and is ready at any time to become a scab. We have, then, in our case the equation: the native workman is to the immigrant workman what the latter is to the former elsewhere. This inverse ratio in itself would suffice to complicate matters between the Jewish and

the Arabic workman. The case, however, is made more acute by the fact that we are after all dealing here with members of two peoples that at times stand in open animosity to each other.

Yet all this did not prevent the Jewish workman from taking the initiative in extending a friendly hand to his Arabic fellow workman. Now, there was only one way which could lead to an understanding and to cooperation between the two, namely, to organize the latter. But when the Jewish workman set himself this task, he found it beset with difficulties. There was a wide gulf yawning between the two. In customs and habits the Arab differs from the Jew more widely than the latter does from the European non-Jew. Again, tho the Arabic workman is a slave to his employer, yet there exist traditional patriarchal relations between the two, which it would be difficult to sever. As a matter of fact, the attempt to sever these relations by organising the Arabic workman, has actually been resented by the effendis, the landowners, the employers, to whom an organisation such as this would spell revolt against the semi-feudal system still prevailing between them and their workers. And there is no doubt that this resentment was one of the explosive elements in the outbreak against the Jews in Palestine on May the first, 1921, and that it has served as a stimulus to the opposition to Jewish immigration thither.

There existed, however, a more serious obstacle in

the way of an understanding between the Jewish and the Arabic workman. The former was opposed to the employment of the latter among Jews. This opposition, it is true, by no means sprang from any animosity towards the Arab as such, but was dictated, firstly, by the national consciousness that the widespread employment of Arabs would bring to naught the endeavor of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, and, secondly, by the general opposition on the part of the organized workman to the employment of cheap labor. Yet, here is, on the face of it, at least, a psychologic discrepancy, an evident inconsistency between the sentiment above-mentioned and the endeavor to arrive at an understanding with the Arabic workman—one of the paradoxes into which all new settlements are liable to fall.

This contradiction has become glaringly evident in the relation between the Jewish workman and the village Arabs employed in the Jewish colonies. Tho the latter are very easy of access, working as they do at times together with the Jewish workmen on the same farm, yet as regards organisation, they are the most difficult to handle. For the consciousness seems to be prevalent among them that were they to organise and demand a betterment of their condition, they would lose more than gain in the process. And there is good reason for this feeling. The strength of the Arabic labor market in the Jewish colony lies mainly in its cheapness; hence, an endeavor on the part of the Arabic workman to im-

prove his condition would probably result in his being ousted from his position by the Jewish workman. Not that the latter would do so intentionally, but the natural course of events would lead to it. Should the Jewish workman, then, come to the Arabic farm-hand in the Jewish colony to propagate his emancipation, the latter would naturally look at him with suspicion.

The Jewish workman has been aware of all this, and yet he approached the problem earnestly and honestly. Two factors prompted him to do so. In the first place, he was conscious of the fact that as long as the Arab will remain in his present condition, unorganized and a cheap laborer, he will be his dangerous competitor; but secondly, and mainly, it was the idealism inherent in the Jewish workman everywhere that was at work here, too. Here he faced a labor problem, difficult and unique, and perhaps the more attractive because of this. Was he not called upon to solve it? Would he prove untrue to the tradition of his fellow-workers elsewhere? Thus the question of organising the Arabic workman has become an outstanding feature in the proceedings of the conferences of the Jewish workmen, particularly those of the Socialist parties, in Palestine. And if the results of these deliberations have so far been very small, yet a beginning was made.

The beginning has naturally been made with the non-village Arabic workman. Of these, two classes come into consideration: those employed by the gov-

ernment, particularly on railroads, under the same conditions as the Jewish workmen, and those working in towns with non-Jewish employers, neither coming in direct competition with their Jewish fellow-workers. The first are naturally the more accessible to propaganda and organisation,—as they work together, and on the same footing, with the Jews. Very little propaganda, then, was needed in order to effect the organisation of the railroad men, Jews as well as Arabs.

Here, however, another serious problem was met with: What form shall this organisation assume?—the form of national unions, to be federated afterwards, or of a general union, regardless of nationality? This was not an idle question, as it looks on the face of it, a mere formal affair to be decided on at will. It was a question of highest import. The Jewish workman in Palestine does not aspire solely to further his own ends; he has also national interests at heart. He helps build the country not merely as a wage earner, but also as a free independent worker. And just here he is in touch with the bourgeois class. It is true that he creates things in his own style; but his cooperatives and institutions get subsidies from national funds, and he settles on national lands by the aid of national means. As an organised workman, he has, therefore, national interests that he cannot share with the Arabic workman. To be sure, the interests of the railroad workmen are not bound up directly

either with Jewish or with Arabic nationality; the question was not, however, of one particular trade, but of the tactics of the workmen as a whole. Should the members of both nationalities be organised in the same unions, there could consistently be no curtailment of rights of any member and no stopping short at any point whatsoever. Could any Arabic member of a union of farmhands, for example, be told, when a selection is to be made from its members to settle on Jewish national land: "You can go no farther; your rights end here"? If, on the other hand, the union principle be justly and consistently carried out, the Jewish people would rightly say: for ventures like this we could not and would not afford the means.

The solution lay, then, in the other direction, in organising the two nationalities into two separate federations united federatively. This procedure was actually proposed by some of the leaders at the conference where this issue was to be decided upon. But the Jewish railroad men stood under the influence of ultra radicals, and they resolved otherwise. It was even proposed by them that the name of the Jewish federation of labor called "The Organisation of the Jewish Workmen in Palestine" be changed simply into, "The Organisation of Workmen", in order that the doors be thrown wide open for the Arabs—a proposition that could not be and has so far not been accepted by the organisation. Yet the example of the railroad men was followed up also in other trades, where the few city Arabs who fell

in line share the benefits of the same unions with the Jews. It will, however, not be erroneous to assume, that this arrangement is merely transitory, Not only cannot the Jewish workmen afford, for the reasons set forth above, to follow up this policy, but even the Arabs will adhere to it only as long as they will remain in the capacity of disciples of the Jews. As soon as they will learn sufficiently the secret of organisation, they, too, will put forth a demand for separation, were it merely in order to be saved the torture of bilingual meetings.

What does this endeavor mean for the future of the Jewish workman, of the Jewish people as a whole, in Palestine? The fact that the Arabic workman has so far been dependent upon the initiative of the Jew need not necessarily be construed into a favorable omen for the future. In a country where two peoples stand in conflict with each other, the organised workman is not always impartial towards the other people. We have a glaring example in the attitude of the organised Polish workman towards the Jews in Poland. Will, then, the present alliance in Palestine lead to the much desired understanding between Jew and Arab, or does it mean, on the contrary, that here an organised force is being mobilised against the Jews in Palestine?

The Jewish workman does not stop to think about it; he does not try to pierce the mystery of the future. He is facing one of the most difficult labor problems, and he feels himself, in all earnestness, called upon to solve it.

CHAPTER XIII

THE JEWISH WOMAN IN PALESTINE

THERE is a sharp line of demarcation between the position of the Arabic and that of the Jewish woman in Palestine. The former has no social status. She is entirely subjected to the male part of the family: father, husband, or even brother. As a wife, she is the slave of her husband, whether she veils her face, as in the case of the city Moslem woman, or does not, as in the case of the village woman or the Christian Arabic woman both in town and in village. Humbled and often famished, she toils for him, fulfills respectfully even to the least of his desires, trudges patiently along, merchandise on head, beside the donkey, on which her husband, with the mien of lord and master, rides to the market, and is not admitted into the company of men. Add to all the fact that the Arabic woman is one of several wives to a husband, i. e., that polygyny, with all its evils, is prevalent among the Arabs, and you will have a fair idea of the position of the woman in Arabic society.

It is not for the sake of comparison with the status of the Jewish woman in Palestine that the picture was drawn above. Bondage and liberty are

not comparable terms. It was done in order to bring the situation of the Jewish woman into relief, to make it serve as a Rembrandtesque dark background, upon which the figure of the latter may be emphasized.

Jewish women in Palestine fall into two general classes: those of the "old settlement" and those of the "new." The former are a type that has come down from bygone ages and is still to be met with outside of Palestine, in smaller towns in Eastern Europe. The social status of this type of woman is rather low. In education, she is still, in a great measure, under the ban of the rule laid down by one of the Talmudic sages: He who teaches his daughter the Torah is likened unto the one who teaches her profanity." Only grudgingly is she given some education,—and this dissimilar to that of the man. As a wife, she is in some sort of subjection to her husband; but this subjection is not enjoined from the outside, as in the case of the Arabic woman,—it is rather self-imposed. Her husband generally treats her with respect, as his wife, as the mother of his children, as one bearing the brunt of life perhaps in a greater measure than himself, and at times even as the provider for the family, he being engaged in the study of the Law. Yet she is humble, feeling her inferiority to her husband out of religious consideration,—a natural feeling experienced by people in presence of those whom they look up to as their superiors. The Jewish woman of the Old Settle-

ment feels the superiority of her husband as of the one whom religion has given a grant of nobility, whom it has endowed with six hundred and thirteen Mitzwoth to her three, as of one versed in Jewish lore and standing nearer to God than she. Again, in society she plays no role, mainly because she has no ambition to do so. "The glory of the princess (the daughter of Israel) is within"; it is "within," in the house, where her ambition lies: to be a good wife and to rear God-fearing children.

This type of woman is, however, not maintained in its invariable traditional rigidity. A gradual but perceptible change is coming about under the influence of modern life, that pervades the country in ever widening circles. An unrest is felt among the younger generation of women. The atmosphere in the pale of the Old Settlement is becoming too heavy for them. Some break away, perhaps to join the nearest workmen's colony. "The wind is carrying them off, light is sweeping them away," as Bialik would say. Others may remain within the pale, but bearing in their hearts a secret longing for the enticements outside. As a whole, the type of the Jewish woman of the Old Settlement is in a state of transition, in the process of dissolution.

To this type belong also the women of the Yemenite Jews and partly the Sephardic women. The latter are, in outward appearance, a southern European type, with a luster of the eye acquired under the brilliant sun of Iberian skies. In Palestine,

the Sephardic woman looks like an exotic or, rather, like a cross-fertilized plant, half occidental half oriental, the effect of both climes being clearly marked off in her. And such is also her education as well as her social status. Education was not general with her till recently; wherever she enjoyed it, it was semi-oriental, covered with a French veneer. It was only recently that she began entering almost freely the modern Hebrew school, thus getting a normal education. As for her social status, she enjoys some social freedom within certain limitations. The Sephardic woman, too, is undergoing a social transformation, intermarrying freely with the Ashkenazi of the Old, as well as of the New Settlement.

An interesting case is that of the Yemenite woman. In Yemen she is almost on the same social level with the Arabic woman, the Yemenite Jew indulging, like the Arab, in the practice of polygyny. On coming to Palestine, she generally goes to serve in the house of an Ashkenazi. Here she learns Hebrew and cultured manners; she observes the mutual relations between husband and wife, and sees the kind of education given the children. All this does not remain without its influence upon her own domestic relations; it brings in a note of discord into the harmony of the patriarchal household of the Yemenite Jew and the polygynous practice, still prevalent with him. As a total result, polygyny seems to be disappearing, particularly

among the young Yemenite generation, which comes, on its part, too, under the influence of the cultural and monogamous environment.

Thus the process of assimilation, of welding together of the various Jewish elements in Palestine is naturally marked also among the women. This process of internal physical and cultural assimilation, however, going on between the various "ethnic" groups in Palestinian Jewry and tending towards the modern type, may be said to be rhythmic or graduated, at least as far as intermarriage is concerned. Intermarriage between Ashkenazi and Yemenite Jew, for example, does not go on directly; the cultural gap between them is too wide for that,—it goes through the Sephardi as a medium. The latter stands culturally between the two; hence he reaches out freely in both directions. Only a couple of marriages between Ashkenazim and Yemenites have so far been recorded,—and these between men of the former and women of the latter, a fact pointing towards the greater amenability of the Yemenite woman to culture alluded to above.

All the types of Jewish women so far described have, with all the advance made by them, no problems of their own, that is to say, they are not aware of any. They are generally good and obedient wives, looking up to their husbands as their superiors. They are busy toiling and house-keeping and caretaking of their children. They are

faithful mothers, though, in their ignorance and superstition, they frequently attempt the improvement of their children's spirituality at the expense of their mentality and the cure of their bodies at the expense of their health and even their lives. They are glad, however, to be let alone. They fight for no recognition in society. They demand nothing and get nothing, except the flotsam the current of societal evolution brings their way, or the rights fought out for women by their sisters of the New Settlement.

It is the woman of the New Settlement that has her problems, that fights for full recognition, for a social status equal to that of the man.

Palestine is a country where the political and the economic systems are still unsettled and where mores, social habits and attitudes are in process of creation. And just as the Jewish community in that country is on the lookout lest some precedence be established in its disfavor, so the Jewish woman is on the watch lest any social precedence prejudicial to her be established. Again, in other countries, where there is a traditional sanction for finery and well dressing and an established code of etiquette, the woman is likely to find ample compensation in finery for political rights, in social admiration for social justice towards her. In Palestine there is neither a hallowed tradition of finery or well dressing nor a code of etiquette in the relation towards women. Vanity, to be sure, is

likely to assert itself everywhere, and in Palestine, too, you will meet with bejeweled fingers, dangling earrings, and gaudy dresses. These, however, have hardly any chance, at least, not in the near future, of working their way into the social system, in a country where very little appreciation is shown them, where there is no need for elaborate dressing nor great economic opportunities for gaudiness and finery, and where the "lowly" do not look up to but look down upon their wearers.

Dress and finery, then, neither are nor can be the ambition of the modern Jewish woman in Palestine, or serve as a substitute for social rights and social recognition. Nor can social admiration be the object of her ambition. Social admiration for women is a mere tribute paid by the socially strong to the socially weak, by the superior to the inferior, as a compensation. The modern Jewish woman in Palestine may not have any economic advantages in the same measure as the man, but she is by no means imbued with a sense of inferiority. For is it not she who stands shoulder to shoulder with man, working together for the creation of a society that is still in its incipient stage? And these endeavors she will never consent to exchange for mere social applause. Nothing short of rights equal to those of the man will satisfy her.

And the Jewish woman in Palestine attained, in the New Settlement, to rights inferior to none in

any other country. Her education equals that of man. In the economic field, it is true, she is at a disadvantage. This, however, has nothing to do with curtailing her rights in principle; it is rather due to the eternal economic problem of man versus woman, of the handicap of the latter in the universal struggle for existence. Where economic opportunities are limited, as they are now in Palestine, they are liable to be wrested by man from the hands of woman. Such positions as are, in other countries, largely occupied by women, such as stenography and typewriting, are rather rare in Palestine, though constantly increasing in number, being limited to government offices and larger firms. The teaching profession, though open to women, is being overrun more and more by men, in proportion as we ascend the scale from the kindergarten to the highest class of the gymnasium, the former, however, being entirely in the hands of women. Store, shop, and factory offer a few trades and occupations to women; but they are hardly lucrative enough to serve as a great enticement for the latter. In the professions, such as medicine and dentistry, the women have a fair representation,—and here and there gain some distinction. Only in two occupations the woman need fear no competition: nursing in the hospitals and serving in a private family. The latter position is generally occupied by the less cultured elements, such as the Yemenite women, and is, as anywhere else, held in

contempt by the more advanced woman. Yet, even the latter has frequent recourse to it, perhaps as a transition stage to some other occupation, or even as an economic vantage ground, being a comparatively safe and well paid position.

The political status of the Jewish woman in Palestine is unequal. The law of the country, which is the Turkish law, colored by English interpretation, declares her the appendage of the male part of the family. Similarly the Jewish religious law, which is in force there in marital relations, still stands in all its rigidity towards her. The modern civil Jewish law, on the other hand, grants her full recognition, and the Jewish civil administration provides her with full political rights, such as the active and passive rights of vote.

Not without breaking a lance in war, however, did the Jewish woman in Palestine fight out her political rights. And it was not she alone that launched out. All progressive elements stood by her in her fight. It was around the Asefath Hanivharim, the congress of Palestinian Jewry, in particular, that the war was waged. The war was declared by the extreme right wing. The ultra-orthodox, of the type of "Agudath Israel," opposed the political rights of the woman to participate in the Asefath Nivharim, avowedly out of religious considerations. There is, to be sure, no written law prohibiting to sit with a woman at one meeting and hear her speak; but there is the unwritten

experience of a religious horror felt in her presence, —a horror to which Freud would probably give a not complimentary interpretation. The exclusion of the woman from the Asefath Nivharim was, therefore, a condition sine qua non on the part of the ultra orthodox, as regards *their* participation. At bottom, however, this religious non-possumus seems to have been a mere pretext; for at first their consent to participate had been obtained. Another factor than the religious one was obviously at work here. These people, composed mainly of the Old Settlement and used to a disorganised, chaotic public life, began to feel, after the congress had already become a fact, that they would be powerless in a democratic, organised Jewish congress, such as the Asefath Nivharim promised to be. However, the woman now became the casus belli, and as the Asefath Nivharim could not yield as regards a cardinal principle such as this, the ultra-orthodox stayed away from it.

But then came the second part of the drama. The "Mizrahi," the orthodox Zionist wing, now entered in and, on its part, made an issue of the participation of the woman in the Asefath Nivharim. Now, if there had been a doubt as to the motives of the ultra-orthodox party, there could be no semblance of one as to those of the Mizrahi. In the first place, the opposition of the Mizrahi to the woman's right of participation in a public meeting stands in contradiction to Zionist tradition,

and unless the Mizrahi abrogate its own right to participate in the Zionist congresses, from which no woman is barred as a member, its fight against the rights of the Jewish woman to participate in the Palestinian Jewish congress is a gross self-contradiction on its part. Secondly, the Mizrahi not only acquiesced at first in this right of the woman, but actually took part in the first two sessions of the Asefath Nivharim, woman and all. It was only at the third session, in the spring of 1925, that the issue was raised anew by the Mizrahi; and as the latter got no satisfaction, it seceded and joined the ultra-orthodox in a rival assembly.

The real motive of the Mizrahi thus became apparent, nay, it bubbled forth in a candid harangue by one of its spokesmen at the session of the Asefath Nivharim. The Mizrahi felt that it was a vanishing minority at the latter; it feared for its interests and it stood in need of the cooperation of the ultra-orthodox. And since it could not bring the mountain to itself, it betook itself to the mountain.

The question of the woman's rights in internal politics in Palestinian Jewry was thus, so to speak, a sort of Bosnia-Herzegovina, serving the purpose of lighting the fuse of the bomb of war, but in reality merely releasing the warlike tendencies that had been in the air. The figure of speech is perhaps too strong; but the fact is that the Mizrahi endangered, by its action, the unity of

the Jews in Palestine, so much desired even by the left wing of that Jewry.

Peace has, however, been patched up at the most recent session of the Asefath Nivharim, naturally on the basis of equality for woman,—an equality which has obviously come to stay in Palestine.

The most interesting phase, however, of the struggle of the Jewish woman for rights and recognition is that of the workingwoman within the organised body of workmen. Here is a social, economic, and political body, forming a well defined and well organised unit within Palestinian Jewry, and based upon theoretic and practical social justice; and yet there is an unrest, a dissatisfaction, a constant struggle on the part of woman within this unit.

What is the nature of this unrest? Surely, it is not oppression that the workingwoman rises against. She has as many rights within the workers organisation in Palestine as any other woman in any other group or party in or outside of that country. Nor is it life's burdens at which she chafes. She is ready to share the hardships of the workman; she has as much self-sacrificing zeal as he,—she is toiling as hard and suffering as much as he. You will find her work with as great devotion in the workers' institutions as the man. You will see her in the street preparing mortar for a building in the process of erection. You will notice her laying tiles on the floor of your new

house. You will meet her on the road sitting and breaking stones for the causeway. She is always ready, nay, she is happy to do all this. She did not come to Palestine merely to improve her economic condition. She came there to participate in the building up of the country, and in it to build up a working, creative community. But she came for something else besides: to build up her womanhood into humanhood,—to lead a life as independent as that of the man, to assert her individuality and give vent to a self-expression as freely as he.

It is herein where her problem lies. The perfect equality granted her in theory, in all solemnity and earnestness, is stinted her in practice. Through the fault of the workman? Not directly. Her own fate and limitations as a woman are rather to blame. She cries out for full equality in terms of all round work; but this *cannot* always be granted her, notwithstanding good will. The work of the woman in the field, for example, does not pay as much as that of the man; her work does not pay wherever great exertion is required. "Deficits" are the great problem of the workmen, particularly of the agricultural workmen, in Palestine, and the admission of woman to all-round work would mean all-round increase of these deficits.

The wrong felt by the workwoman as done to her is thus more imaginary than real. And yet there is room here for the male principle to assert itself. The weakness of the biologically weaker is taken

up with the arrogance of the stronger and exaggerated into a practice. Hence the woman is generally relegated, in the workmen's group, to the kitchen and the washboard,—a fact very much resented by the sensitiveness of the workwoman. And it is this sensitiveness that has given rise to a special woman's section within the workmen's organisation, as well as to a number of agricultural women's groups. The range of the latter, it is true, is not so wide as that of the men's or co-work groups. They limit themselves to the raising of vegetables, poultry and the like. But there is the satisfaction of utter independence, of freedom from the irksomeness of the eternal question of "relations."

There is one more problem that confronts the Jewish workwoman in Palestine, the workwoman under special conditions, namely, as mother. The problem is here twofold: there is, in the first place, again, the desire of the woman to be a useful, working member of the community, instead of staying home and simply attending to her child, and, then, there is the economic question of feeding another mouth, without another hand working for it. It was mainly to solve this problem that a system of children's nurseries has been created by the workmen's groups, thus leaving the mothers free to pursue their tasks as members of the group. This experiment belongs, however, in another connection, where it is discussed at greater length.

Thus the Jewish woman in Palestine fully participates in the building of the country, at the same time fighting successfully for social recognition and effecting the building up of her own personality.

CHAPTER XIV

JEWISH RELIGION

PALESTINE is the nursery of Judaism, the cradle of Christianity, the inspirer of Mohammedanism. It has been called "holy land" by the revealed religions and by the most cultured peoples on earth. It has been the goal of achievement of religious glory to the militant crusader, a shrine of pilgrimage to the humbler pilgrim, an object of prayer and religious longing to the orthodox Jew.

On the basis of all this, a recent Jewish writer argued that Palestine can become merely a religious center, but not a national home for the modern Jew.

This is one of those arguments that spring from the superficial conception of a historic fatalism that what has been will be, regardless of the new circumstances that have arisen and of the new social forces that have come into play under the new conditions. Judaism has maintained its identity for thousands of years, it argues, and it will continue to do so in the future, in spite of all adverse circumstances; Palestine has always been a country of deep religious content and it must continue to be so, to the exclusion of any other

import, despite the change of attitude on the part of the Jewish people towards it.

Well, the argument was refuted long ago, not by counter-argument, but by fact. Palestine has become to the Jew not merely a religious, but a national center. For the movement of returning to Palestine has been rather nationalistic than religious in sentiment. Now, the relationship between the theories of nationalism and of religion has had its history, and it would be consonant, I think, with the trend of the subject, to trace briefly this relationship.

The dictum of Moses Mendelsohn that the Jews are not a nation but a religious sect is well known. The first to oppose this view and to proclaim the nationality of the Jewish people was no less a personage than S. D. Luzzatto or, as he is known in Hebrew literature, by the abbreviated name, Shadal. To him, however, Jewish nationalism was co-terminous with Jewish religion. To speak figuratively, the two were to him like the obverse and the reverse sides of a coin, on the one of which is imprinted the motto, "In God We Trust," and on the other—the national value of the coin.

We need not dwell at length, in this connection, on the reform movement in Germany and the Haskalah movement in Russia, in the second and third quarters of the last century respectively. We may only say in passing that they were both religious reform movements,—the former being,

however, a distinctly anti-nationalistic movement, whereas the latter was a-national. It will be more to the purpose to point to another milestone in the evolution of the relationship between religion and nationality, and that is the view of the Hebrew novelist and publicist, Peretz Smolenskin. To him religion is not, as to Shadal, the kernel of nationalism, its essential feature, but it is only of equal importance to the latter. Figuratively speaking, the two are, according to his view, like the two rails of a railroad track, running parallel to each other, but both being of equal importance.

It is, however, with the publicist and national thinker Ahad Haam (Asher Ginsberg) that we reach the final stage in the evolution. Ahad Haam, namely, severed entirely the connection between religion and nationality in so far as there is mutual dependence between them. This is his contribution to Jewish national thought. Jewish religion, it is true, is the creation of Jewish nationality and is dependent upon it, but not vice versa. Jewish nationality embraces Jewish religion, just as it embraces many other national phases, but leads in itself an entirely independent existence. One may be a good Jew even if he be an infidel.

This view may be said to have been, consciously or unconsciously, incorporated in the tenets of Zionism. Otherwise, Zionism could not have been workable with the radical wing and perhaps with the majority of the center of the Zionist movement;

it would not have been workable even for an Ahad Haam or a Herzl, for a Nordau or a Lewisohn. And it is on this principle of separation of state from religion that the work of rehabilitation of Palestine by the Jews is now going on.

This, however, has not become clear to some religious Jews. The tacit understanding in the Zionist ranks, as to the severing of connections between nationality and religion and as to religious freedom in Palestine could not meet with their approval. They are shocked at the sight of irreligiosity here and there met with in the "holy land,"—so much so that their decision to make Palestine their permanent abode is shaken, at times, by it. If this be the prospect of Judaism in a rebuilt Palestine, is the whole movement worth while?

Psychologically, this attitude is quite natural. The religious Jew in the diaspora is still accustomed to regard religion as the strongest bond between Jew and Jew. In point of fact, religion had been serving this purpose till recently and is still serving it to a great extent. And so, even if the inclinations of this type of Jew are nationalistic, his nationalism is still in the stage where Shadal left it, namely, that it is unthinkable without Jewish religion. Hence, on coming to Palestine, his whole mode of thought receives the shock of a different reality,—a reality in which religion plays

the part of an important social phenomena, but not of an indispensable national requisite.

The fact is, however, that the religious Jew who would run away from Palestine because of this would be like unto one who would run away from himself. For, after all, he can find ample compensation for his dissatisfaction with religious conditions in Palestine, by being able to give full vent to his own religious sentiments there. In Palestine the religious Jew can observe the tenets of Judaism as in no other country in the world. He can send his children to the Hebrew school, where they may get a Jewish as well as a secular education, and need not fear, or fight vainly against, the influence of the Christmas present and the Christmas carol. He is not forced to send, with a troubled conscience, his children to the store or shop on the Sabbath; for factory and business place are everywhere closed on that day. In general, whatever is social in Jewish religion has entered, without any struggle, into the civil system of Palestinian Jewry. Saturdays and holidays are officially observed. In the Jewish civil court (the *Mishpat Hashalom Haivri*), Jewish law is given recognition—naturally in so far as it accords with modern life. Even Kosher meat has a semi-official recognition. In private observance of the religious tenets, however, absolute freedom is granted the individual.

In this respect, there is nothing more illuminating than the anecdote told of an old Jew, who, on

coming to Palestine and seeing a young man smoke a cigarette on Saturday, scolded the latter, in Yiddish, for the profanation of the holy day. The reply was: "Ivri daber ivrith" (Jew speak Hebrew). The significance of this anecdote does not lie, as some would interpret, in the irreligiosity of this young man and of young men in general in Palestine. For all you can tell, this young man may have had some religious ideals of his own, in spite of his violation of the Sabbath law. The significance rather lies in the fact that to this young man, as well as to many another, Jewishness has a stronger expression in the speaking of Hebrew than in some religious forms. Or, let me state it differently and in its fuller and broader signification: Judaism in Palestine finds its interpretation or, rather, its practical application, in a thousand and one ways. To the one it means orthodox religion; to the other it is Hebrew speech; to the third—the Jewish and human education of his children in the Hebrew school,—to the fourth it means perhaps a sparkling glass of wine from the Jewish wine-press in Rishon Lezion. As a matter of fact, no Jew living in Palestine is at all troubled by any of the multitudinous questions that harass the mind of the Jew in the diaspora as to what is Jewishness, what is Judaism, and what is Jewish religion. The sheer fact that he lives there and helps rebuild the country and readjust Jewish life is what constitutes his Jewishness, what justi-

fies it, what lends gist and zest to it, what makes it a palpable reality to him. And to no one in Palestine, except perhaps to a member of the "Agudath Israel," would it occur to deny Jewishness to any Jew whatever, be he as irreligious as he may, be he even a distant admirer of Jesus. The Hebrew novelist Brenner, with his article, published in a Hebrew magazine in Palestine, calling for more tolerance towards Jesus, and Klausner with his book on Jesus, published in Jerusalem, have roused less indignant comment in Palestine, than Wise with his quotation of Klausner in the diaspora.

Judaism in Palestine is thus developing along national rather than religious lines. And because of this, religion as such is kept out of most of the modern schools. Of all schools under the supervision of the department of education of the Zionist Organisation, which are the most modern in the country and which comprise nearly two thirds of all Jewish children there, only a small number has religion as a special subject in the curriculum, namely, those directed by the orthodox wing of the Zionist Organisation, the Mizrahi. The majority of the Zionist schools are non-religious. The Bible and the Talmud are taught there as literature rather than as religious books, and the Jewish holidays and Jewish customs rather as social than religious institutions.

Because of this ratio of religion to nationalism

we have rather interesting religious phenomena in Palestine, that we find nowhere else among the Jews. In the first place, religion has become there a political factor. In the diaspora, religion as such is entirely severed from politics, and the utmost the Jewish clergy can aspire to is to become a seelenversorger or a social leader, say, in the ethical sense of the word. In politics they are powerless; their profession is an inhibition to their participation in politics. In Palestine, on the contrary, the right wing in the Asefath Hanivharim, the congress of Palestinian Jewry, and in the Kehiloth, the communal diets, is clerical, led and controlled mainly by the clergy.

Palestine, however, is now witnessing a much more interesting religious phenomenon than a mere clerical party,—a phenomenon hardly ever witnessed in the diaspora. I am referring to the coming of the Hasidim, together with their Rabbis, to settle on land on the basis of self work and cooperative life. So far two such groups have settled in two colonies, in the valley of Jezreel, and some more are expected. This is a phase of Jewish religious life that Judaism has not experienced since the days of the Essenes, who flourished in the period of the second temple. There is, of course, as much difference between the ancient Essenes and the modern Hassidaic sect as history has had time to engrave changes in customs, habits, and general religious attitude. Women, for instance, are by no

means shunned by the modern Essenes as they were by their ancient prototypes. Ablutions and cleanliness of the body, too, which rose almost to the degree of a religious tenet with the latter, are left among the modern Essenes to personal taste and hygienic habits. But the same principle of living obtains in the activities of both: holy life welling out and connected with handiwork.

But what is the status of Jewish religion in Palestine? Should we exclude the Samaritans and the Karaites from the fold, because they drifted away too far from traditional Judaism,¹ Jewry in Palestine can hardly be divided into religious denominations. The religious differences between Ashkenazi and Sephardi, between these two and the Yemenite or the Persian Jew, can be defined merely as liturgic, arising out of local habit and custom, but not as theologic, as a difference in tenet or dogma. A division may rather be made on the basis of the degree of piety. In a division such as this, the Agudath Israel, for instance, a non-Palestinian product, but which found its adherents in Palestine, too, would stand at the head of the line, as the ultra orthodox, the most bigoted, intolerant, and Jesuitical organisation. Then the Mizrahi, a milder orthodox organisation, would follow. Then the other religious elements, varying in the

¹ It may be remarked that a great number of ardent Jews would by no means give them up so easily, and that the Zionists recently established a Hebrew school for the Samaritans at Nablus.

degree of adherence to law and tradition, would come, all of them, however, standing on the basis of orthodoxy,—until we would reach the most orthodoxly irreligious group, the workmen. Or we should be more justified in calling the latter, as an organised body, non-religious. For it must be said in their favor, as an indication of their political sagacity, and as another proof that Palestinian Jewry is now far removed from the stage of mere religious life, they do not concern themselves at all with matters religious. Hence the workmen's organisation in Palestine embraces also a wing of "religious workmen." Nay, even the Hasidaic groups mentioned above joined it, their rabbis being now and then chosen by the workmen's organisation as arbiters between the workers and their employers.

The religious status in Palestine may thus be presented graphically as a right triangle, divided by straight lines running parallel to the side and marking off trapezia to represent the various degrees of religious attitudes in Palestinian Jewry, the common base of which being, however, orthodoxy.

Why has there been no religious reform movement in Palestinian Jewry? Two main reasons may be adduced. In the first place, Palestine has been a religious center of attraction only for the orthodox Jew. The so-called Old Settlement is almost entirely composed of those whose parents or who

themselves came to Palestine to lead an orthodox life. Even the New Settlement has drawn largely from the orthodox class. The reform Jews have stricken Zion and Jerusalem out of their prayer book, and their rabbis were the first protestants against Zionism. Only in recent years has some change come about in this respect. The interest of reform Judaism in Palestine has thus been slight and hence its influence could hardly have been felt there. The other, and, probably, more cogent reason, is, that more vital problems now confront Palestinian Jewry than those of religion. The reform movement in Judaism arose during a time when Jewish religion was almost the sole expression of Jewishness and Judaism; at least, it so appeared to the west European Jews. And so the reform movement, purposing to readjust Jewish life in consonance with modern conditions, made the operation first of all in Jewish religion. In Palestine, as we have seen, Judaism is more expansive, spreading to the end of the national limits in all their manifestations. Here, too, a process of readjustment is now going on; but the process is hardly religious. It is rather economic, political, and cultural,—a process that will probably keep Palestinian Jewry and, for that matter, the Jewries of the world, busy for decades to come. And this fact will probably leave religion in Palestine for a time at its status quo.

From the discussion of the status of Jewish

religion in Palestine, the temptation is naturally strong to cross the boundary into the dangerous realm of speculation about the future of religion there. And yet the step must be taken, were it merely for the sake of rounding up the study of our subject.

Now, the evolution of Jewish religion in Palestine is being hampered at present not only by the two factors mentioned above, but by the further fact that with a great number of the Jews there orthodoxy has become worth while economically. In no other Jewry of the world is there such a portion of the population dependent economically upon orthodoxy and upon the orthodox sentiment of Jewry as a whole as in Palestine. I am referring to the institution of the *Halukah*, which has under its sway not only rabbis and Talmudic students, but also a large number of laymen, rich as well as poor, who get a share in it in proportion to their orthodoxy and their standing in the community. It is in the interest of the *Halukah*, therefore, to fight tooth and nail against any attempt at innovation in affairs religious, which would mean the jeopardizing of its very existence.

With all this, however, there probably will be room for progressive religion, when political and economic affairs will be more settled in Palestine, and a break in the solid wall of the *Halukah* and extreme orthodoxy will follow as a result. But, even then, progressive religion, if it will come at

all, will have to work its way circumspectly and patiently. The time for the entry of religious reform with the sounding of horns and beating of drums has passed. Besides, progressive religion will have to reckon with a strongly organised militant orthodoxy, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with the religious indifference, nay, the antagonism, if it will come to an open issue, on the part of the most earnest, wide awake, and enthusiastic, part of the young generation—the workmen in Palestine. The latter, who probably consist of the majority of the young generation there, have created a sort of religion of their own, which may perhaps be defined in the terms of Matthew Arnold's definition of religion, as "morality touched with emotion," or rather in the way Simmel sees religion sociologically, as a sort of oversoul. Their religion consists of faith rather than belief,—faith in the powers of nature, in their own organised strength, and in the realization of their ideals, but no belief in a superhuman being. Only here and there will you hear the faint cry of an intellectual for a higher type of religion. Taking all this into consideration, the higher type of religion will have to make its entry carefully and with moderate steps.

CHAPTER XV

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION

FROM all that has been said about Jewish life in Palestine, it can be gathered that something is being created there which is novel in Jewish life, that there is an expansion of activities not experienced by the Jewish people for the last nineteen hundred years. There is, of course, much to be criticised, much to be derogated in that life; you will discover in it the inconsistency of the novel settlement, the zigzag of the new experiment. But you could not deny that there is much selfness and originality in it.

What has been accomplished in Palestine till now has been done with great personal sacrifice, with the enthusiasm of pure idealism, with the tenacity of profound faith. Many obstacles have been removed, many gaps bridged over. Yet, what has been so far accomplished may be said to be a mere beginning. The Zionist question resolves itself, in the long run, into the question of a race for a majority in the country. Within the last few years it has been proven that the race can be won with some exertion, and it is this exertion that the Jews are now called upon to make. So far, however, the

greatest endeavor had to be made, and will have to be made for some time to come, to conquer the Jewish people itself, to overcome the indifference and the lack of belief in its own powers, to remove the prejudice against its ability to determine its own fate and to govern itself.

It is in self confidence and self help wherein the realisation of Zionism lies. Zionism may have, and does have, some grievances against the British government for ignoring its rights; it may have its demands to make upon the league of nations. To defend these rights, to make good its claims, Zionism, to be sure, must stand on its guard, the sharpest weapon available in hand. But those who put down as the basis of their Zionist program merely the *demanding* of these rights from others, employ the tactics of the typical Galuth Shetadlanuth (backstairs influence) in Jewish politics, and divert the attention of the people from the real source of political power, that of self-help, where-with rights are *gained*, to the "deceitful" source of putting up claims, though it be done with clenched fists and glistening eyes, with loud vociferations and cries of protest, without any real, basic power to back them. The mistake made by these people lies in the fact that they separate political from economic and social activities. They claim to be the disciples of Herzl, following in his footsteps, in stressing the political issues of Zionism. This is nothing novel in the movement; since

the days of Herzl, the political aspect has always stood in it versus some other aspect: education, culture, etc. The point is, however, that since those days the world has learned a lesson or so in political reality, to know that the self-reliance of a people and economic and social advantage are the surest road to this reality,—especially so in Palestine, where, as shown above, every step in economic progress is also a forward political move. Only with the gain of an economic and social vantage ground in Palestine, will the English official there be brought to regard Zionism in the right light, and only the increase of numbers there can give weight to political demands. He who, therefore, begins his Zionist program with political demands begins at the wrong end, faces about not in the right direction. It is the Jewish people in whose direction one should first and foremost face about, when the progress of Zionism is considered.

It is, however, precisely here that the difficulty lies. Not only has there been no proper response from the Jewish people, but even the Zionists now and then missed their chance. The year 1920-21 may serve as a glaring example. In April, 1920, the conference at San Remo decided on the rights of the Jews upon Palestine as their homeland. A whole year passed, however, before the boundaries of Palestine were determined upon, as if the powers were waiting for the response of the Jewish people, before taking the decision. However it be, had the

Jews known how to take advantage of the situation and thrown a few columns of settlers into Palestine, up the river Litanis, in the north, to the Horan, in the north east, to Transjordanian etc., these places would have remained the permanent boundaries of Palestine, just as Metulah, the farthest Jewish colony north, has remained the northern boundary. Moreover, the Jewish position thus strengthened, the attitude of officialdom would have been different from what it was, and there is reason to believe that there would have been no outbreaks against the Jews in 1921. Circumstances favored great action for Palestine. Never had the enthusiasm for Zionism been among the Jewish people at such a height as then; and it did not sound hollow. With a wise manipulation, this enthusiasm could easily have been exploited for the benefit of the movement. But instead we had the notorious dissension in Zionism during that year,—a dissension that extended both to the right and to the left wing, thus quenching the enthusiasm of the people and causing their interests in Palestine to lag. Very little was, therefore, done for the movement during that year, with the result, that the boundaries of Palestine were appocopated, the situation in the country became serious, Zionism experienced a drawback, and the Sisyphean work of rolling the stone upwards had to be begun again. This was the most serious slipshod case in the history of the work for Palestine. There were, however, numer-

ous minor cases of letting opportunities slip by,—cases that cannot be here enlarged upon, but that testify to an incapacity of grasping the situation, and even speak against the commercial and industrial ability of the Jews. Surely, *demand* cannot be of great weight under such circumstances!

In spite of all these drawbacks, however, the stone has since been rolled upwards, gradually, laboriously. It was principally the small number of Jews in Palestine, who, “With one of their hands wrought in the work, and with the other held this weapon,” made further and more rapid work possible. It was they who placed Zionism beyond the doubt of the experiment; and it is now for the Jews of the world to put it beyond the point of question, that is, to create conditions whereby Zionism should cease to be a problem, but become a reality. The real issue is not political but economic, and as such it rests with the Jewish people to bring it to realisation.

Jews from the diaspora visiting Palestine generally are willing to accord Palestinian Jewry the credit due it, expressing admiration for the work done by it. It is, however, an admiration not without an admixture of self-gratification for the share they themselves have had in this work. But this self-gratification is rather a dangerous affair, often running into overbearance, into overestimating one's share in the work for Palestine. The case is so particularly with the American Jews. I

recently had the opportunity of speaking to a couple of American Jews, who boasted of the great monetary assistance lent the settlement in Palestine, asking me, at the same time, not without interjecting some critical remarks, what was done with all the millions the American Jews are pouring into Palestine. When I declared that American Jewry is hardly doing anything for the rebuilding of that country, they opened their eyes wide with astonishment. Only after I had pointed out to them, that a whole year's contribution of American Jewry to Palestine is no bigger a sum than what is spent by the Jews of one city in America on a couple of indifferent institutions, and after I had shown them the immeasurable distance between what *is* done and what *should* be done, were they silenced into grasping the situation. It is an attitude such as displayed by these people with which the work in Palestine is generally approached. It is the attitude of people who are used to giving indiscriminately to this or that kind of charity, to this or that institution. It is the standard of the "social worker," but not of the one who dreams of building up a country and rebuild a people within it. Furthermore, even those who are of deeper insight, comprehending the work in Palestine in its full significance, mostly mistake the situation, thinking that the development of Palestine can be left to the mercy of an evolutionary process. The truth of the matter is that the work in Palestine cannot afford to

wait for "natural" developments; for natural developments would not go our way. Conditions there are neither like those in America at the time the Pilgrim fathers landed at Plymouth, nor like those of Palestine under the Turkish regime. We now are living through a period in which progress, though proceeding at a slow pace, is marked even in non-Jewish Palestine. This fact does not only mean that the game is becoming more difficult, but that the march forward involves greater expenditure, if it is not done quickly enough. The purchasing of land by bits, for example, signifies not alone buying at a retail price, but also the immediate raise of prices in the neighborhood and the leaving room for speculation. The gain, on the one hand, is thus outweighed by the loss, on the other.

Not in small instalments, therefore, is the historic debt to be paid Palestine, but in one large payment, in one great effort, as befitting the solution of the greatest problem in Jewish history. Time is certainly ripe for that. Never during the life in the diaspora has such an opportunity of acquiring Palestine been offered the Jewish people as at this moment. Politically, the country is entirely open to the Jews. The notion that political rights will first have to be fought out there is fundamentally wrong; it is economic progress that will do whatever fighting will have to be done. Economically, though a great part of the Jewries of the world has become impoverished as a result

of the war, there has never been so much riches among the Jews as now. The Jews of the world, with their three thousand millionaires in America and many more millionaires in other countries, would hardly become the poorer for rebuilding Palestine, even within the space of a decade.

Zionism is not a business undertaking, that can wait for developments; nor is it a social process, that is subject to a simple natural evolution. It is an urgent social and national problem, as live and acute as none that stared in the face of Jewry before,—and as such it demands its immediate solution.

APPENDIX

A CITY IN EVOLUTION (TEL-AVIV)

At the time the building of Tel-Aviv was contemplated, Jaffa was the chief center of the New Settlement in Palestine. Most of the immigrants entered through the port of this town, so that the latter came to be called "The Gate of Zion." Hence in Jaffa were centered the main offices of the institutions for the building of the country,—those of the Hovevey Zion, the Jewish Colonisation Association, the Palestine office of the Zionist organisation, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, etc. Besides, the Hebrew gymnasium was originally established in Jaffa, and the Gymnasium—was it not to play a great role in the building and the rapid development of Tel-Aviv? Such a role it played to some extent also for the pre-Tel-Aviv Jaffa.

With the crowding of the Jews in Jaffa, an oriental town, conditions of habitation became intolerable. Rental grew apace, and as for conveniences as a recompense, the Arabs, who were then, as they are now, the overwhelming majority of the property holders in Jaffa, are in this respect, as in all other respects, very conservative. The desire, nay, the necessity, thus arose to build a new and modern sec-

tion, which should provide fit and comfortable dwellings for those who came from the west and were used to such.

In August, 1906, the first meeting to discuss ways and means took place. So far ten members participated; but it was decided to increase the membership to thirty, before steps were to be taken to secure land.

The founders, among whom were teachers and officials, desiring to debar speculation, which was liable to creep into an undertaking such as this, from the very beginning, passed a resolution, "not to receive as a member one who was already in possession of a house in Jaffa, and so wanted to build more houses for speculation."

Negotiations were then made with the Zionist organisation, which promised a loan of a quarter of a million francs for the purchase of land. 150,000 square ells were thus bought in 1909, to the north of Jaffa, at 95 centimes (19 cents) an ell. It was decided that every member give 30 per cent of his lot for the building of streets, sidewalks, and city garden, and that modern improvements be introduced. At the same time, the Anglo-Palestine Bank made loans to members of Tel-Avid for the building of houses.

A characteristic feature of the building of this Jewish section was the placing of the Hebrew gymnasium in the center and in the most conspicuous place—to the architectural and hygienic detriment of the place. For, as the gymnasium stood, it made

the principal street, Rehov Herzl, hopelessly short and shut out the sea breezes from it. The tendency of the new settlement was, however, clearly indicated thereby: to place education in the center of its activity.

Characteristic of Tel-Aviv were also its building laws and the regulations of the place. Each building was to occupy only one third of the lot; the other two thirds were to be converted into a yard and a garden. Furthermore, Tel-Aviv was to be merely a residential section, a garden city; hence, business was to be kept out of the place, stores being permitted only in so far as they might keep the place provisioned, and this only in particular zones.

I have been all this time speaking of "Tel-Aviv"; the fact is that I only anticipated the name. For the new section adopted the name Tel-Aviv only in 1910, being the Hebrew name given to Herzl's utopia "Alt-neuland" by its Hebrew translator, N. Sokolov.

During that same year, Tel-Aviv was considerably enlarged by the addition of the new modern section Nahalath Benyamin, built to the north by members of more moderate means. There was also a considerable increase in population by the settling of people because of the conveniences and the greater educational facilities that Tel-Aviv was offering. Thus the latter was rapidly growing both in size and in population.

The example of Tel-Aviv roused that part of the Jews of Jaffa who lived in a section of their own,

situated beside Tel-Aviv, to introduce some improvements in their quarters, too. If they could not reshape their section after the model of Tel-Aviv, they at least managed to get from the latter a supply of water. Tel-Aviv also served as an example for modern Jewish sections to grow up around towns, such as Jerusalem, Haifa, etc. Thus Tel-Aviv became a factor in the modernisation of Palestine.

But then came the world war with its blighting effects. The war not only checked the growth of Tel-Aviv, but gave it a setback, nay, it threatened its very existence. Many an inhabitant was sent out of the country by the Turkish government, now freed by the war from the baneful effects of the "capitulation," or left of his own accord. The building of the town stopped and business was at a standstill. Tel-Aviv was in danger of starvation. But, on the other hand, the world war lent greater significance to Tel-Aviv, in that the latter became the center, the mouthpiece, the executive power, of suffering Jewry in Palestine. Till then the function was merely local: to solve the housing question, to arrange and organise other internal affairs. The war brought new duties to this first modern Jewish town in Palestine: to save Palestinian Jewry from starvation, nay, from utter ruin, to intercede for them with the Turkish government. Tel-Aviv was called upon to do all this as a town that had succeeded, within the few years of its existence, in gaining confidence and respect, as one that was more

organised than any other Jewish community in the country, as one, again, that had absorbed a great number of intellectuals and possessed the main offices of the organisations for the rebuilding of the country. It did so in spite of the constant suspicion, nay, the persecution of the Turkish government,—organising affairs in Palestinian Jewry, preparing wheat for the time of dearth, and arranging work for the workless. And so great was the confidence of people in Tel-Aviv, that its notes were accepted by Jew and Arab at their face value, at the same time that the Turkish pound was on the constant decline.

Finally, however, there came the expulsion of the Jews from Tel-Aviv as a port town. This event took place in 1917, on the eve of Passover. The people scattered north, south, and east, many never to return, because of the great suffering that will have befallen them. Only a dozen or so of people, among them the present writer, were left there, by permission of the government, and another dozen clandestinely, to guard the place.

The empty streets of Tel-Aviv now presented a dismal appearance. Previously full of people and ringing with song and merriment, they were now abandoned and desolate. Your eye would perhaps meet now and then with a stray dog, half mad with hunger, running about in search of food, or your ear might catch the miauling of a famished cat from behind a stone fence. Otherwise, you would have

the ghastly feeling of hearing the echo of your own footsteps or be roused from your despondent thoughts by the distant boom from the battlefield. The town looked as hollow as a graveyard, perhaps of a once wonderful but extinct race, yourself feeling as their last scion. But the watch was carried out to perfection; even the watering of the gardens was well attended to,—until at last Jaffa and Tel-Aviv were released by the British, and the return of the exiles was effected on the feast of the Maccabees.

With the end of the war, the purchase of land around Tel-Aviv assumed immense proportions and building began on an enormous scale. The building fever did not stop even with the riots at Jaffa, in 1921. On the contrary, during the summer following the riots, the largest building activity known in the history of Tel-Aviv prevailed. Some five or six hundred houses were then erected, composing entire sections. As if now of all times the question was as to who will outdo the other in the speed of building, the prize of the race being Palestine itself. But then there was the urgent need of leaving Jaffa, for the sake of safety, and of building quarters of the Jewish own, and this would naturally be in or around Tel-Aviv. However it be, Tel-Aviv grew in one summer to about twice its own size.

Another effect of the riots was the exclusive employment henceforth of Jewish workmen in the building trade. Up to that time the Jews were not discriminative in this respect. They employed

Arabic workmen very freely in Tel-Aviv, much more so than Jewish workmen. There was even a time when the Arabic watchmen were used exclusively. If for the employment of the Arabic workman there was merely the incentive of greater cheapness, there was the additional reason for employing the Arabic watchman, because the latter, it was thought, would know how to guard the Jewish settlement against thieves of his own people. The mistake, however, was immediately recognized. The Arabic watchmen proved very troublesome, and had to be dismissed. Not so the Arabic workman, particularly in the building trade; he was employed more extensively than the Jewish workman down to the riots in Jaffa, when he was entirely excluded in Tel-Aviv from the building trade.

Tel-Aviv thus became a center of Jewish workmen, remaining as such to this day. Moreover, as the main "Gate of Zion," absorbing three fourths of the immigration to Palestine, Tel-Aviv has not only kept up the building tradition, but has also established a number of industries, in which Jewish workmen are employed. The increase of the Jewish workmen there has thus kept pace with the development of the town.

Tel-Aviv has, then, experienced a rapid growth. From an area of some 30 acres, in 1909, it has grown to an area of 1135.78, in 1925, and to a still larger area in 1926. From a population of 500 souls, in 1909, to that of 35,000 in August, 1925; and if it

really absorbs, as stated in the official bulletin of the town, three-fourths of the immigrants to Palestine, it now has a population of *circa* 45,000, making Tel-Aviv about twice the size of Jaffa. A similar growth it experienced in the number of houses, which rose from 60, in 1909, to 2,700, in June, 1925, and in its budget, which amounted, in 1909, to \$700, and in 1925 to \$375,000, besides an extra budget for building purposes of \$125,000. Surely, the growth of Tel-Aviv has been phenomenal. But with the growth in extent and population, its problems have also grown. The pre-war Tel-Aviv had hardly any internal problems of any magnitude. Its main problem was perhaps how to keep the hand of the Turkish official off the management of the town. It was a residential section at that time, presenting the quiet characteristics of such. Its inhabitants were homogeneous: teachers, officials, business men. The workmen still lived, in their great majority, in the cheaper quarters of Jaffa itself; and had they lived in Tel-Aviv, they would not have raised any special problems, for they could hardly have had any issue around which to rally, no business or industry to speak of existing in the place at that time. Today, Tel-Aviv presents another aspect; it has now become a center of business and industry. Not only the business section, but even the residential section, is, with the exception of certain zones, replete with stores and shops. In 1925 some 3,000 workmen were engaged in its shops and factories, and some 4,000 more em-

ployed in the building trade,—almost all of whom being well organised and having their wonderful institutions centered in Tel-Aviv. There were, besides, in that year, 45 schools in the place, attended by 7,200 children and requiring a budget of some 200,000 dollars.

All this naturally offers its difficulties, presents its problems. There is the housing question. In spite of the building fever, there was a scarcity of dwellings in Tel-Aviv, in 1925, and accordingly a swing upwards of rental and of prices of real estate. It will, of course, be said that this is a private affair. So it is, in a great measure. But, then, the problem is right there, and it is after all in the interest of the town and of the country not to let speculation go too far. In point of fact, Tel-Aviv has taken steps, directly or indirectly, in this respect. There is, again, the problem of education, which is growing more and more acute with the influx of immigration. There are even now hundreds of children, who either do not get any education at all or get only a part day education or else retrovert to the education of the out-of-date Heder, because there is no sufficient provision for a modern Jewish school system.

An acuter problem by far is that of the relation between the workmen and the other classes of society. It is more acute, because it is not only economic but political. The workmen are the best organised body in Tel-Aviv, and, for that matter, in all Palestine. They are thus able to present a strong

united front economically as well as politically, say in the town elections. It was during the last year that the struggle between the workmen and the other classes came to the fore in Tel-Aviv,—a struggle that resulted in the withdrawal of the representatives of the property owners from the management of the town, which remained thereupon in the hands of the workmen and their supporters. And it must be said, parenthetically, that the latter have shown executive ability in the management of the town. They have been wise enough to understand that times are not yet ripe for meddling too much with private property in Palestine; but at the same time they have been energetic enough to introduce a number of improvements in town.

Finally, there is the problem of the relation of the town to the Palestinian administration. The complaint made against the English administration, that it shows partiality towards the Arabs, is not confined to the Jews of Tel-Aviv, but is general among the Palestinian Jews. Tel-Aviv, however, is confronted with special problems in this respect. It is true, that it was recognized, in 1921, as a township for itself, with the privilege of creating even a police force of its own. Yet, it is in many ways connected with Jaffa and is subject to it, though, as said, it is now about twice the size of the latter. The government offices are situated at Jaffa, and so is the port. And Tel-Aviv, which is supposed to get a share from the revenue of both towns, proportionate to its popu-

lation, has to fight at every step for it, and even then it is stunted her, though the greatest income of the government flows, as shown elsewhere, from the pockets of the Jews.¹

This is the story of Tel-Aviv in its growth and evolution. Its growth has been record-breaking both in its rapidity and in its influence, serving as a model for other sections to spring up in some old towns and bringing in a modern note into the near east. As to its future, there is reason for believing that it will remain an important cultural, commercial, and industrial center, even after the port of Haifa will have been built. One condition is, however, indispensable for its further growth and development, as for those of other Jewish towns in Palestine: the creation of a Jewish hinterland, a sound and healthy rural settlement, that will be able to back and support the Jewish town.

¹ After this had been written, the news came that Tel-Aviv was separated from Jaffa and became an entirely independent municipality.

DS126 .W2
Modern Palestine, Jewish life and

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00023 0476